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FAIR DEALING COMES OF AGE IN THE
REGULATION OF GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
Carole B. Silver*
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of going private transactions, particularly cash out mergers
in which minority shareholders must take cash for their stock,, has been the sub-
ject of considerable debate over the last several years.2 Such transactions are in-
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and comments and criticisms made by Professor J. William Hicks of Indiana University School of
Law and John M. O'Hare, Esq. The author also would like to thank Dean Lewis M. Collens,
IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Michael Hyatte, Esq. for their review of drafts of the article,
and Mr. Dean Dornbos for his valuable research assistance.
1. A going private transaction is a transaction designed to eliminate public shareholders from
equity participation in the company. It may be accomplished in a variety of ways, such as by merger,
sale of assets followed by dissolution, liquidation, or reverse stock split. This article will consider
the notion of fair dealing principally in the context of a cash out merger.
A cash out merger is a going private transaction in which a less-than-wholly-owned subsidiary
is merged into its parent or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent, and the consideration received
by the public minority shareholders of the subsidiary consists entirely of cash. The minority shareholders
of the subsidiary corporation are "cashed out" or eliminated from equity participation in the surviving
corporation. The same transaction can be accomplished by an individual or group of individuals who
own a controlling interest in the company rather than by a corporate majority shareholder.
The essence of a freezeout is the displacement of public investors by those who
own a controlling block of stock of a corporation, whether individuals or a parent com-
pany, for cash or senior securities. The public investors are thus required to give up
their equity in the enterprise, while the controllers retain theirs. Freezeouts most com-
monly take the form of a merger of a corporation into its existing parent or into a
shell corporation newly formed for the purpose by those who control the merged entity.
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Restatement].
This article deals only with cash out mergers of publicly held corporations (i.e., corporations
subject to the reporting requirements of § 12(g) or § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78o (1982)).
The term "cash out merger" is intended to by nonprejorative; other labels for this kind of
transaction are take out merger, freeze out and squeeze out. See infra note 12 (discussing proposed
classifications for such transactions).
2. See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
987 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporation Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares]; Restatement, supra note 1; Carney, Shareholder
Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983
AM. B. FOuND. R. J. 341; Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982); Goldman & Wolfe,
In Response to A Restatement of Corporation Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1979); Greene,
Corporation Freeze-out Mergers: A proposed Analysis, 28 STAr. L. Rav. 487 (1976); McBride, Delaware
Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company,
33 Bus. LAW. 2231 (1978); Robinson, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 6 N.C. L. REv. 515
(1983); Rothschild, 'Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3: What are the Standards for Fiduciaries?,
7 SEc. Rao. L.J. 195 (1979); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 624 (1981); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REv.
1101 (1978); Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co.: Delaware Imposes Restrictions on Freezeout Mergers,
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herently suspect because a single party stands on both sides of the deal. On the
one hand, the majority shareholder, when acquiring the subject company, is the
purchaser of the minority's stock. On the other hand, the majority shareholder
represents the company being acquired and all of its shareholders in the transac-
tion, either directly or through management that is under the majority's control.3
As a result of its dominance of the subject company and its presence on both
sides of the transaction, the majority shareholder often has the ability to establish
unilaterally the terms of the transaction. The position of the majority shareholder
on both sides of the transaction and its consequent power to dictate the terms
of the deal combine to create the likelihood that the majority shareholder will
exercise that power to its own advantage and to the corresponding detriment of
the minority shareholders.' Such a potential for unfairness to the minority has
led some to suggest that going private transactions should be absolutely prohibited,5
while others have been content to protect the minority simply by ensuring the
availability of appraisal rights.'
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently considered how best to regulate
going private transactions.' Delaware has generally judged all self dealing trans-
actions, including going private tansactions and cash out mergers, against a stan-
dard of entire fairness.8 As applied to going private transactions, entire fairness
originally was interpreted as requiring only that a fair price or exchange ratio
66 CALIF. L. REv. 118 (1978); Comment, Going Private: An Examination of Going Private Trans-
actions Using the Business Purpose Standard, 32 Sw. L.J. 641 (1978).
3. [In a going private transaction where management is the purchaser, the problem] is that
[m]anagement is acting on both sides of the transaction. In its fiduciary capacity, manage-
ment is seeking to sell the corporation and, therefore, must have concluded that a sale
is in the best interests of the shareholders. In its proprietary capacity, management is
seeking to purchase the corporation, and must have concluded that it can do so at a
price favorable to it. In short, management is dealing with itself.
Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, Legal Times of Washington, Oct.
10, 1983, at 15, col. 3. The transactions discussed by former Securities and Exchange Commissioner
Longstreth can be distinguished as involving only one business entity in contrast to other cash out
mergers where two viable businesses combine; see infra note 12. See also infra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the fiduciary duty of a majority shareholder).
4. The use of control by a majority shareholder to gain an advantage to the corresponding
detriment of the minority shareholders constitutes self-dealing. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717 (Del. 1971); Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261, 265 (Del. Ch. 1982).
See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; c.f. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 15, 20.
5. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 2, at 495-96, 512-13, who proposed prohibition of going
private transactions involving only one corporate business entity; Brudney, Equal Treatment of
Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALi. L. Rav. 1072, 1091-98, (1983)
who urged formal and substantive equal treatment for all shareholders, absent compelling benefits
from disparate treatment. See also Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 49-50, 342
A.2d 566, 574 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1975) (involving a proposed management buyout which the
court enjoined); Gabbart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (involving a
squeeze out in a closely held corporation; the court held that a merger accomplished without a valid
corporate purpose should be treated as a dissolution, and governed by the statute regulating voluntary
dissolutions). Cf. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 21, col. 2 (indicating that even procedural safeguards,
such as those discussed in this article, are "inadequate to give shareholders full value for their shares.").
6. See, e.g., Berger and Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses
Singer, 39 Bus. LAW 1, 10 (1983); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 11, 187 A.2d
78, 80 (1962); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
7. Delaware corporation law is influential far beyond the boundaries of the state. The Delaware
judiciary has the opportunity to address many issues of first impression in interpreting the law govern-
ing Delaware corporations, and its opinions are considered persuasive by courts of other jurisdictions
when faced with the same or similar issues.
8. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
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be offered to the minority shareholders for their stock. 9 But in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., O the Delaware Supreme Court held that entire fairness required not
only that a fair price be paid to the minority shareholders for their stock, but
also that the majority shareholder accord fair treatment to the minority in ac-
complishing the transaction."
This article will analyze fair dealing, the procedural aspect of the entire fairness
standard, in the context of going private transactions between publicly held parent
and subsidiary corporations.12 In Part I, the theoretical basis of the duty of fair
9. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
10. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). For a description of the facts in Weinberger, see infra notes
52-66 and accompanying text. The three Weinberger decisions-409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979), 426
A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), and 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)-will be referred to as Weinberger, Weinberger
11, and Weinberger, respectively.
11. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
12. It is assumed that going private transactions ought to be permitted and that some form
of regulation of such transactions is required for the protection of minority shareholders and the
preservation of the integrity of the securities markets. For an interesting discussion of whether such
transactions should be permitted and, if so, under what circumstances, see Brudney, supra note 15;
Carney, supra note 2; Greene, supra note 2; Easterbrook and Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
Proposals have been made to divide going private transactions into three groups and then regulate
them according to the class to which they belong. Under this classification scheme the Type I transac-
tion consists of situations in which the acquiring company's initial investment was by way of tender
offer for all of the outstanding shares of the acquired corporation. After the acquiring company
gained control, it would eliminate the minority shareholders of the acquired corporation by voting
its majority stock interest in favor of a merger of the controlled corporation into the acquiring cor-
poration, in which the minority shareholders would be paid cash or other consideration. Greene, supra
note 2, at 491-92. In order for a transaction to be classified as a Type I cash out, one commentator
proposed that the second step cash out merger must be accomplished within one year of the original
acquisition of control. Id. at 492 n.18.
[T]he two steps in the acquisition-tender offer plus merger-are integrated and repre-
sent a "plan." . . . Although the tag-end merger appears to be an example of self-
dealing by the majority stockholders, it is only superficially of that class. Realistically,
the tender-plus-merger procedure is merely a way of bypassing the target company's
proxy machinery, which is controlled by the incumbent board, and submitting the
acquisition proposal to direct referendum of the stockholders.
Restatement, supra note 1, at 1360 (footnote omitted). But see Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2,
at 692-94.
A Type II going private transaction differs from a Type I transaction in two principal respects.
First, the original investment is accomplished pursuant to a tender offer for less than 100% of the
outstanding shares of the acquired company. Second, the subsequent cash out merger is effected more
than one year after the tender offer. Greene, supra note 2, at 492-93. Greene argued that the likelihood
of an unfair price being paid to the cashed out minority shareholders in the second step merger was
greater in a Type II transaction than in a Type I transaction, in part because "as the time between
steps [of acquisition] increases, valuation becomes more difficult, because the arm's-length price paid
in the first step [i.e., the tender offer] has little bearing on the value of X [the acquired corporation]
at the time of the merger." Id. at 509. He therefore concluded that a Type II cash out should be
subject to stricter regulation than a Type I cash out. Id. at 510.
A Type III going private transaction involves only one business, and the majority or controlling
shareholders of the corporation simply merge the company into a corporate shell created for the pur-
pose of merging and owned 100% by the controlling shareholders. The minority shareholders of the
business corporation are paid cash for their stock, and are eliminated from participation in the surviv-
ing company. Id. at 495. Greene proposed that Type III transactions be prohibited. Id. at 512.
Consistent with Greene's focus on the period of time between the original acquisition of control
and the subsequent cash out merger, Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1983), which regulates going
private transactions involving companies subject to the federal securities laws (see infra note 16), excepts
from its application going private transactions occurring within one year from the date of a tender
offer in which the majority shareholder acquired its controlling interest. Id. § 240.13e-3(g)(1). The
1984]
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dealing will be discussed. 3 In general, procedural fairness is viewed as a means
of obtaining substantive fairness. When the decision-making process in a going
private transaction resembles an arm's length bargaining process, the result of
the process-the substantive terms of the transaction-may be considered fair on
the assumption that it will resemble the result of an arm's length bargaining
process.
In Part II, the elements required to fulfill the duty of fair dealing are con-
sidered. The Weinberger opinion is the starting point for the discussion, since
it includes a significant enunciation of the principle of fair dealing,' although
it is not the first exploration of the elements of procedural fairness in the law
of Delaware. From time to time, Delaware courts have considered conduct relating
to one or more of the elements of fair dealing as indicative of the presence or
absence of self dealing. In addition, other states' statutes and administrative
regulations 5 governing going private transactions will be discussed to the extent
that they address the notion of procedural fairness.
As a comparison to state law, this article will also consider whether the
elements of fair dealing are relevant to the regulation of going private transactions
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) under Rule 13e-3
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).' 6 This regulation requires
Rule conditions the exception on the existence of the following:
That the consideration offered to unaffiliated security holders in such Rule 13e-3 trans-
action is at least equal to the highest consideration offered during such tender offer
and provided further, that:
(i) If such tender offer was made for any or all securities of a class of the issuer.
(A) Such tender offer fully disclosed such person's intention to engage in a Rule
13e-3 transaction, the form and effect of such transaction and, to the extent known,
the proposed terms thereof; and
(B) Such Rule 13e-3 transaction is substantially similar to that described in such
tender offer; or
(ii) If such tender offer was made for less than all the securities of a class of
the issuer:
(A) Such tender offer fully disclosed a plan of merger, a plan of liquidation or
a similar binding agreement between such person and the issuer with respect to a Rule
13e-3 transaction; and
(B) Such Rule 13e-3 transaction occurs pursuant to the plan of merger, plan of
liquidation or similar binding agreement disclosed in the bidder's tender offer.
Id. See also IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (Supp. 1983) (requiring that a second step cash out merger,
accomplished within two years of the original acquisition, offer to the shareholders terms substantial-
ly equivalent to those offered in the original acquisition); infra text accompanying note 205. This
article deals primarily with Type II transactions.
13. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Wisc. ADMiN. CODE §'SEC 6.05 (1980); IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101, 1101.1 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1984).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1983). The disclosure requirements of the Rule are contained in
Schedule 13E-3, id. § 240.13e-100.
As a result of the responses received by the SEC in connection with its Notice of Public Fact-
Finding Investigation in the Matter of Beneficial Ownership, Takeovers and Acquisitions by Foreign
and Domestic Persons, Securities Act Release No. 5526, 5 SEC DOCKET 115 (1974), as amended by
Securities Act Release No. 5538, 5 SEC DOCKET 406 (1974), the Commission in 1975 began rule-
making proceedings regarding going private transactions involving publicly held corporations, Securities
Act Release No. 5567, 6 SEC DOCKET 250 (1975), which eventually led to the adoption of Rule 13e-3.
The SEC initially proposed to regulate the substance of going private transactions as well as the disclosure
of such deals. Proposed Rules 13E-3A and 13E-3B would have required that any going private trans-
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disclosure of certain types of information to the minority shareholders of a con-
trolled corporation about to be taken private. Information is required to be dis-
closed because the SEC considers it to be significant to the public minority
shareholders. And significance in many instances means that the information reveals
whether or not the majority shareholder exerted its control over the represen-
tatives of the minority shareholders. Therefore, if information is required to be
disclosed under Rule 13e-3, the conduct underlying the disclosure may be signifi-
cant to the procedural fairness of the transaction.' 7
Finally, in Part III the question of the continued significance of the notion
of fair dealing is addressed. The Weinberger court determined that fair dealing
is important both as evidence of substantive fairness'8 and for purposes of deciding
who bears the burden of proof on the issue of fairness, 9 but the court left open
the question of whether procedural fairness must be provided in addition to
substantive fairness.
The position developed in Part III of the article is that procedural fairness
is important both in and of itself and as a means to a desired end. As a means
to an end, procedural fairness is the best way to obtain substantive fairness before
the transaction is accomplished. 20 An ex ante determination of fair value is im-
portant to both the minority and majority shareholders. Appraisal, therefore, as
an ex post valuation process, is inadequate as the sole test for substantive fairness.
Furthermore, fair dealing defines fair value as between the parties to the trans-
action accomplished pursuant to their terms be substantively fair. Id. at 265. Similarly, the 1977 ver-
sion of proposed Rule 13e-3 also addressed the substantive fairness of a Rule 13e-3 transaction. Securities
Act Release No. 5884, 13 SEC DOCKET 839, 851 (1977). But the SEC decided to forego regulation
of the substantive fairness of a Rule 13e-3 transaction in 1979, when it adopted the final version
of Rule 13e-3. The Commission indicated that it would defer to the states, at least temporarily, on
the issue of substantive fairness. Securities Act Release No. 6100, 17 SEC DOCKET 1449, 1450-51
(1979). Current Rule 13e-3 regulates going private transactions only by requiring disclosure of certain
types of information. 17 C.F.R. § 240-13e (1983).
If Rule 13e-3 had been in effect when the Signal-UOP merger was proposed, the transaction
would have been subject to the Rule. The Rule applies to any purchase of securities in connection
with a merger by an affiliate of the issuer, if the transaction would result in a class of securities
registered under §§ 12(g) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78o(d) (1982), being
held by less than 300 people or in the delisting or cessation of quotation on a national securities
exchange or the over-the-counter market. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3)(ii) (1983). An affiliate is defined
in Rule 13e-3(a)(1) to include a person who controls the issuer, so Signal would have been an affiliate
of UOP. Moreover, since UOP's common stock was registered pursuant to § 12(g) of the Exchange
Act, UOP would have been a Rule 13e-3(b) issuer and, therefore, subject to the anti-fraud provisions
of Rule 13e-3(b)(1) as well as the requirements of subsections (d), (e) and (f}. Finally, the Rule would
have applied to both Signal and UOP; Signal, as the purchaser of equity securities of its affiliate,
and UOP, as the solicitor of proxies in connection with a merger with its affiliate. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 17719, 22 SEC DOCKET 783, 789 (1981).
In Fisher v. Plessey Co., Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case challenging an issuer
tender offer subject to Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1983), the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York found a private right of action for damages under Exchange Act
§ 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982). Similar reasoning might be applied in a case challenging a Rule
13e-3 transaction. See Securities Act Release No. 5884, 13 SEC DOCKET at 857 (1977) (SEC intends
for private right of action to be implied for violation of Rule 13e-3).
17. See Longstreth, supra note 3, at 19 ("As so often is the case, these items of disclosure
[in Rule 13e-3] have tended to encourage the use of the practices required to be disclosed. This is
no accident. When the commission backed away from a substantive rule of fairness, it sought to
achieve the same goal through the detailed disclosures required by Rule 13e-3.").
18. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
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action. Just as the substantive result of arm's length bargaining carries a presump-
tion of fairness, so the result of fair dealing carries a presumption of fairness.
Fair price, as between the majority and minority shareholders, is simply that
amount which each side accepts voluntarily and with knowledge of all relevant
information. Since fair price is a relative concept rather than a number pulled
out of the sky, requiring fair dealing will increase the likelihood that the selected
price is inherently fair.
But even where a third party determines, after the fact, that the price paid
to minority shareholders was indeed fair, as in an appraisal proceeding, the
minority shareholders still should be entitled to fair treatment.2" Support for this
proposition is gained by analogy to the federal securities laws. Just as a board
of directors laboring under a conflict of interest may be an inadequate represen-
tative of the corporation for disclosure purposes under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, 2 so a board tainted by loyalty to the parent company
should be considered incapable of representing the corporation in a transaction
with the parent. Under such circumstances, the minority shareholders or their
representatives should step into the shoes of the subsidiary corporation for pur-
poses of consenting to a deal with the parent. Furthermore, where the subsidiary's
consent to the transaction is obtained without providing fair dealing, the consent
should be considered ineffective regardless of the substantive fairness of the deal.
Substantive fairness has been held to present no defense to a claim that shareholder
approval of a transaction was procured by misrepresentation in violation of Rule
14a-9 of the Exchange Act.23 It can be presumed that the absence of fair dealing
would contribute towards obtaining the approval of the transaction, so such ap-
proval should be disregarded.
The right to fair dealing, regardless of fair value, is also supported by policy
considerations.2" Such a right, at a minimum, would work as an incentive to the
majority shareholder to fulfill its duty of fair dealing regardless of the majority's
perception of the fairness of the price paid to the minority. And to the extent
that the majority shareholder treats the minority fairly, the chance of substantive
fairness resulting from the dealing between the parties will be increased. The arti-
cle concludes that fair dealing should play a major role in regulating self dealing
transactions, and offers some suggestions for how best to use the duty of fair
dealing to ensure its effectiveness.
PART I
Fair Dealing and the Entire Fairness Test
The term "fair dealing" was first used by the Delaware courts to describe
a part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by a director to their corporation.25
The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate fiduciary from engaging in a self deal-
21. See infra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). See infra cases cited in notes 251-60
and accompanying text.
23. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970). See infra notes 240-50 and
accompanying text.
24. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
25. In Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 389, 118 A. 1, 3 (1922), the court first held that
the directors of a corporation owed a duty of fair dealing to the stockholders of the company. See
also Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938); Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp.,
16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 A. 54 (1928).
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ing transaction which results in a benefit to the fiduciary and a corresponding
detriment to the corporation. When a director, in his individual capacity, con-
tracts or otherwise deals with his corporation, the duty of loyalty requires that
he act with the "utmost good faith and fair dealing" in his relations with the
company.2 6
The duty of fair dealing also has been imposed upon majority shareholders
as part of the duty of loyalty owed by them to minority shareholders. A majority
shareholder who enters into a transaction with the corporation it controls must
"follow a course of fair dealing toward the minority shareholders." ' 27 Fair deal-
ing is required in such cases because the majority shareholder stands on both
sides of the transaction. It represents its own interest, on the one hand, and directs
the actions of the corporation by virtue of its controlling stock ownership in-
terest, on the other hand.
Until recently, when Delaware courts used the term "fair dealing," they used
it literally and without elaboration. The duty of fair dealing meant simply a duty
to deal fairly, to treat the corporation or its minority shareholders in a fair manner
in the context of a particular contract or transaction. Specifically what was re-
quired of the director or majority shareholder to constitute fair treatment was
an open question.2"
In Lofland, the directors of the Lewes Fisheries Company were sued for breaching their fiduciary
duties by voting themselves salaries when neither the certificate of incorporation nor the by-laws
authorized the payment of salaries to directors. The duty of loyalty, and, as part of it, the duty
of fair dealing, was discussed because the directors were "on both sides" of the transaction: they
acted as directors on behalf of the corporation in voting to approve the salaries and acted in their
own interests as recipients of the compensation. Lofland, 13 Del. Ch. at 393, 118 A. at 5.
Before deciding Lofland, the Delaware Supreme Court used the term "fair dealing" in Model
Heating Co. v. Magarity, 25 Del. (2 Boyce) 459, 477, 81 A. 394 (1911), in the sense of general good
business practices and commercial honesty. Fair dealing has been similarly used in subsequent cases.
See, e.g., VCA Corp. v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19554 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Burris Foods,
Inc. v. Dept. of Community Affairs and Economic Dev. (Del. Ch. April 2, 1975); Data Gen. Corp.
v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc. (Del. Ch. November 7, 1975).
26. Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 389, 118 A. 1, 3 (1922). See also Petty v. Penntech
Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975). The plaintiff, a shareholder of Penntech, sued to
enjoin the directors from selectively redeeming shares of Penntech preferred stock for the purpose
of perpetuating their control of the corporation. The court discussed the duty of fair dealing owed
by the directors, citing Lofland, in connection with its finding that it was improper to use corporate
funds to perpetuate control regardless of authority for such selective redemption in the statute or
charter. Id.
27. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 921 (Del. Ch. 1969), modified, 280 A.2d 717(Del. 1971). Cf. St. Louis Union Trust v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,151, at 92,203 (8th Cir. 1977) (fiduciary duty of fair
dealing was not breached by the enforcement of a call, where enforcement was triggered by an event
outside the control of the defendant); Leibert v. Grinnell Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 340, 345, 194 A.2d
846, 849 (1963) (Defendant used a contract with an independent third party as a guide to establishing
the terms of a contract with its controlled subsidiary, to avoid "the vices of self-dealing implicit
in [its] position as the majority stockholder ...").
28. See supra cases cited in notes 25-27. Of all the cases considered, the opinion of Chancellor
Duffy in Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 261 A.2d 911, 919 (Del. Ch. 1969) came closest to defining
fair dealing. In discussing the fact that the majority shareholder, Sinclair, chose to do business with
its subsidiary, the court said: "Sinclair voluntarily took on a fiduciary duty. To meet that obligation
it could have installed a truly independent board and had it done so the business judgment test might
have been dispositive of most of the case. But Sinclair elected not to do that." Id. On appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court's rejection of the applicability of the business judg-
ment rule. The Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule was the applicable standard unless
there was both a fiduciary relationship and self-dealing which caused the majority shareholder to
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,29 the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a duty
of "fair dealing," as it had in the past, upon the majority shareholder in a parent-
subsidiary transaction. The Weinberger court, however, did much more than simply
recite that the parent owed a duty of fair dealing to the minority shareholders
of the subsidiary. It gave content to the term "fair dealing" by delineating specific
acts and practices which it would consider relevant in assessing whether or not
the duty of fair dealing had been satisfied. By supplying meaning to the two words,
"fair dealing," the Weinberger court gave the concept of fairness in dealing new
importance.
The court also identified the notion of fair dealing as part of the Delaware
standard of entire fairness. 30 The entire fairness standard is the legal test used
to judge cases in which a breach of the duty of loyalty is charged. This standard
requires a director or majority shareholder, when entering into a transaction with
the corporation, to bear the burden of proving the transaction's entire fairness
to the corporation or its minority shareholders.' In placing the burden of proof
on the director or majority shareholder, application of the entire fairness test means
that the transaction is presumed to be unfair. 2 Unfairness is presumed because
receive a benefit to the detriment of the minority shareholders. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
In discussing the unsettled state of the law when the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), but had not yet issued its opinion, reversed
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), one commentator stated: "it might be possible to defeat a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction by emphasizing business purposes, obtaining independent appraisals,
having the independent directors of the controlled corporation handle the negotiations, allowing the
vote of a majority of the public stockholders to determine the outcome, and perhaps giving a pre-
ferred stock or a debenture instead of cash." Silberman, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts and Going
Private Transactions, An Overview (Panel), 32 Bus. LAw. 1489, 1494 (1977). Interestingly, many of
the factors relevant to fair dealing were identified there. See infra text accompanying notes 92-96,
110-58, and 208-23. See also Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standards of Fairness of Merger Terms under
Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CoiP. L. 44, 46-47 (1977) and Richards, Protection of Majority Interests,
4 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 728, 728-33 (1979).
29. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The transaction at issue in Weinberger was a cash out merger
of a less-than-100% subsidiary, UOP, Inc., into its parent, Signal. See supra notes 1 and 12.
30. "The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price." Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 711.
31. The Weinberger court explained the "entire fairness" standard as follows:
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness
of the bargain. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., Del. Supr., 91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (1952).
The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both
sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
Del. Supr., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., Del. Ch., 256 A.2d 680,
681 (1969), aff'd, Del. Supr., 278 A.2d 467 (1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
International Inc., Del. Ch., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (1968).
Id. at 710.
The standard of "entire fairness" was originally applied to a merger of a subsidiary into a
parent corporation in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110
(1952). The merger in Sterling was not a cash out; stock of the parent company was the consideration
paid to the minority for their shares in the subsidiary. Id. at 297, 93 A.2d at 109.
32. The starting position for a court is the result which will be required if the burden of proof
is not met. Here, that result is a finding for the plaintiff, so the starting position is to assume that
the transaction is unfair. See Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 556, 559
(1973) (explaining that a presumption that responsibility follows from a certain proposition is rebut-
table: "the plaintiff has given a reason why the defendant should be held liable, and thereby invites
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the director or majority shareholder has the ability to exert influence in establishing
the terms of the transaction due to his position on both sides of the deal and,
as a result, he has the power to impose terms which are favorable to him but
detrimental to the corporation or its minority shareholders. 3
In cases involving going private transactions, Delaware courts historically re-
quired only fair value to satisfy the entire fairness standard.3 4 That is, the inquiry
under the entire fairness test was limited to whether adequate consideration was
paid by the parent to the subsidiary's minority shareholders for their stock. If
the majority shareholder paid fair value, then the transaction was held to satisfy
the standard of entire fairness. Thus, while expressed in broad terms, in practice
the test had a quite narrow application, going only to the matter of price.
the defendant to provide a reason why, in this case, the presumption should not be made absolute.
The presumption lends structure to the argument, but it does not foreclose its further development.").
Cf. Wright v. Heizer Corp., [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,101, at 91,966(7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1977) (discussing the burden of proof and presumption of unfairness in the context
of a claimed violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982),
and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), thereunder).
33. Cf. Brudney, supra note 5, at 1078 (dividend distributions should be in the same form
to all members of the class to prevent major shareholders from discriminating against the minority).
34. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 307-10, 93 A.2d 107, 109-17(Del. Ch. 1952); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432-36 (Del. 1968)(suit to enjoin a stock-for-stock merger of A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. into its parent, Dunhill Inter-
national, Inc. The court used the test of entire fairness, relying upon Sterling, 249 A.2d at 430. In
discussing what must be examined in determining entire fairness, the Dunhill court stated:
What is to be considered was stated precisely by Chancellor Seitz in Sterling: "I con-
clude that all relevant value figures of both corporations may be examined and com-
pared in order to arrive at a decision as to the fairness of the plan. Thus, while not
determinative, nevertheless, the value of each corporation for various purposes, e. g.,
going concern value, book value, net asset value, market value, is pertinent to the issue
presented." (89 A.2d at p. 867).
Id. at 431. Cf. Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675, 677 (Del. 1963) (involving a claim
that minority shareholders of a 96% owned subsidiary were unfairly treated when the parent's
stockholders exchanged their stock for shares of Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, which thereafter,
through the parent, bought all of the assets of the subsidiary. The court judged the transaction against
a standard of fairness, but fairness was considered only as to the price paid for the assets of the
subsidiary); Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 318 n.49 ("no specific criteria have been offered for deter-
mining the 'intrinsic fairness' of a merger price"); Restatement, supra, note 1, at 1363 (in discussing
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), the author noted that the court "added, citing
the well-known Sterling case, that even if such a [legitimate] business purpose were shown to exist,
the merger would still be subject to attack on grounds of 'fairness'-presumably a reference to the
adequacy of the price paid to the minority" (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Borden, supra
note 2, at 1015, 1021.
Another line of cases, of which Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d
78 (Del. 1962) is the first, held that minority shareholders who were dissatisfied with the terms of
a cash out merger were limited to an appraisal remedy. See also David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34-36 (Del. Ch. 1971) (suit to enjoin merger of Schenley into a wholly-
owned subsidiary of its parent, Glen Alden. Each minority share of Schenley was to be exchanged
for a combination of cash and Glen Alden debentures. While the plaintiff alleged that several factors
other than value bore on the entire fairness of the transaction (e.g., tax consequences of the merger),
the court focusing solely on the adequacy of consideration paid for the minority's shares, denied
the injunction and restricted the plaintiffs to an appraisal proceeding); Arsht, Minority Stockholder
Freeze-Outs Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAw. 1495, 1497 (1977):
Where the appraisal remedy is unavailable as a check on the conduct of a majority
toward the minority, the Delaware courts have closely scrutinized corporate action, even
though that action is superficially in compliance with the requirements of the corpora-
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In 1977, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Singer v. Magnavox Co.35 and
held that entire fairness required more than just fair value. Like Weinberger, Singer
involved a going private transaction in which the parent corporation paid cash
for the minority's shares. The court in Singer decided that even if the majority
shareholder paid a fair price for the publicly held shares, the transaction did not
satisfy the entire fairness test unless the parent showed that there was some valid
purpose for the cash out merger other than eliminating the minority shareholders
from equity participation.3 6 In attempting to give more substance to the entire
fairness test, the Singer decision left unanswered a number of interpretive
questions." Among these questions were whether the relevant business purpose
had to serve the subsidiary's interests or whether a purpose serving the interests
of the parent would suffice, 38 whether a valid purpose was required for a short-
form cash out merger accomplished pursuant to section 253 of the Delaware Cor-
poration Law, for which shareholder approval was not required, 39 and what specific
purposes would be considered adequate."0 Before all of these questions could be
resolved, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Weinberger, in which it again
tion law. In the merger context, on the other hand, the appraisal remedy is available
to insure that minority stockholders are not denied the fair value of their stock by the
conduct of the majority .... [Tihe only reason for denying effect to an otherwise technical-
ly correct merger is that it operates unfairly with respect to minority shareholders. Such
unfairness can only arise if the appraisal proceeding is incapable of arriving at the fair
value of a minority shareholder's stock .... The Delaware courts, however, have not
abandoned faith in the reliability of the appraisal remedy.
Id. at 1499.
The Delaware courts apparently considered the Sterling rule, requiring the majority shareholder
to prove the entire fairness of the transaction, inapplicable to cash out mergers, because appraisal
rights were available to cashed out minority shareholders. See Weiss, supra note 2, at 655. Regardless
of the forum in which fairness was addressed, the issue was the same in cases challenging both cash
out mergers and other, noncash going private transactions. That issue was the fairness of the con-
sideration paid by the majority shareholder to the minority.
35. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
36. The reason for this requirement of a valid business purpose for the transaction can be
explained by the court's finding that
those who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in the
exercise thereof over corporate powers and property, and the use of such power to
perpetuate control is a violation of that duty.
By analogy, if not afortiori, use of the corporate power solely to eliminate the minority
is a violation of that duty.
Id. at 979-80. For a discussion of the history of the business purpose test, see Borden, supra note
2, at 987, 995-96 and 1022-23.
37. "The decisions in Singer, Tanzer and Roland International have bred some uncertainty
in this Court as well as, I think it fair to say, among members of the corporate bar. . . ." Weinberger
I1, 426 A.2d at 1342 (Del. Ch. 1981).
38. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) established that the
purpose served by the merger could be that solely of the parent corporation.
39. In Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), the court held that the business
purpose test applied to short-form mergers accomplished under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1983)
as well as to long-form mergers such as that involved in Singer.
40. The issue of what would constitute a valid business purpose was still the subject of confu-
sion when the Chancery Court decided Weinberger II, 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981). Compare Young
v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. Ch. 1978) (two purposes were offered to justify the cash
out merger: tax savings, which the court dismissed as capable of being achieved by other means,
and avoidance of conflicts of interest, which the court described as "somewhat contrived") with
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reinterpreted the entire fairness test and, in the process, abolished the business
purpose requirement.'
In reinterpreting the entire fairness standard, the Delaware Supreme Court
retained the notion, developed in Singer, that fair value is not the sole determi-
nant of the entire fairness of a going private transaction. While the fairness of
the value paid to the minority shareholders is still a significant factor in assessing
a transaction's entire fairness, 2 the court in Weinberger also required fairness
in the way in which the transaction was effected. Weinberger thus integrated the
meaning of the duty of loyalty and entire fairness by giving content to the notion
of fair dealing. As a result, the concept of fair dealing has new importance aris-
ing from its place as part of the standard of entire fairness and its expanded
and more detailed definition.
The Theory of Fair Dealing
An agreement reached as a result of arm's length bargaining generally is
presumed to be substantively fair. Substantive fairness is presumed first because
of the existence of the parties' agreement itself. Each party would agree to the
transaction only if it viewed the deal as beneficial to its interest and goals.
Conversely, either party could reject the transaction and look elsewhere for a better
Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1348-50 (the court accepted the following purposes as sufficient to satisfy
the Singer test: parent's economic interest in securing an investment for its surplus cash; tax, account-
ing and insurance savings; savings from the elimination of duplicative reporting to government agen-
cies; and avoidance of conflicts of interests).
See Elfin, Changing Standards and the Future Course of Freezeout Mergers, 5 J. CORP. L.
261, 270 (1980) (charging that a legitimate business purpose should "have the potential to increase
the economic viability of the business enterprise," and furthermore that such increased efficiency not
be otherwise economically obtainable); Restatement, supra note 1, at 1367 ("The Singer decision strongly
implies that a corporate purpose is necessary to sustain the legal validity of going private. To meet
that condition, the proponents should be required to show that public stock ownership is actually
inconsistent with the company's continued viability, not merely that public ownership entails a cost
that can be avoided by eliminating the public's interest. But we are not aware that such a showing
has ever been made in a going-private case, and we doubt it ever could be."). See also Borden,
supra note 2, at 1001; Rothschild, supra note 2, at 225.
41. The business purpose test was considered by the Weinberger court almost as an afterthought.
It was eliminated from Delaware's law governing cash out mergers apparently because of the open
issues and criticism that it engendered and because, in view of the standards developed in Weinberger,
the court did not think it provided minority shareholders with "any additional meaningful protec-
tion." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
42. As to the method of determining fair value, the Weinberger court rejected the historical
judicial position that considered the "Delaware block" approach the only acceptable method of valuing
stock. The court labelled the Delaware block method of valuation "clearly outmoded" insofar as
it "excludes other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community." Id. at 712. The
only limitations that the court put on the methods of valuation to be used in the future were that
they be "otherwise admissible in court," "generally considered acceptable in the financial commun-
ity" and consistent with the court's interpretation of the Delaware appraisal statute, DEL. CODE ANN,
tit. 8 § 262(h) (1983). Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
Furthermore, the court expanded its interpretation of the Delaware appraisal statute to give
substance to the mandate that "all relevant factors" [emphasis supplied] be considered in determining
fair value. The exclusion from consideration of elements of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the transaction was given a very narrow interpretation, so that only "pro forma
data and projections of a speculative variety relating to the completion of a merger" must be rejected
pursuant to the statute. Id. The court remanded the case to the Chancellor for consideration of the
issue of fair value in light of these new standards. Id. at 715.
1984]
The Journal of Corporation Law
deal. Where all of the parties have the ability to reject the transaction, agreement
indicates that each party considered the transaction substantively fair.4 3
Substantive fairness is presumed also because of the procedure which led to
the agreement-the arm's length bargaining process. Arm's length bargaining re-
quires that each party be independent of the others; no party can be subject to
the control of another in an arm's length bargaining situation." In the context
of a transaction between two corporations, an unacceptable relationship resulting
in control might arise from either party owning a substantial amount of stock
in the other, dependence upon one another for the success of their businesses,
sharing common directors, officers or executive employees, or being controlled
by the same person. If there is a control relationship, the controlled party cannot
necessarily adequately represent its own interests in negotiating and consenting
to the transaction; but if there is complete independence, each party can advocate
its own purposes in the negotiations and can voluntarily assent to a proposal
or walk away from the deal if its purposes are not met.
Arm's length bargaining does not normally exist in a transaction between
a parent corporation and its subsidiary. The parent's ability to control the sub-
sidiary as a result of its stock ownership interest generally is sufficient to negate
a finding of an arm's length relationship.45 As a result of its stock holdings, the
parent can single-handedly approve, on behalf of the subsidiary, any transaction
required to be approved by a majority of the subsidiary's shares, even if the trans-
action is between the parent and subsidiary. The parent, moreover, may use its
power as a stockholder to elect the directors of the subsidiary, who would normally
represent the subsidiary in its dealings with a third party. The parent's control
over the subsidiary, thus, can be extended to the director level, so that persons
negotiating the deal on behalf of the parent and subsidiary will all be controlled
by the parent. Finally, the subsidiary's ability to agree to or reject a transaction
with its parent is restricted as compared to the freedom of choice which is en-
joyed by the parties to an arm's length transaction. The subsidiary's fate is
ultimately controlled by the parent, and if the subsidiary initially rejects a trans-
action it cannot look elsewhere for a better deal. The existence of this on-going
relationship between the parties may undermine the voluntariness of any agree-
ment by the subsidiary. The choice for the subsidiary may be limited to a choice
between assent now or assent later.46
As a result of the parent's ability to control the subsidiary in their dealings
and the consequent absence of arm's length bargaining between them, it is
43. See Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 791-92 (Del. Ch. 1967).
44. See e.g. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3) (1970) defines
"arm's length" as "the amount which was charged or would have been charged in independent trans-
actions with unrelated parties under the same or similar circumstances." Id.
45. Where the parent owns less than 50% of the subsidiary's stock, the courts distinguish be-
tween the right or ability to control and the exercise of such control. If control has not been exercised
in such a case, the court will treat the situation as one involving arm's length bargaining. See infra
notes 113-16 and accompanying text. Where, however, the issue is entire fairness and the parent owns
50% or more of the stock of the subsidiary, the ability or right to control is enough in itself to
give rise to a presumption that such control was exercised.
46. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Civil Action Nos. 5827, 5830 (March 21, 1983). The
Vice-Chancellor found that a full and fair reading of the proxy statement disclosing a proposed cash
out merger revealed that the fate of the minority stockholders was "tied directly to the whim of
Curtiss," the majority stockholder. If the parent owns less than 50% of the stock of the subsidiary,
or if control otherwise could be sold to a third party, the subsidiary might be able to solicit bids
from outsiders in response to a proposed cash out. Id. See also Longstreth, supra note 3.
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difficult, if not impossible, to assess the substantive fairness of a parent-subsidiary
transaction. In any parent-subsidiary transaction, the parent has the ability to
establish unilaterally the terms of the transaction, through its control of the sub-
sidiary at the board level, and the power to speak for the subsidiary in accepting
the deal, through its control at both the director and shareholder levels. The power
of the parent thus subverts both of the reasons that an agreement reached as
a result of arm's length bargaining is presumed to be substantively fair. It
negates the existence of a true, voluntary agreement by the subsidiary and it
disproves the subsidiary's independence, which is necessary for arm's length negotia-
tions. This relationship between the parent and subsidiary makes it difficult to
assess the substantive fairness of any "agreement" reached by the parties without
recourse to an objective judge of fairness.
The notion of fair dealing developed by the court in Weinberger serves the
purpose of establishing some circumstances when the agreement reached by a parent
and its subsidiary can be presumed to be substantively fair. In a parent-subsidiary
transaction, fair dealing is intended to simulate arm's length bargaining; satisfy-
ing the duty of fair dealing will result in the parties acting as though they were
bargaining at arm's length. The product of the process of fair dealing, then, ought
to resemble the product of arm's length negotiation."1 After Weinberger, evidence
47. "It is commonly said by courts and commentators that the fiduciary norm in this situation
[of a parent-subsidiary merger] is one of arm's-length dealing; a fair price for the minority stock
is that which an arm's-length bargain in a free market would have produced." Fair Shares, supra
note 2, at 309. See also Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 8 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 46 (1983) ("[B]oth the reasonable expectations of the minority
and the fiduciary obligations of the controlling shareholder ... suggests that the controlling shareholder
should be required to pay at least as much for the minority's interest as the minority would realize
if the corporation were being sold to a third party in an arm's length transaction.")
A transaction which is not tainted by a controlling relationship between the parties and has
been negotiated at arm's length is, when challenged, considered in light of the business judgment
rule. Application of the business judgment rule results in the transaction being presumed fair.
The business judgment rule is a presumption that a rational business decision of the
officers or directors of a corporation is proper unless there exists facts which remove
the decision from the protection of the rule, such as self-dealing, conflict of interest,
etc. If the business judgment rule applies the objector must bear the burden of persua-
sion to show the impropriety of the transaction. Maldonado v. Flynn, Del. Ch., 413
A.2d 1251 at 1255 (1980). If an objector to a corporate transaction shows, however,
that the transaction involves a parent and a subsidiary with the parent controlling the
transaction and fixing the terms (as here), and shows that the parent benefitted from
the transaction to the exclusion and detriment of its subsidiary, the test of propriety
is not the business judgment rule but is the intrinsic fairness rule, which places the burden
of persuasion on the parent corporation to show that the transaction is objectively fair.
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, Del. Supr., 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971).
Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956-57 (Del. Ch. 1980).
In Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court held that the business judg-
ment rule was the applicable test where there was no showing that the 46% shareholder stood on
both sides of the transaction and no showing of fraud. The transaction challenged in Puma was the
acquisition by Marriott Corp. of all of the outstanding stock of six companies owned by the 46%
shareholder of Marriott, in exchange for Marriott common stock. See also David J. Greene & Co.
v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968) (involving a stock-for-stock merger of a
subsidiary into its parent corporation, where the court, in discussing the standard against which to
judge the merger, stated: "In the absence of divided interests, the judgment of the majority stockholders
and/or the board of directors, as the case may be, is presumed made in good faith and inspired
by a bona fides of purpose.").
Cf. Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952), which involved
a suit to enjoin the acquisition by Maracaibo of all of the outstanding stock of the Case Pomeroy
companies in exchange for shares of Maracaibo. One of the ten directors of Maracaibo was the "in-
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of fair dealing will go far towards establishing the substantive fairness of the terms
of the transaction. 48
In order to simulate the process of arm's length bargaining, fair dealing must
address the reason that there can be no arm's length bargaining: the unacceptable
power of control held by the parent over the subsidiary. Fair dealing neutralizes
the taint of the parent's ability to control the subsidiary by requiring safeguards
against the exercise of such control. To that end, the Weinberger court stated
that fairness in dealing embraced "questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how
the approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained." 49 These questions
are directed at specific elements in the process by which the agreement was
reached-timing, initiation, structure, negotiation, disclosure and approval-where
the parent's control can be exercised to the detriment of the subsidiary and its
minority shareholders. If the parent corporation adopts certain practices relating
to an element of the decision-making process which enables it to exert its in-fluence over the subsidiary, such conduct will indicate the absence of fair dealing.
The relationship that exists when the majority shareholder exercises its control
over the subsidiary is the antithesis of the relationship between parties bargaining
at arm's length. Conversely, if the parent adopts practices to neutralize its con-
trol and protect the subsidiary's ability to represent its own interests and those
of its minority shareholders in the negotiating and deliberative processes, that con-
duct will indicate the presence of fairness in dealing." It will indicate that the
parent refrained from exercising its influence over the subsidiary, so that the sub-
sidiary was left free to further its own interests. Therefore, in assessing whether
the parent has fulfilled its duty to deal fairly with the subsidiary and its minority
direct owner of a large percentage of the stock of the Case Pomeroy companies," was a member
of the Maracaibo board committee charged with investigating potential acquisitions for Maracaibo
and proposed to the board of Maracaibo the acquisition of the Case Pomeroy companies. Id. at271, 92 A.2d at 316. The court examined the transaction only to ensure that there was no fraud
or overreaching present. It distinguished the case before if from a situation where "a majority ofthe board of directors are officers of the other company involved. In such a case, if there had been
no ratification by the stockholders, the burden would be on those who were asserting the validity
of the transaction to prove that the transaction was an arm's length transaction and that the interests
of the corporation were fully protected." Id. at 273, 92 A.2d at 318 (Citations omitted); Meyerson
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967), where the minority shareholder
of an 80%-owned subsidiary sued the parent company, El Paso, for unjust enrichment. The plaintiff
argued that the parent's retention of all of the tax savings resulting from filing consolidated tax returns
with the subsidiary and offsetting El Paso's income with the subsidiary's losses constituted unjust
enrichment. The court was convinced that, since the parent and subsidiary shared common manage-
ment, there could be no effective bargaining between them in negotiating an allocation agreement,
and it would be impossible to estimate the terms of any agreement reached by independent parties.Therefore, the court refused to establish a "fair" allocation and concluded that "[tihe question, then,is reduced to one of business judgment with which the court should not interfere absent a showing
of 'gross and palpable overreaching.'.
48. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 n.7. See Note, Achieving Fairness in Corporate Cash Mergers:
Weinberger v. UOP, 16 CONN. L. REv. 95, 115-16 (1983).49. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. These elements of fair dealing were apparently first iden-
tified in an article by Nathan and Shapiro, supra note 28, in which the authors' primary focus was
on fair price. The notion of procedural fairness was further developed by Richards, supra note 28,
at 731-32.
50. A distinction could be made between actions which affirmatively protect the minority
shareholders, such as providing for or encouraging their representation in negotiations, and actions
which merely prevent the majority shareholder from exerting its influence over the minority. Fairdealing, as here interpreted, requires both active and passive protection. See infra text accompanying
notes 110-31 (discussion of independent negotiations). See also infra text accompanying notes 159-75
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shareholders, a court must consider whether the parent's conduct, with respect
to each element of the bargaining process, resulted in the parent exercising its
control over the subsidiary and its minority shareholders, thus contradicting the
aim of fair dealing, or whether the parent refrained from exerting its influence
in the transaction, so that the dealings between the parties resembled an arm's
length bargaining process.
PART II
If the duty of fair dealing is to play any meaningful part in the regulation
of parent-subsidiary transactions, the conduct required to satisfy the duty must
be clearly defined. The parties to the transaction must be able to ascertain the
standard during the planning stages of their dealings so that they can use it to
guide their conduct during the decision-making process. Otherwise, the purpose
for imposing the duty of fair dealing will not be accomplished, since a retrospec-
tive determination of what went wrong cannot lead to a decision of what the
product of the dealing would have been if the correct procedure had been
followed."
In Part II, the standard of conduct required to fulfill the duty of fair dealing
will be developed. The starting point for the discussion are the six elements of
the decision-making process identified by the Weinberger court. As to these six
elements, and any others suggested by outside sources, two questions must be
addressed. First, does the element identify some aspect of the decision-making
process which might be tainted by the parent's exercise of control over the sub-
sidiary (is the element appropriate to the regulation of procedural fairness)? Second,
what conduct is required, after Weinberger, to satisfy the duty of fair dealing
with respect to each element? In the course of the analysis, it is sometimes helpful
to have as a backdrop a specific set of facts, and for that purpose the facts of
the Weinberger case begin the analysis.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
The relationship between the Signal Companies, Inc. (Signal) and UOP, Inc.
(UOP) began in 1975, when Signal acuired a 50.5% stock ownership interest in
UOP.' " At the next annual shareholders meeting of UOP, Signal filled six of the
thirteen positions on UOP's board of directors with Signal officers, Signal
employees, and a representative of its investment banking firm.53 When the presi-
(discussion of disclosure requirements). See Note, A Cash-Out Breakthrough in Delaware Judicial
Merger Regulation: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 37 Sw. L.J. 823, 835 (1983).
51. See infra note 235-37 and accompanying text.
52. The acquisition agreement provided that Signal would purchase 1.5 million of the authorized
but unissued shares of UOP, at a price of $21 per share, if Signal was successful in making a cash
tender offer for 4.3 million publicly held UOP shares at the same price per share. Immediately before
the announcement of the tender offer, which attracted more than the desired number of shares, UOP's
stock was trading at just below $14 per share on the New York Stock Exchange. Weinberger II,
426 A.2d at 1336.
53. The persons elected by Signal in, 1975 to serve on UOP's board of directors were: Charles
S. Arledge, Vice President and Director of Signal; Andrew J. Chitiea, Senior Vice President and
Director of Signal; Forrest N. Shumway, President and Chief Executive Officer and Director of Signal;
William E. Walkup, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Executive Vice President of Signal;
Harry H. Wetzel, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Garrett Corporation, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Signal; Frank J. Pizzitola, General Partner, Lazard Freres & Co., the investment bank-
ing firm that represented Signal in the 1975 acquisition of UOP. Appendix to the Brief of the Ap-
pellant at ASI, Weinberger [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Appendix]; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704-05.
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dent and chief executive officer of UOP retired, Signal appointed James Crawford,
a long-time employee of one of Signal's wholly-owned subsidiaries, in his place.
At the same time, Crawford was elected to the UOP and Signal boards of
directors."
During the period from 1975 through the end of 1977, Signal was searching
for an investment opportunity in order to utilize its excess cash." In 1978, after
pursuing these efforts without success, Signal's sights returned to UOP, when two
Signal officers, both of whom were also directors of UOP, prepared a "feas-
ibility study" regarding the possibility of Signal acquiring, for cash, the balance
of UOP's outstanding shares. 6 This feasibility study was discussed among Signal's
senior management personnel, who concluded that UOP presented the best
opportunity for a friendly cash investment57 and decided to call a meeting of the
executive committee of Signal's board of directors to propose the acquisition.
Immediately prior to the executive committee meeting, Signal's chairman of
the board, William E. Walkup, and president, Forrest N. Shumway, met with
Crawford to broach with him the subject of Signal's proposed acquisition."
Crawford reacted favorably to the proposed price range of $20 to $21 per UOP
share. 9 Shortly following this discussion, at the executive committee meeting,
Signal's top management was authorized to negotiate an agreement with UOP
and instructed to present such an agreement to Signal's board of directors within
the week."
Between the date of the executive committee meeting and the appointed time
54. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1336; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705.
55. Weinberger I, 426 A.2d at 1335-37; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705. In 1974, Signal sold
one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries for $420 million in cash. It was this cash which prompted Signal
to purchase 50.5076 of UOP's common stock in 1975 ($121.8 million ($21/share multiplied by 5.8
million shares) was the approximate cost of Signal's 1975 investment in UOP). This same source
of cash was also the motivating fund behind the 1978 acquisition of the remaining 49.5% of UOP stock.
56. The feasibility study, prepared by Messrs. Arledge and Chitiea, is a twenty-seven page docu-
ment that briefly sets forth the purposes of the merger, the sequence of events for approving the
merger and the financial effects of the acquisition of the remaining 49.5% of UOP on Signal as
a whole. Appellant's Appendix, at A1472-A1499. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
Signal's original acquisition of UOP occurred more than one year before the cash out merger.
The length of this time period between the purchase of the original controlling block and the going
private transaction has been considered important by several commentators for purposes of regulating
going private transactions. See supra note 12. As a result of the expiration of more than one year
between the initial acquisition and the cash out, more than minimal regulation of the cash out would
be required by such commentators.
Similarly, Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1983), would have applied to the transaction in-
volved in Weinberger had the Rule then been in effect. The Rule exempts from its provisions certain
cash outs occurring within one year from the original acquisition, but in Weinberger more than one
year had elapsed. See supra note 12. Moreover, even if the cash out in Weinberger had followed
the original acquisition within the one year time limit, it is unclear whether the exception would have
been applicable, since Signal acquired its controlling interest pursuant to a combination of the tender
offer and the private purchase from UOP. The Rule requires that the controlling interest have been
acquired in a tender offer, which would give weight to the tender offer price.
57. These discussions occurred among Messrs. Walkup, Shumway, Arledge, Chitiea (all of whom
were directors of both Signal and UOP) and Brewster L. Arms (Signal's internal counsel). Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 705.
58. Id. Crawford was invited to the Signal executive committee as a "courtesy;" he was not
a member of that body.
59. "Crawford said he thought such a price would be 'generous,' and that it was certainly
one which should be submitted to UOP's minority shareholders for their ultimate consideration." Id.
60. Id. at 705-06.
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of Signal's board meeting, Crawford discussed the proposed acquisition with each
of UOP's non-Signal directors, and from these conversations concluded that Signal
would have to pay $21 per share, rather than $20, to gain the approval of these
directors.6 During the same period, Crawford also contacted UOP's regular in-
vestment banker, Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. (Lehman Brothers), to re-
quest their opinion as the the fairness of the price offered by Signal. Three Lehman
Brothers analysts conducted a three day investigation of UOP, including a one
day due diligence session at the company's offices, and concluded that a price
in the range of $20 to $21 per share would be fair to the minority shareholders
of UOP.62
Six days after Signal's executive committee meeting, the boards of directors
of both Signal and UOP convened. The two meetings were connected by telephone,
and all of UOP's non-Signal directors were present in person or by telephone.6 3
Signal's board was the first to consider the proposed acquisition, and it unan-
imously approved the agreement. Before putting the proposal to a vote of the
UOP board, the Signal-designated UOP directors left the room to permit the non-
Signal UOP directors to freely discuss the proposed merger. When the Signal-
designated directors returned to the meeting, a proposal to accept Signal's offer
was made and adopted. All of the non-Signal directors, plus Crawford and the
Signal investment banking representative, voted in favor of the merger. The other
Signal-designated members of the board abstained from voting on the advice of
counsel, but indicated in the minutes of the meeting that, had they voted, they
would have voted in favor of the transaction.
The agreement adopted by the two boards of directors called for Signal to
pay $21 per UOP share, and required that the merger be approved by a majority
of the minority shares of UOP in order to become effective.65 At UOP's annual
shareholders meeting on May 26, 1978, the proposal received the required
shareholder approval by votes cast in person and by proxy, and the merger became
effective. 66
61. Id. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 707. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. Id. Walkup and Crawford were the only Signal-designated members of UOP's board pre-
sent in person at the UOP board meeting. The other Signal-designated UOP directors participated
in the UOP meeting by conference telephone. The court made it clear that Walkup and Crawford
left the meeting for some time before the UOP directors voted on the proposal. While it is not entire-
ly clear from the court's opinion that the telephone hook-up with the other Signal-designated members
of the board was disconnected during that same time period, the implication is that the telephone
link was in fact broken.
In considering the merger proposal, the UOP directors had before them the proposed agreements,
UOP financial statements for the years 1974-1977, its most recent financial statements, market price
information, budget projections for 1978, and the Lehman Brothers fairness opinion. The court found
that the non-Signal UOP directors did not have the opportunity to examine the feasibility study. Id.
65. The merger agreement also required that the merger by approved by two-thirds of all UOP
shares, including the shares owned by Signal. Id.
66. Of the 3,208,652 minority shares voted at the meeting (56% of the outsiding minority shares),
2,953,812 were voted in favor of the merger and 254,840 were voted against it. Id. at 707-08.
After the merger became effective, William Weinberger, a minority shareholder of UOP, promptly
filed a class action challenging the merger. Weinberger's initial complaint failed to allege any misrepresen-
tations by the defendants, and was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Del. Code Ann., Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Chancery
(1981). The court found that the approval of the merger by a majority of the UOP minority shareholders
rendered Singer v. Manavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and its progeny inapplicable, since Signal
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Pressured Decision-Making
Fair dealing requires the majority shareholder to respect the integrity of the
subsidiary's decision-making process, and that respect includes refraining from
imposing unreasonable time constraints upon that process. Decision-making on
behalf of the subsidiary occurs at three levels. The first level is the subsidiary's
did not use its control to effectuate the merger. Weinberger, 409 A.2d at 1266. The court required
the plaintiff to show some "fraud, misrepresentation, or other conduct attributable to the majority
shareholder which would warrant setting aside the affirmative vote of the minority for their own
benefit." Id. at 1268. The amended complaint alleged misrepresentation and was deemed sufficient
to state a claim.
Weinberger alleged that the sole purpose of the transaction was to eliminate the minority
shareholders of UOP, contrary to the dictates of the Singer business purpose requirement. A second
challenge to the merger was that the defendants made various misrepresentations in the proxy state-
ment sent to UOP shareholders and in press releases, and that these misrepresentations negated the
effectiveness of the affirmative vote of a majority of the UOP minority shares. Weinberger's third
claim was that the directors of UOP breached their fiduciary duties by failing to negotiate a higher
price for the cashed out shareholders, giving insufficient consideration to the transaction and neglect-
ing to obtain current appraisals of certain UOP assets. Finally, the plaintiff attacked the $21 price
paid for each UOP share as grossly inadequate. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1341.
In response to Weinberger's first ground of attack regarding the purpose of the merger, Signal
presented facts indicating that the purpose of the merger was to serve its economic interests by finding
a suitable investment for its excess cash. The Chancellor accepted this as sufficient to satisfy the
business purpose test. Id. at 1349-50. The court also recognized that Signal would benefit from the
merger by realizing tax, accounting and insurance savings, and by avoiding both potential conflicts
of interest and duplicate governmental agency filings. Id. at 1349.
The Chancellor rejected the plaintiff's second claim upon finding that no material misrepresen-
tations had been made. In assessing the misrepresentation claims, the court applied the standard of
"complete candor" set forth in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). Weinberger
II, 426 A.2d at 1350-53. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
As to the third charge, the court was convinced that the directors of UOP had acted reasonably
in considering Signal's offer, and therefore had not breached their fiduciary duties to the minority
shareholders. Id. at 1353. See infra notes 71-76, 132-35 and accompanying text.
Finally, with respect to the plaintiff's challenge to the price paid by Signal, the Court applied
the "Delaware block" approach to value the stock and concluded that the amount of $21 per share
represented a fair price to the UOP minority shareholders. Id. at 1356-62. The "Delaware block"
method assigns particular weights to certain elements of value (e.g., assets, market price, earnings)
and adds the resulting amounts to determine the value per share.
After a full trial, the Chancellor rejected the plaintiff's claims and rendered judgment for Signal.
In granting judgment for the defendants, the Chancellor stated that, in addition to its analysis of
each of the separate claims asserted by the plaintiff, he also considered the fact that the cash out
merger had been approved by a majority of the UOP minority shares as indicative of the fairness
of the merger terms. Id. at 1362-63.
Quite simply, while structuring the vote in this fashion (at least in my opinion)
does not free the transaction from the so-called scrutiny required of the Court, and
while this factor alone does not automatically establish that Signal had discharged its
fiduciary duty to the minority as a majority shareholder standing on both sides of the
transaction, it does not mean that this factor is removed from further consideration
by the Court. Rather, it is simply another element that must be considered as part of
the overall picture in evaluating the terms of the merger for entire fairness to the minority.
When this element is added to all the other matters considered herein, I am con-
vinced that it conclusively sways the decision in favor of the defendants.
Id. at 1362.
Initially the Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's judgment, but that opinion was
withdrawn when the court reheard the case en banc. For a description of portions of the initial opin-
ion of the Supreme Court, see Deutsch, Weinburger [sic] v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CORP.
L. REv. 29 (1983).
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board of directors. The board must decide initially whether it would serve the
best interests of the corporation to accept or reject a transaction proposed by
the parent or any outside party. The second level consists of the outside advisors
and experts of the subsidiary. These outsiders-financial analysts, lawyers and/or
accountants-may be hired by the board to consider the advisability and legality
of the proposed transaction; their opinions may provide some basis for the board's
decision. Finally, the proposal may. be submitted to a vote of the subsidiary's
shareholders; the stockholders' decision to accept or reject the transaction is the
third level of consideration. Unreasonable time pressures imposed by the parent
at any of the three levels of consideration will indicate the absence of fairness
in dealing.
In Weinberger, Signal was criticized for imposing unreasonable time constraints
on both the UOP board of directors and UOP's financial advisor, Lehman
Brothers. 67 The relevant time period in Weinberger was the six days between the
Signal executive committee meeting and the directors meetings at which the cash
out merger was approved. 68 As soon as UOP's president, Crawford, was informed
of the proposed cash out by the Signal executive committee on February 28th,
he contacted the non-Signal members of UOP's board to inform them of the
proposed merger and the offered price range of $20 to $21 per UOP share. All
of these directors indicated to Crawford that they would approve a price of $21
per share, but would not approve a lower price.
69
On March 6, the JOP board met to consider and vote on Signal's proposal.
They had before them the proposed merger agreement, Lehman Brothers' fairness
opinion, UOP financial data for the previous four years, its most recent financial
statements, information on the market price of its stock, and budget projections
for 1978. At the meeting, the directors discussed and approved the proposal.7
The Weinberger court indicated that the decision-making process of the UOP
board of directors had been adversely affected by the brief period of time afforded
for its consideration of the transaction. 7 The court did not find, however, that
the board had breached its duty of care by approving the transaction, nor did
it identify any specific course of action that should have been taken by the board
but was not pursued because of lack of time. In other words, the court failed
67. There was no allegation that Signal imposed unreasonable time constraints on the minority
shareholders. At the shareholder level, Delaware state law provides some guidance in the notice re-
quirements. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(c) (Supp. 1982). Rule 13e-3 provides additional guidance.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(f)(i) (1983).
68. Six days after the date when Crawford was informed that Signal proposed to buy the re-
maining publicly held UOP shares, the boards of directors of UOP and Signal met to vote on the
merger. Since it is not clear that Crawford informed all of the non-Signal UOP board members of
Signal's proposal on February 28, six days, only four of which were business days, was the maximum
amount of time that any of these directors had to consider the proposal. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 706.
Arledge, Chitiea, Walkup and Shumway were the persons who initiated the idea of Signal in-
vesting its cash in the remaining publicly held shares of UOP. Crawford, another Signal-designated
member of UOP's board, was first informed of the proposal on February 28th, so he, too, had
only six days to consider the transaction. Id. at 705. There is no indication of the amount of time
for consideration given to the two other Signal-designated UOP directors or to the Signal board.
69. "In a conversation with Walkup, Crawford advised that as a result of his communications
with UOP's non-Signal directors, it was his feeling that the price would have to be the top of the
proposed range, or $21 per share, if the approval of UOP's outside directors was to be obtained."
Id. at 706.
70. Id. at 707.
71. Id. at 711.
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to explain why the time schedule imposed upon the UOP board was unreasonable.
Since none of the UOP directors requested additional time to consider Signal's
proposal, there was no objective evidence that they objected to Signal's schedule.
Pressured decision-making by boards of directors has been considered impor-
tant by Delaware courts in other contexts. In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer
Company,' 2 the speed with which a transaction was negotiated and approved by
the board of directors was deemed to indicate that the transaction was entered
into for an improper purpose. In addition, in Gimbel v Signal Companies, Inc. , 3
the court concluded that the brief period of the board's deliberations did not
cause its action to be reckless, but 4ionetheless considered hasty decision-making
significant to the extent it produced a grossly inadequate price. In these cases,
the time constraints under which the boards of directors labored indicated that
something else-purpose or price-was amiss.
In Weinberger the court did not explain what, if any, adverse consequences
resulted from the short time schedule imposed upon the UOP board's considera-
tion of Signal's proposal. One result of those time pressures was to prevent the
UOP board from obtaining the reactions of third parties to Signal's offer. Such
a reaction might have taken the form of a competing offer for the UOP minority
stock74 or an adjustment of the market price of Signal stock.15 At a minimum,
a reaction in either form would have provided the UOP board with an objective
view of the sufficiency of Signal's offer. That information would have been useful
to the UOP board in formulating its response to the proposal.
Furthermore, perhaps the brevity of the board's deliberations weighed against
a finding of fairness in dealing because the time constraints were established solely
by Signal and for no apparent reason.7 6 Signal had been looking for an invest-
ment opportunity for its excess cash for over a year before it proposed the cash
out merger, and the merger was not submitted to a vote of the UOP shareholders
until more than two months after the date of the board meetings. Thus, the time
pressures that Signal imposed upon the UOP directors' consideration of the merger
72. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 362, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (1967) (involving a challenge to the actions of
the directors of the target company in defense against a tender offer; the board's haste in approving
the issuance of 75,000 new shares indicated that the "primary purpose of the issuance of such shares
was to prevent control of Lunkenheimer from passing to Condec," which the court deemed to be
an improper use of the corporate machinery).
73. 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974) (involving a suit to enjoin the sale of a wholly-owned
subsidiary to a third party; "[t]he method does not appear to be so bad on its face as to alter the
normal legal principles which control. But hasty method which produces a dollar result which appears
perhaps to be shocking is significant.").
74. It is unlikely, however, that a third party would have been interested in purchasing a minority
interest in UOP. The possibility of selling control might exist under such circumstances if the minority
shares and unissued stock could be offered, See generally Longstreth, supra note 3.
75. It would have been meaningless to consider the UOP stock price as indicative of public
reaction to the deal, since the offer by Signal would have established a ceiling price for UOP stock.
There was some period of time, however, when the public could have responded to the proposed
transaction by trading in Signal stock; the $20-21 price range was announced in a press release on
March 2, and the directors' meetings to vote on the transaction were held on March 6.
76. But see Levine, The Proposed SEC Going Private Rules, 32 Bus. LAw. 1509, 1511 (1977),
in which the author, then a staff member of the SEC, stated that the SEC's review of filings relating
to going private transactions took longer than the usual period for such filings during the time when
the going private rules were only proposed. This was the time period when the Signal-UOP merger
occurred.
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were not equally applied to all levels of the transaction's consideration. In addi-
tion, the time schedule was established by Signal alone, without consultation with
the UOP board.
The Delaware Supreme Court also criticized Signal for putting unreasonable
time pressure on Lehman Brothers, UOP's financial advisor. One of the six non-
Signal UOP directors contacted by Crawford on February 28th was James
Glanville, a Lehman Brothers partner. Crawford called Glanville not only to in-
form him of Signal's proposal, to which Glanville reacted favorably, but also
to ask him if Lehman Brothers would render an opinion on the fairness of the
proposed $20 to $21 price range offered by Signal for each UOP share. Crawford
chose Lehman Brothers to prepare the fairness opinion because he thought that
the nearly twenty year association of that firm and UOP, as well as Glanville's
position on the board of UOP, would substantially increase the possibility of ob-
taining the opinion in five days, of which only three were business days.""
Glanville assembled a three person team to work on the UOP fairness opin-
ion. These three analysts reviewed UOP's annual reports and SEC filings for the
period of 1973 through 1976, its audited financial statements for 1977, its interim
reports to shareholders, and the recent and historical market prices and trading
volumes for UOP stock. In addition, two of the Lehman Brothers employees spent
one day performing a due diligence investigation by interviewing UOP's presi-
dent, general counsel, chief financial officer, and other key executives and per-
sonnel. The result of this examination was that on March 6, at the board of
directors meetings, Lehman Brothers delivered an opinion that the proposed merger
price of $21 per share was fair to the minority shareholders of UOP. 8
What did not occur with respect to the Lehman Brothers fairness opinion
during this six day period of time, according to the Delaware Supreme Court,
was a careful study of the information needed to support an opinion that a price
of $21 per UOP was fair." The court criticized Lehman Brothers, at least im-
pliedly, for spending only three days on the investigation supporting the opinion, 80
77. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 706; Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1353. It is unclear whether the
Lehman Brothers team worked only on the three business days or also on the weekend, which would
have given them five days to prepare their opinion.
78. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 706-07. In fact, Lehman Brothers was apparently willing to opine
to the fairness of the merger at any price within the range of $20 to $21 per UOP share. The exact
language of Lehman Brothers' opinion is: "our opinion is that the proposed merger is fair and equitable
to the stockholders of UOP other than Signal." Appellant's Appendix, at A103.
79. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
80. There was no disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the rather cursory prepara-
tion of the Lehman Brothers' fairness opinion. Instead, the impression was given UOP's
minority that a careful study had been made, when in fact speed was the hallmark,
and Mr. Glanville, Lehman's partner in charge of the matter, and also a UOP director,
having spent the weekend in Vermont, brought a draft of the "fairness opinion letter"
to the UOP directors meeting on March 6, 1978 with the price left blank. We can only
conclude from the record that the rush imposed on Lehman Brothers by Signal's timetable
contributed to the difficulties under which this investment banking firm attempted to
perform its responsibilities. Yet, none of this was disclosed to UOP's minority.
Id.
The fact that the price per share was left blank in the opinion letter is simply illustrative of
an extremely common practice, and should not have been interpreted by the court as indicative of
the care, or lack thereof, with which Lehman Brothers prepared its opinion.
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but did not explain why three days was an insufficient amount of time to spend
on the investigation. Lehman Brothers had been UOP's investment banker for
nearly twenty years. It, therefore, should have been familiar with UOP's historical
financial information and performance. Preparation of the opinion might have
necessitated merely updating certain information and evaluating the results of the
investigation. 8' The court did not specify any information or method of analysis
which the Lehman Brothers team overlooked, misinterpreted or performed inade-
quately. Nor did the court hold that $21 per share was not a fair price for the
UOP stock.8" It is thus unclear exactly what the court thought Lehman Brothers
should have done but did not do in the three days it had to accomplish its in-
vestigation which rendered the three day period of time unreasonable.
After Weinberger, it is unsettled what fair dealing requires regarding the time
afforded for the subsidiary's decision-makers to consider the proposed transaction.
Since the Weinberger court failed to identify anything that should have been, but
was not, accomplished by either the UOP board or Lehman Brothers in order
to adequately fulfill their respective obligations, the significance of the short periods
of time permitted each of them is an open issue. It might be argued that the
time periods involved in Weinberger were so brief as to convince the court that
no board of directors or investment advisor could satisfactorily work within such
constraints, but shorter periods of time have been deemed sufficient for decision-
makers in other cases.83 In addition, the Weinberger court itself stated that the
amount of time, standing alone, is irrelevant to fair dealing,8" and it gave no
indication of what additional period of time would have sufficed. While a specific
number of days could be selected as the minimum period in which the decision-
making process for the subsidiary should be accomplished, 85 such an absolute re-
quirement would not guarantee that the actions necessary to reasonable and in-
formed decision making would be taken.
81. This would be consistent with the recent trend of integrating disclosure requirements under
the federal securities laws, so that neither effort nor information need be duplicated. See Securities
Act Release No. 6383, 24 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 1262 (announcing the SEC's adoption of new Registra-
tion Forms S-2 and S-3, and its amendment of Regulation S-K to facilitate integration of the disclosure
of information under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act). See also Securities Act Release No.
6499, SEC Docket (CCH) (1983) (announcing the adoption of Rule 415, governing shelf registration
of securities, in which the SEC indicated its approval of the practice of continuing due diligence
by underwriters).
82. "While we do not suggest a monetary result one way or the other. . . .[u]ntil the $21
price is measured on remand by the valuation standards mandated by Delaware law, there can be
no finding at the present stage of these proceedings that the price is fair." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
83. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Companies, 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), in which the time
involved for the board's deliberation was only a couple of hours.
84. "For whatever reasons, and they were only Signal's, the entire transaction was presented
to and approved by UOP's board within four business days. Standing alone, this is not necessarily
indicative of any lack of fairness by a majority shareholder. It was what occurred, or more properly
what did not occur, during this brief period that makes the time constraints imposed by Signal rele-
vant to the issue of fairness." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
85. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1039 (proposing that the majority shareholder be required
to give a least 90 days advance notice of the proposed cash out transaction so that "others who
might be interested in offering a better price would have an opportunity to make their offers known.");
Longstreth, supra note 3, at 21.
With respect to any tender offer which is subject to the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-78o(1982), the target company is required to send to its shareholders within ten business days from
the commencement of the tender offer a statement recommending acceptance or rejection of the offer
or expressing neutrality or inability to take a position with respect thereto. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2
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Instead of focusing attention on the number of days or weeks allocated for
consideration of the proposal, an unreasonable time constraint should be defined
as one that prevents the decision-maker-the board of directors, expert or minority
stockholders-from giving adequate consideration to the proposed transaction. For
the board of directors, adequate consideration can be defined in terms of a direc-
tor's fiduciary duty of care. In making decisions on behalf of the corporation,
a director is obligated to use that degree of care that an "ordinarily prudent per-
son in a like position would use under similar circumstances." 86 If a director would
breach his duty of care by succumbing to the time pressures imposed by the ma-
jority shareholder, then those time pressures are unreasonable. Similarly, the time
schedule imposed upon an expert would be unreasonable if compliance with it
would cause the expert to violate its professional duties to the subsidiary. In other
words, the expert must be allowed sufficient time to perform the necessary in-
vestigation, gather the relevant data and analyze all of the information required
to render an opinion. Finally, the minority stockholders should be given enough
time to read and digest all of the information provided to them, consider their
alternatives and simply reflect, for at least a brief period, on the decision that
faces them. The reasonableness of the interval of time allowed to any of the three
decision-makers depends not upon the number of days, weeks or months, but rather
upon the activity or inactivity that occurs and should occur during that period.8 7
The parties whose activity or inactivity will determine the sufficiency of time
afforded them, therefore, should participate in establishing the schedule for their
decision-making. In order to fulfill its obligation of fairness in dealing, the majority
shareholder should refrain from unilaterally determining the time schedule for the
subsidairy's consideration of the transaction. At a minimum, the shareholder should
consult with the subsidiary's board of directors and the representatives of the
two parties should together establish a time schedule. An even better practice would
be for the parent to permit the subsidiary's directors, specifically its independent
directors,88 to determine unilaterally the timing of their and the shareholders' con-
sideration of the transaction. Then, of course, the independent directors of the
subsidiary could, if they deemed it useful, take the time necessary to obtain and
even solicit the reactions of outsiders to the parent's offer. As a matter of pro-
cedural fairness, however, obtaining the reaction of outsiders need not be a con-
dition to a decision on the parent's proposal. 89
Similarly, the time schedule for the subsidiary's experts should be established
by consensus of the subsidiary and the expert, and not by the parent company.
The question of how quickly an expert will render an opinion is generally one
(1983). Furthermore, a tender offer "must be held open for at least twenty business days from the
date of its commencement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1983), and the shareholders of the target com-
pany, to whom the offer is made, are guaranteed the right to withdraw any securities they tender
within the fifteen day period following the commencement of the tender offer, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983) and Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). These time requirements
are designed to protect the shareholders of the target company from being pressed into deciding whether
or not to accept the bidder's offer.
86. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979) (added in 1974).
87. The time which is reasonable for one group may not necessarily be reasonable for the
others. See supra note 84.
88. See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
89. But see Longstreth, supra note 3, at 21 (proposing that going private transactions be per-
mitted "only after affording all potential bidders a reasonable opportunity to investigate the company
and make alternative bids.").
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of the issues negotiated by the expert and the client at the time the expert is
retained. Since the subsidiary, not the parent, is the client, 90 the independent
representatives of the subsidiary should negotiate the time schedule, and the time
schedule should be one which is not so brief as to cause the subsidiary's represen-
tatives to be suspicious of the reliability and integrity of the expert's opinion.
Structure
Another issue identified in Weinberger as relevant to fairness in dealing is
how the transaction was structured. Unfortunately, the Weinberger court did no
more than mention that the structure of the transaction was "Signal's doing." 9'
The definition of the term "structure" and its relevance to fair dealing, however,
is supplied by another Delaware case, Tanzer v. International General Industries.92
The Tanzer court considered three different aspects of the structure of a trans-
action as bearing on the entire fairness of the deal. The first aspect of structure
discussed by the court was the form of the transaction. The court inquired into
whether the form of the transaction-a cash out merger-was required in order
to satisfy the parent's purposes for the deal, or whether those purposes could
be served by an alternative form of transaction that would not force the minority
shareholders to give up their equity interests in the merged entity. This inquiry
required the identification of the purpose for the transaction, and the Chancellor
found that the principal purpose for the cash out merger in Tanzer was to facilitate
future long term debt financing by the parent corporation.93 The plaintiffs con-
tended that this purpose could have been satisfied by a stock-for-stock merger,
or a sale of the subsidiary's assets for the parent's stock and a simultaneous
liquidation of the subsidiary. The plaintiffs would have preferred either of these
alternatives to the cash out merger because either would have enabled the minority
stockholders to share in the benefits of the merger by making them shareholders
of the surviving corporation. The essence of the plaintiff's contention was that
if the parent could accomplish its purpose without forcing a cash out of the
minority shareholders, then the parent's fiduciary duty to the minority would dic-
tate that it pursue a means less onerous than the cash out to accomplish its
purpose.94
The Chancellor was not convinced, however, that the alternative forms pro-
posed by the plaintiffs were less onerous than a cash out merger. The court im-
plied that the cashed out minority shareholders could use the cash they received
90. But see infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text. It could be argued that the expert alone,
should set its time schedule, without interference by or consultation with the minority's represen-
tatives. In view of the importance of the timing of such transactions, however, such a proposal would
be unrealistic. The expert does have a duty, though, not to agree to a time schedule that would
render its work impossible.
91. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
92. 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979). While the Tanzer court did recognize that entire fairness
might be viewed as consisting of fair value and fair dealing, id. at 389, it did not use those concepts
in assessing the entire fairness of the transaction before it. Instead, it considered the structure of
the transaction simply as bearing on its entire fairness, without regard to what particular aspect of
fairness was addressed. Id. at 387-89.
93. Id. at 389.
94. This analysis is analogous to the least onerous means test used in cases alleging an equal
protection challenge under the United States Constitution where the challenged classification is suspect,
such as race. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-06 (1978).
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to purchase shares of the parent on the open market and thereby obtain an equity
interest in the surviving company while sharing the benefits of the merger. In
addition, the court indicated that the plaintiffs' alternatives might have been un-
fair to the minority shareholders because they would have forced the minority
to accept stock in the surviving corporation, an investment which they might not
have wanted. 95 The Chancellor did suggest that future cash out mergers be struc-
tured to give the minority shareholders a choice of either cash or stock in the
parent corporation as consideration for their shares, and indicated that such a
choice might render a cash out merger "more fair" to the subsidiary's public
shareholders than a cash-only transaction.96
The second structural aspect considered by the Tanzer court was whether the
transaction was structured so that appraisal rights would be available to the sub-
sidiary's minority shareholders. Delaware law provides that appraisal rights are
available only in certain kinds of transactions, one of which is a merger where
cash is the only form of consideration.97 The Chancellor considered the parent's
choice of a structure in which appraisal rights were available as indicative of the
entire fairness of the deal.
The court further stated that the unavailability of appraisal rights might
have indicated unfairness. In connection with its discussion of the alternative forms
of the transaction proposed by the plaintiffs, the court noted that appraisal rights
would not have been available if either alternative had been used. 98 That was
an additional reason for the Chancellor's rejection of the plaintiff's argument
that the proposed alternatives were less onerous than a cash out merger.
The application of Tanzer's analysis to the facts of Weinberger yields in-
teresting conclusions. In Weinberger, the primary purpose of the cash out merger,
as found by the Court of Chancery, was to provide Signal with a satisfactory
investment for its excess cash. 99 While there was no evidence that Signal had
considered any alternatives to a cash out merger, its purpose of using up cash
95. Of course a minority shareholder who was unhappy with accepting stock of the parent
corporation could simply sell his shares in the stock market.
The court also expressed some concern over problems in valuing the parent corporation's stock
after the merger. See Tanzer, 402 A.2d at 391. The court separately considered the existence of appraisal
rights as one of the eight factors relevant to a finding of fairness. Id. at 393.
See also Elfin, supra note 40, at 272, suggesting that the cash out price include an amount
to compensate the minority shareholders for the "the cost in terms of brokerage fees that must be
expended in order to secure a like investment;" Restatement, supra note 1, at 1373.
96. Such an offer of stock or cash was made by Hilton Hotels Corporation (Hilton) to the
minority shareholders of Mayflower Hotel Corp. (Mayflower) in connection with a stock-for-stock
merger of Mayflower into its majority shareholder, Hilton. The cash was offered pursuant to an
agreement, separate from the merger agreement, between the two corporations. Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (Del. 1952).
See Borden, supra note 2, at 1019 ("[U]nless there are significant immediate corporate cost
savings in effecting the transaction for cash rather than for stock, the parent should be compelled
to offer its stock in these transactions.") See generally Restatement, supra note 1, at 1372, 1374,
and sources cited in note 32 therein.
97. 402 A.2d at 393. Appraisal rights are not available under DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 8 § 271
(1983), the sale of assets statute, Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22
(1962), aff'd 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963), nor where the merger involves the exchange of
stock listed on a national securities exchange for the same, DEL. CODE AsN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(1) (1983).
98. 402 A.2d at 390-91.
99. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1348-9. See supra note 55. The Delaware Supreme Court was
not required to consider the lower court's finding regarding Signal's purpose in effecting the transac-
tion in view of its elimination of the business purpose test.
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could have been satisfied only by an alternative investment, not by an alternative
form of transaction with UOP. Any transaction which would have permitted the
minority shareholders to maintain an equity interest in the surviving business would
have required Signal to offer its stock instead of cash, and therefore would not
have satisfied Signal's goal of using up its cash. Even if Signal had offered the
UOP minority shareholders a choice of cash or Signal stock, the availability of
stock would have rendered the transaction less satisfactory than one in which only
cash was offered. So an alternative form of the transaction would not have ac-
complished Signal's purpose to the same extent as a cash out merger, and the
structure chosen by Signal did have the benefit of making appraisal rights available
to the minority shareholders.
It is interesting to note how the two structural elements discussed in Tanzer
are treated under the SEC's Rule 13e-3, which applies to going private trans-
actions involving public corporations. That Rule requires disclosure relating to
both the form of the transaction and the availability of appraisal rights. It re-
quires the majority shareholder to describe any "alternative means" which it con-
sidered to accomplish its purposes for the transaction and its reasons for rejecting
such alternatives.' 0 In addition, the parent must disclose the "reason for the struc-
ture" of the transaction.'"' A proposed version of the Rule contained a statement
that offering the minority shareholders an equity interest in the surviving business
entity would be indicative of the substantive fairness of the transaction.' This
is similar to the Tanzer court's indication that fairness might be served best by
offering a choice of cash or stock. Thus, both the proposed and current versions
of Rule 13e-3 support Tanzer's identification of these structural elements as im-
portant to an assessment of the fairness of the transaction to all shareholders
of the subsidiary.
Regardless of the interpretation offered in Tanzer and supported by Rule
13e-3, however, one specific holding of the Weinberger decision was the abolition
of the business purpose test.' 3 As a result, the use of the notion of a business
purpose for the transaction, even simply as a starting point to a consideration
of the structure of the deal, may be inconsistent with Weinberger's holding.
Moreover, even if purpose can be considered in order to assess the efficiency and
fairness of the deal's structure, a purpose such as that offered by Signal-to use
up excess cash-can easily by concocted to justify a cash-only transaction. And
after Weinberger, Delaware courts may refuse to become entangled in an argu-
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 7(b) (1983).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 7(c) (1983). Schedule 13E-3, item 13(a) also requires disclosure
of the existence or nonexistence of appraisal rights. The disclosure of the consideration of alternative
forms of the transaction and the availability of appraisal rights is considered "particularly important
to investors" by the SEC. Securities Act Release No. 6100, supra note 16, at 1451-54. As a result
of the SEC's judgment as to the special importance of this information, as well as all other informa-
tion elicited in response to items 7, 8 and 9 of Schedule 13E-3, that material must be set forth in
a section, at the front of the Rule 13E-3 Transaction Statement, designated "Special Factors." 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e)(3)(i) (1983).
102. An earlier draft of Rule 13e-3 included a substantive fairness requirement as well as the
disclosure requirement present in the adopted version of the Rule. See supra note 16. One factor
listed by the SEC as relevant to the substantive fairness of the transaction to the minority shareholders
was whether the consideration offered to such minority shareholders would enable them "to maintain
an equity interest in the continuing business enterprise." Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(2)(J), Securities Act
Release No. 5884, supra note 16, at 860.
103. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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ment over what is the true purpose for the transaction. It may, therefore, prove
difficult for a minority shareholder to use this idea of structure successfully to
contend that the majority shareholder is effecting a cash out without reason.
Even accepting Tanzer as providing the correct interpretation of the term
"structure" in the context of fair dealing, two questions are left open. First, it
is unclear whether the parent must offer the minority shareholders an option of
stock or cash even if offering stock conflicts with the parent's purpose for the
transaction. This question probably ought to be answered in the negative, at least
so long as the stated purpose has some basis in fact. Cash-only mergers are
specifically authorized by statute in Delaware, °4 and a judicial interpretation of
fairness ought not overrule such an express enunciation of legislative intent. Sec-
ond, the Tanser court did not conclude that the transaction must be structured
in the manner least onerous to the minority shareholders if alternative structures
are available. In many cases, the least onerous form of transaction will be a cash
out merger. But whether there is an obligation to use the least onerous form of
transaction was left open by Tanzer.
The third aspect of structure discussed by the Chancellor in Tanzer involved
the allocation of the effects of the transaction between the majority and minority
stockholders. The plaintiffs in Tanzer argued that it was unfair for the parent
to allocate to itself all of the benefits of the cash out merger.' 05 In this connec-
tion, the court considered the effects or benefits of the merger to be any gains
or savings flowing from the transaction in the form of operating economies, tax
savings and/or actual or perceived financial benefits resulting from the combina-
tion of the two businesses.' 0 6 It concluded that both the existence and value of
such benefits were too speculative to determine prior to the consumation of the
transaction. Therefore, the court relegated consideration of the effects of the trans-
action, as a practical matter, to an appraisal proceeding conducted after the
accomplishment of the merger. But the court found that it was precluded from
including the effects of the merger in its assessment of fair value because
the Delaware appraisal statute prohibited consideration of "any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."'0 7 It refused to
find that the transaction was unfair simply because none of its benefits had been
allocated to the minority shareholders, since those benefits of the merger were
precluded from consideration in the assessment of fair value.
In Weinberger, however, the Delaware Supreme Court reinterpreted the ap-
praisal statute and held that only "speculative elements of value" flowing from
the accomplishment of the transaction were excluded from consideration.' 08 Other,
non-speculative elements of value arising from the accomplishment of the trans-
action apparently now can be considered in establishing fair price. So, after
Weinberger, if the value of the effects of the merger are determinable with some
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(b) (Supp. 1982).
105. 402 A.2d at 394.
106. "To put the matter in context, suppose that the merger of a parent and subsidiary is expected
to generate an increment in the combined value of the two companies. In effect, the value of the
merged entity is seen to exceed the sum of the premerger value of parent (P) and subsidiary (S)
taken separately." Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 308.
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h) (Supp. 1982); Tanzer, 402 A.2d at 394-95.
108. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (emphasis added). See supra note 42.
Tanzer also considered whether the merger was financed by the funds of the subsidiary as one
factor that would indicate unfairness. 402 A.2d at 393. See infra note 109.
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certainty, then they are an appropriate factor to consider in appraising the fair
value of the minority's shares." 9
This last aspect of the structure of the transaction does not bear on fairness
in dealing. It goes only to the substantive fairness of the deal. If the majority
shareholder allocates to itself all of the benefits arising as a result of the trans-
action, it must simply compensate the minority shareholders for their portion of
those benefits. It is no reflection on the fairness with which the parent treats
the minority that all of such benefits are allocated to one party. This aspect of
structure, then, should be considered only as it bears on the substantive fairness
of the transaction and not as a part of fair dealing.
Negotiation
A corporation is typically represented by its board of directors in its rela-
tions with third parties." 0 The board of directors of a controlled subsidiary cor-
poration will often include at least some members who were elected by and are direc-
tors of the parent company."' These directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty
to both corporations. They are viewed generally as unsatisfactory representatives
of the subsidiary in a transaction with the parent because of their divided
loyalties.' 2 If the subsidiary is represented by persons independent of the majority
shareholder, the taint of unfairness resulting from the majority shareholder being
on both sides of the transaction may be lessened or removed. To that end, the
subsidiary corporation might appoint a board committee, composed of directors
other than those elected by the parent, to act as its representative in dealing with
the parent. The purpose of appointing independent negotiators for the subsidiary
is, of course, to reform the relationship between the parent and subsidiary into
one which resembles as closely as possible that which exists between independent
parties bargaining at arm's length.
The use of independent negotiators in Puma v. Marriott"3 and Harriman
109. Schedule 13E-3, item 7(d) and instructions (2) and (3) to item 7 require disclosure of the
effects of the transaction, including the federal tax consequences.
Item 6 of Schedule 13E-3 requires disclosure of the source of the funds to be used in the subject
transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 6 (1983). In the 1977 version of proposed Rule 13E-3,
two factors included as indicating the fairness or unfairness of the transaction were the anticipated
benefits to be received by the controlling shareholder versus those to be accorded to the minority
shareholders as a result of the transaction, including a consideration of the extent to which the trans-
action would be financed by the funds of the controlled corporation (Proposed R. 13E-3(b)(2)(G))
and the tax consequences of the transaction to the minority shareholders (Proposed R. 13E-3(b)(2)(H),
Securities Act Release No. 5884, supra note 16, at 860. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1014 n.130;
Silberman, supra note 28, at 1493, regarding the use of the corporation's funds to acquire control thereof.
For a suggestion that fair price be an amount net of income tax liability incurred by the minority
shareholders as a result of the merger, see Elfin, supra note 40, at 272.
See generally Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2, at 697, (arguing that the benefits of the trans-
action could many times be obtained without using cash as the only form of consideration).
110. "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter
or in its certificate of incorporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (Supp. 1982). See also MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35.
111. This was the case with UOP and Signal. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
112. See generally Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 315.
113. 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971). Puma involved the acquisition by the Marriott Corporation
(Marriott or the Company) of all of the outstanding stock of six corporations owned by the Marriott
Group which consisted principally of members of the Marriott family. The Marriott Group also own-
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v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.114 led those courts to conclude that no control
at all was exerted over the subject corporations. Puma and Harriman each in-
volved a transaction in which the "controlling" shareholder owned less than fifty
percent of the shares of the subject company, but owned enough stock to enable
it to exercise control if it so desired. In Puma, the negotiators were the indepen-
dent, outside directors of the Marriott Corporation, the controlled company. In
Harriman, both the "controlling" and "controlled" corporations were represented
by "special negotiating committees composed of persons unconnected with the
opposing negotiating party.""'S In each case, the court decided that the less than
fifty percent ownership interest of the "controlling" shareholder was insufficient,
alone, to establish that the shareholder dominated and controlled the subject com-
pany. Since the companies were represented by negotiators independent of the
"controlling" shareholders, the courts were convinced that the defendant-
shareholders had not used their ownership interests to exert control over the com-
panies in the specific transactions at issue. The absence of controlling stock owner-
ship interests coupled with a lack of actual domination in the challenged transac-
tions led the courts to conclude that these transactions should be afforded the
presumption of regularity applied to transactions between unaffiliated parties
negotiated at arm's length.
' 6
The same transaction that was at issue in Harriman was also challenged in
Collins v. SEC."7 The Collins court, however, was not particularly impressed by
the independence of the negotiators for the subsidiary. The members of the sub-
ed approximately 46% of the stock of Marriott, and four of the owners of the acquired companies
were directors of Marriott. It was this interest of the Marriott Group in the acquired companies and
the Company that caused the Company's outside directors to desire to sever the relationship between
the Company and the acquired companies. In addition, Marriott wanted to list its stock on the New
York Stock Exchange, but the Exchange would not permit such a listing unless the relationship bet-
ween Marriott and the acquired companies was eliminated. Id. at 694-95.
114. 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975). Harriman involved a proposed merger of E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Company (DuPont) into Christiana Securities Company (Christiana), an investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1982).
At the time of the proposed merger, the DuPont family owned, directly or indirectly, 75% of the
outstanding common stock of Christiana. Christiana in turn owned 28.3% of DuPont's common stock,
which was sufficient to constitute control by Christiana under § 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company
Act. In addition, the two corporations shared five directors. Id. at 142.
115. Harriman, 411 F. Supp. at 142.
116. Puma, 283 A.2d at 695-96; Harriman, 411 F. Supp. at 152. The district court in Harriman,
however, ultimately applied the intrinsic fairness test because the case arose under the Investment
Company Act. The court considered the Investment Company Act standard of "fair and reasonable
and free from overreaching" to be stricter than the standard of entire fairness. Moreover, the Invest-
ment Company Act required the court to consider the rights of the shareholders of both companies,
rather than just the rights of the subsidiary's stockholders. Cf. Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d
797, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the "parent" corporation, MDC, owned 46% of the stock
of ACI, a corporation purchased by Conductron, which was an 80%-owned subsidiary of MDC.
In discussing whether the purchase of ACI by Conductron was a parent-subsidiary transaction, the
court stated that "[uinder Delaware law, non-majority stock ownership is not sufficient, by itself,
to establish domination and control." And the lower court found that ACI was not in fact controlled
by MDC. Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to scrutinize the transaction "with care" because
of MDC's substantial ownership interest in both ACI and Conductron. The court did not, however,
hold that the intrinsic or entire fairness test was legally required to be applied under the facts before
it. Id.
See generally Rothschild, supra note 2, at 225, (discussing the issue of whether Singer applied
to less-than-majority shareholders in effecting cash outs).
117. 532 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub rom, E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
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sidiary's negotiating committee were full-time employees of the subsidiary; "they
were selected for the negotiating committee by a Board of Directors presumptive-
ly controlled by... [the parent, and] they had their compensation fixed by a six-
man Bonus and Salary Committee, three of whom owned stock in [the parent.]" II
The court concluded that the "arm's-length nature of the bargaining would have
been strengthened" if the negotiating committees also included non-employee
representatives of the unaffiliated shareholders."'
Weinberger stands in stark contrast to the facts of these cases. UOP did not
attempt to neutralize the controlling influence of Signal by appointing indepen-
dent negotiators. Instead, the entire UOP board of directors, over half of which
consisted of persons who were directors and/or employees of Signal,'20 acted as
the representative of UOP and its minority shareholders in the transaction with
Signal.' 2' The court, in criticizing this failure to arrange for independent represen-
tation for UOP, stated that the result "could have been entirely different if UOP
had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to
deal with Signal at arm's length."' 22
What would have been required in Weinberger in order to produce this "en-
tirely different" result? Puma, Harriman and Collins provide some indication of
who will be considered an independent negotiator. Harriman suggests that, in the
context of a parent-subsidiary transaction, independence means, at a minimum,
that the subsidiary and its minority shareholders be represented by directors who
are unaffiliated with the parent company. If these director-negotiators are
employees of the subsidiary, however, they may not adequately protect the interests
of the minority shareholders because of their desire to satisfy the parent corpora-
tion in order to maintain their jobs after the accomplishment of the transaction.
Therefore, in addition to independence from the majority shareholder, in-
dependence for the subsidiary's negotiators may require that there be no employ-
ment relationship between the director-negotiator and the subsidiary, as suggested
by the court in Collins.
Of the thirteen members of UOP's board at the time the merger was proposed,
five directors had no employment relationship with UOP and had not been
designated by Signal.2 3 These non-employee directors might have been appointed
to a committee to represent UOP in the negotiations with Signal. But these direc-
tors would have been adequate representatives for the minority shareholders only
to the extent that they could have and did exercise truly independent judgment.
Truly independent judgment means independence both from Signal, without whose
118. 532 F.2d at 598.
119. Id.
120. In addition to the persons listed in note 53, supra, the seventh Signal-designated UOP
director was James Crawford, UOP's president and chairman.
121. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704-08.
122. Id. at 709 n.7.
123. One of these five directors was James Glanville, the Lehman Brothers partner. While the
relationship between Lehman Brothers and UOP did not render Glanville an employee of UOP, it
is unclear whether a court would consider Glanville independent from UOP in view of the long and
close financial relationship between UOP and Lehman Brothers.
Each of these five directors owned some shares of UOP stock. Appellant's Appendix at A49.
This stock ownership might have made them better representatives of the minority shareholders, since
it would have aligned their interests as stockholders with those of the minority shareholders. Stock
ownership in the parent, of course, would cut the other way.
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consent they never would been elected, 2 4 as well as from the other members of
the board with whom they had served and who had appointed them to the
negotiating committee. 125
As a result of these potential ties between the most independent of all the
subsidiary's directors and the majority shareholder or it representatives, the use
of a committee of directors, while better than nothing, may not be sufficient to
reproduce an arm's length bargaining situation. It is perhaps for this reason that
Rule 13e-3 impliedly suggests going beyond the appointment of a directorial
negotiating committee to the selection of a third party negotiator. In connection
with a discussion of the fairness of the transaction, Schedule 13E-3 requires
disclosure of whether the transaction was approved by a majority of the sub-
sidiary's non-employee directors and whether these directors retained an "unaf-
filiated representative" to act solely on behalf of the minority shareholders in
negotiating the terms of the deal.126 This "unaffiliated representative" would be
someone who is neither a director nor related in any way to either of the parties
to the transaction.'27 The use of a third party negotiator, particularly if the parent
corporation is also represented by an independent third party, would come even
closer to reproducing an arm's length bargaining situation than would the ap-
pointment of a board negotiating committee for the subsidiary. Such representa-
124. Collins implies that the selection of members of the negotiating committee by a board
that is controlled by the parent taints the independence of the committee members. 539 F.2d at 598.
125. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), the court considered whether
it should defer to the decision of independent directors who were members of the board's special
litigation committee on the issue of whether a derivative suit against other members of the board
should be maintained or dismissed. Id. at 797. In deciding not to defer entirely to the committee's
decision, the court said:
Moreover, notwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law entrusts the corporate
power to a properly authorized committee, we must be mindful that directors are pass-
ing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members. The
question naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go I" empathy
might not play a role. And the further question arises whether inquiry as to independence,
good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps
subconscious abuse.
Id. (emphasis added). While the problem of passing judgment on the actions of fellow directors is
not present in the context of parent-subsidiary transactions, a similar concern may be raised as to
the identity of outlook and opinion shared by co-directors. See also A. BORDEN, GoING PRIVATE
§ 8.03[2] (1982); Longstreth, supra note 3, at 20:
Outside directors are invited to serve, not by the shareholders who routinely vote for
them, but by management or, in some cases, other outside directors. Often they have
some business or personal connection with the corporation or its management.
In any event, the relationship exerts on them a powerful force to be loyal to manage-
ment. However subtle and implicit this force may be, its existence cannot honestly be
denied. In speaking of loyalty, I am not suggesting a kind of wrongdoing, venality,
or antisocial behavior. Loyalty is a human quaiity-one we typically applaud. Here it
is simply a force to be noted.
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 8(d) and (e) (1983). The exclusion of employee-directors of
the issuer ought also to exclude directors who are employees or directors of the affiliate-parent cor-
poration. The 1977 version of proposed Rule 13e-3 included as considerations possibly bearing upon
the substantive fairness of the transaction whether the disinterested directors approved the transaction
and whether an independent representative of the minority shareholders was retained to negotiate
the deal on behalf of the minority. Securities Act Release No. 5884, supra note 16, at 860.
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 8(d) (1983).
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tion would eliminate any hint of interdependence or influence among the direc-
tors of both corporations which might arise from their association through
service. 28
The Delaware Supreme Court has never established a requirement that, in
a parent-subsidiary transaction, the subsidiary be represented by negotiators who
are independent from the parent nor did it announce such a requirement in
Weinberger.'29 What the court said in Weinberger, however, is equally significant
as the creation of such a general rule. The court stated that the appointment of
independent negotiators to represent the subsidiary would indicate at least an at-
tempt to reproduce a situation in which arm's length bargaining occurred 130 and
fair dealing is indicated by a showing that the transaction resulted from a process
in which each party acted as though the bargaining was at arm's length.13 ' After
128. DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 8 § 141(c) (1983), prohibits the board of directors from delegating
to a committee of the board "the power or authority in reference . . . [to] adopting an agreement
of merger." Since the statute prohibits delegation of such authority to a committee of directors, it
would also prohibit such delegation to a non-director third party. The proposed agreement, then,
must be submitted to the entire board of the subsidiary for approval or disapproval. However, even
under the statute, it would be sufficient if only the independent board members voted, as members
of the board and not as members of a committee, while the affiliated members of the board excused
themselves.
In Weinberger, the Signal-designated members of the UOP board did not vote on the proposed
cash out merger. They were, however, present at the UOP board meeting when the merger was ap-
proved, and the court criticized the method by which approval of the UOP board was obtained simp-
ly because of the participation in deliberations by the Signal-designated directors. 457 A.2d at 709.
This criticism of such participation is contrary to at least the spirit of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144
(1974), which governs approval of transactions in which directors are interested. Section 144 provides that:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and .. . any other corporation
...in which 1 or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers .. .shall
be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee thereof which authorizes
the contract or transactions, or solely because his or their votes are counted for such
purpose,
id., if the contract or transaction is, after full disclosure, approved by the disinterested directors or
by the shareholders, or if it is fair to the corporation. Id. Of course, § 144 does not regulate transac-
tions that are challenged because of a conflict of interest at the level of a majority shareholder.
129. But see infra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
130. It has become common for an acquisition by a controlling shareholder to be negotiated
on behalf of the public shareholders by a committee of independent directors and for
the transaction to be subject to approval by a majority of the publicly held shares voting
on the transaction. Under the cases which have emphasized negotiation with an indepen-
dent board of directors an acquisition with these procedural protections would be reviewed
by the courts under a standard resembling the "business judgment" rule applicable to
an acquisition by an unrelated third party.
Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-
Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard? 36 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1440-41 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
131. "Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though
each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm's
length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness." (citations omitted). Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 710 n.7.
"Certainly the judicial valuation proceeding produces a 'fair' price which is at best only a crude
approximation of the arm's-length bargain for which it purports to be a proxy." Fair Shares, supra
note 2, at 318 n.49.
See Restatement, supra note I, at 1357-58. Cf. Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d
789 (Del. Ch. 1967). Meyerson involved a challenge by a minority shareholder of an 80%-owned
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Weinberger, the use of independent negotiators to represent the subsidiary, whether
committees of directors or third parties, is one of the factors most certain to
be considered in assessing fairness in dealing.
In addition to inquiring into who represented UOP in the transaction with
Signal, the Weinberger court also considered whether any actual bargaining or
negotiation occurred between the parent and its subsidiary. The court did not
specifically hold that this failure to demand a higher price constituted any breach
of duty on the part of the UOP board. The court did, however, characterize the
negotiations as "modest at best."' 32 The implication is that the UOP board should
have demanded a higher price of Signal, i.e., "negotiated" on the issue of price.'33
There is no doubt that UOP's board did not demand that Signal pay more
than $21 for each share of UOP stock. The real question is whether the board
should have made such a demand. Consider the issue in the context of a merger
between two independent corporations. If the board of directors of Company A,
after careful consideration, concludes that the initial offer of Company B to pay
$x per A share for the stock of A is a fair and reasonable price for the stock,
must the A board then demand that Company B pay more than $x per A share?
Of course not, for such a demand would unnecessarily prolong the merger negotia-
tions, might cause increased legal and investment advisor fees, and could kill the
deal entirely. Moreover, if the board of directors of Company B believed that
the original offer of $x per share represented the fair value of A's stock, it might
subsidiary to the parent's retention of all of the tax benefits flowing from the filing of a consolidated
tax return. In discussing other cases involving the allocation of tax benefits between parent and sub-
sidiary corporations, the court considered two cases, also involving tax allocations, Western Pac. Corp.
v. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953), and Case v. New York R.R., 232 N.Y.S.2d 702, rev'd,
19 A.D.2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 150, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607, 204 N.E.2d 643. In
Western Pacific, Justice Jackson dissented from the Court's action and concluded that the subsidiary
was "entitled to what fair arm's-length bargaining would probably have yielded." 345 U.S. at 277.
On remand in Western Pacific, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its denial of relief to the plaintiff, and
responded to Justice Jackson: "how could this court or the district court determine 'what fair arm's-
length bargaining would probably have yielded?' Bargaining presupposes negotiations to determine
the maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay and the minimum amount a seller is willing to accept.
Such activity is a matter of business administration, and is not a judicial function." 206 F.2d 495,
499-500. In Case, the dissent of two justices of the Appellate Division was subsequently adopted
by the Court of Appeals in reinstating the trial court's denial of relief to the plaintiff minority
shareholder. The dissenting justices stated:
Even if this were an arm's length transaction, it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine what would be fair . . .Traditionally, what is fair is what
these two parties would agree on. But actually in such a situation the terms of agree-
ment would depend almost entirely on the bargaining ability and the personal characteristics
of the parties. Such factors defy the making of an estimate of the result that would
be reached.
19 A.D.2d at 390, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 627. See also Getty Oil v. Skelly Oil, 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
132. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
133. This issue was presented to the Chancellor, who rejected the claim on the grounds that
there was no absolute obligation on the part of the UOP board to seek a higher price per share
than that offered by Signal. Rather, the board's obligation was to act in a reasonable manner in
considering Signal's proposal. The Chancellor explained that "if UOP's board, after reviewing the
matter [the proposed price range of $20 to $21/share], was convinced that the high end of the proposed
price range was fair and reasonable to the minority, then its failure to seek still a higher price did
not, of itself, constitute a breach of its fiduciary duty owned to its minority shareholders." Weinberger
II, 426 A.2d at 1354. The Delaware Supreme Court failed to specifically address the Chancellor's
conclusion.
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constitute a breach of duty to the shareholders of Company B to agree to pay
more than $x per share.- 4
Applying this model to the Weinberger case, the question should be whether
the UOP board, after careful consideration, concluded that $21 per share
was a fair and reasonable price for the stock. The answer depends in part upon
whether the board's consideration of the proposal was deliberate. While the court
in Weinberger implied that the board's decision-making process was unreasonable
due to its brevity, that implication was not supported by factual findings or other
explanations.' 35 Furthermore, the combination of the premium offered by Signal
over market price and the receipt of the Lehman Brothers fairness opinion pro-
vided some support for the UOP directors' conclusion that $21 per share was a
fair price. The analogy to the merger between two independent companies, then,
would indicate that UOP had no obligation to negotiate with Signal for a
higher price.
But perhaps the court was dissatisfied with the absence of negotiations because
the subsidiary was not represented by an independent negotiating team. In such
circumstances, the court might presume that the majority shareholder's power of
control over the subsidiary was actually exercised to grant it some uncompensated
benefit. At the very least, the parent would be tempted to resolve all doubts in
its favor, and, since the subsidiary lacked independent representation, there would
be no one to challenge the parent's resolution of those doubts or exercise of con-
trol. A rule might be established, therefore, to require that, where there are no
independent negotiators for the subsidiary, the board of the subsidiary always
engage in some negotiations with the parents (i.e., demand more money than that
initially offered by the parent).
The Weinberger court did not establish a requirement of actual negotiation,
nor would the concept of fair dealing be furthered significantly by such a require-
ment. Such a rule would have the benefit of ensuring that the parties engage in
only superficial negotiations. It would not, of course, ensure sincere bargaining,
and the requirement that a higher price be demanded would not resolve the issues
of how much to demand and what amount, if any, to accept. Furthermore, the
establishment of such a general rule could have the effect of encouraging the parent
initially to place an unreasonably low value on the minority shareholders' stock,
in anticipation of later increasing the value in response to the subsidiary's demands.
Instead of a rule of apparent negotiation, the concern for adequate protection of
the minority's interests should manifest itself through the requirement of indepen-
dent negotiators for the subsidiary. That, alone, should satisfy the court's con-
cerns in this respect.
134. See Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675, (Del. Super Ct. 1963), in which the
court, in discussing whether the parent corporation's (Middle) board of directors breached its fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary (Midstates) when it failed to negotiate for a higher
price or more favorable terms in connection with an offer by a third party (Tennessee) to purchase
the stock of the parent corporation, said:
After the Middle directors had determined that it was a favorable one they would have
been guilty of a breach of duty had they not submitted it to their stockholders. And
upon what theory of fiduciary duty were they required to negotiate further with Ten-
nessee for the broadening of the offer to include the Midstates minority? Suppose Ten-
nessee had refused to do so. What could Middle have done about it?
Id. at 678. See generally R. FisHER & B. URY, GETr No To YEs (1981).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 and 86-87.
[Spring
Going Private Transactions
Use of Experts
It is common practice in mergers, particularly parent-subsidiary mergers, for
the acquired company's representatives to obtain an investment banking firm's
opinion regarding the fairness of the proposed transaction. 36 In cases challenging
the actions of majority shareholders, Delaware courts have considered a fairness
opinion relevant both to the fairness of the challenged transaction itself and to
the reasonableness of the board of directors' action in approving the transaction.' 37
The reliability of the opinion and the degree of influence it carries, however, can
be undermined by a lack of independence regarding the investment banking firm
that rendered it or the method by which the firm prepared its opinion.
The independence of the investment banking firm retained to prepare a fairness
opinion for a parent-subsidiary transaction may be questioned on several grounds.
First, the existence of a financial relationship between the investment banking
firm and the parent company might negate a finding of independence. For exam-
ple, in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,' an option regarding
the fairness of the cash out price offered to the subsidiary's minority shareholders
was rendered by Dillon, Reed & Co., Inc., an investment banking firm that "had
a $200,000 fee at stake for assisting [the parent] in its long term debt financing
program which depended upon the outcome of the merger."' 3 9 This relationship
between the parent and Dillon Reed resulted in Dillion Reed not being considered
independent with respect to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.' 40
136. In an acquisition by a controlling shareholder the board of directors customarily
obtains an opinion from an investment banking firm that the financial terms are fair
to the public shareholders or that the transaction is fair from a financial point of view.
... An investment banker's opinion on financial fairness may be influential with a
court which reviews the fairness of the acquisition and can help establish that the direc-
tors had a reasonable basis for a statement under the going private rules that they believed
the acquisition was fair to the company's public shareholders.
Chazen, supra note 130, at 1442 (footnotes omitted). See also BORDEN, supra note 125, at § 8.04.
137. See, e.g., Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indust., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 391 (Del. Ch. 1979) (involving
a cash out merger; the court considered an independent recommendation regarding fairness of price
as indicating that the price paid to the minority shareholders was "prima facie fair;" the independence
of the investment banker in that case, however, was questioned by the court); Puma v. Marriott,
283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971) (independent appraisals significant in finding that the majority
shareholder did not dominate both parties to the transaction). See generally Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (Del. 1952); Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F.
Supp. 133, 142 (D. Del. 1975); Chazen, supra note 130, at 1442.
Furthermore, section 141(e) of the Delaware Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(e)
(1974), provides that "[a] member of the board of directors of any corporation organized under this
chapter ... shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon
... reports made to the corporation ... by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board
of directors." Id.
Schedule 13E-3 considers obtaining the fairness opinion or report of an independent firm as bear-
ing upon the reasonableness of the majority shareholder's conclusion that the entire transaction is
fair to the cashed out minority shareholders. Schedule 13E-3 item 8(a), (b)(1)(vii), and (d), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-100 item 8(a), (b)(1)(vii), (d) (1983). The state of Wisconsin, on the other hand, requires
that the fairness opinions of two independent appraisers be obtained in order to establish a presump-
tion that the terms of a going private transaction are fair. The appraisals are only a part of one
of three factors necessary to establish the presumption. Wisc. ADuMN. CODE § SEC 6.05(1)(a)1 (1980).
For a discussion of this rule by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities, see Bartell, Minority
Stockholder Freezeouts Under Wisconsin Law (Panel Discussion), 32 Bus. LAW. 1501 (1977).
138. 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979).
139. Id. at 391.
140. Id.
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In Weinberger, the plaintiff argued that the existence of a non-financial rela-
tionship between the investment banking firm and the majority shareholder im-
paired the investment advisor's independence."' In the Chancery Court, the plain-
tiff claimed that Lehman Brothers conspired with Signal and the UOP board to
deceive UOP's minority shareholders.' 2 Lehman Brothers had been UOP's finan-
cial advisor in 1975 when Signal acquired its controlling interest in UOP, and
it had advised UOP with regard to the terms of that transaction. After the
acquisition was completed, several employees of Lehman Brothers prepared a study
of the consequences of an acquisition by Signal of the remaining publicly held
shares of UOP. This report, apparently requisitioned by Mr. Glanville, concluded
that it would be to Signal's benefit to acquire the remaining shares of UOP at
a price of $17 to $21 per share.'43 The report was never sent to either Signal
or UOP, but was kept in the internal files of Lehman Brothers. It was known
to exist, however, by one of the three members of the Lehman Brothers team
that prepared the 1978 fairness opinion, who consulted the report during the
preparation of the 1978 opinion.'44
The plaintiff claimed that if Lehman Brothers had considered $21 per UOP
share to be a good price for Signal to pay for UOP in 1976, then, in view of
UOP's substantially improved financial performance between 1976 and 1978, it
would be unreasonable for Lehman Brothers to conclude that the same $21 per
share price was fair compensation to the UOP minority shareholders in 1978.
Furthermore, Weinberger argued that the preparation of the 1978 fairness opin-
ion was tainted by the one analyst's knowledge and use of the 1976 report, because
the 1976 report was "geared toward that which was a good deal for Signal rather
than to a price which was fair to UOP's minority shareholders."' '4 5
The Chancellor was required to decide only whether this evidence supported
Weinberger's charge of a conspiracy between Lehman Brothers, Signal and UOP's
board of directors. The lack of any knowledge of even the existence of the 1976
report by anyone at Signal or UOP was controlling, and the court concluded that
the plaintiff had failed to prove his conspiracy charge.'
6
The existence of the 1976 report, however, and the fact that it was requisi-
141. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d 1333, 1347.
142. Id.
143. That report, designated as Exhibit LB-40 at trial, was entitled "Memorandum to
Mr. Forest Shumway-Confidential Draft-Considerations Relating to the Signal Com-
panies' Investment in UOP-Lehman Brothers Incorporated-June 1976." The basic con-
clusion of LB-40 was that it would be to Signal's advantage to acquire the 49.5 per
cent minority interest of UOP at a price of $17 to $21 per share.
Id.
144. Id. at 1348.
145. Id. at 1347.
146. The court added the following comment:
In addition, although Lehman Brothers has been lumped together with Signal and UOP
in plaintiffs allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff has offered no authority
to indicate that an investment banking firm rendering a fairness opinion as to the terms
of a merger owes the same fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders as does the ma-
jority shareholder who initiated the merger as a direct result of being retained by the
management of the controlled subsidiary.
Id. at 1348.
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tioned by Glanville, a UOP director in 1976 as well as in 1978, 14 undermine,
at least to some degree, the independence of Lehman Brothers from Signal. If
in 1976 Lehman Brothers was tempted to vie for Signal's business, the temptation
to do so in 1978 was clearly intensified. Lehman Brothers had been UOP's in-
vestment banker for nearly twenty years. In order not to lose that business entirely,
Lehman Brothers had to look to Signal for a future relationship, and the mere
possibility of a future relationship with Signal might have influenced Lehman
Brothers' assessment of the fair value of the UOP shares. While the Weinberger
court was not called upon to decide whether the relationship between Signal and
Lehman Brothers impaired the ability of Lehman Brothers to represent UOP,
perhaps such a relationship, even though non-financial, should be sufficient to
cast doubts in the future upon the independence of an expert in such a position.
Rule 13e-3 sheds an interesting light on the issue. It requires disclosure of
any relationship between the parent and and the investment banking firm which
"is mutually understood to be contemplated."'4 8 Under the facts of Weinberger,
no disclosure would have been required unless Signal and Lehman Brothers had
agreed that a future business relationship was at least a possibility, and there was
no evidence of any such agreement. Rule 13e-3, therefore, supports the conclu-
sion that the mere possibility that Lehman Brothers might court Signal's favor
should not be considered sufficient to taint the independence of Lehman Brothers.
Another factor affecting the independence of an investment banking firm in
a parent-subsidiary transaction involves the existence of an historical relationship
between the firm and the subsidiary. A long-standing relationship with the sub-
sidiary corporation may result in the investment banking firm identifying with
the interests of the company as a whole, including those of its majority share-
holder. This bond between the investment banking firm and the majority
shareholder would be strengthened if, as in Weinberger, the lead representative
of the investment firm served with the representatives of the majority shareholder
on the subsidiary's board of directors. In such circumstances, the ability of the
investment banking firm to act solely on behalf of the subsidiary's minority
shareholders, whose interests should be considered equivalent to those of the
corporation, 149 in assessing the fairness of the price offered for the publicly held
stock may be seriously questioned. Rule 13e-3 also identifies a relationship be-
tween the investment banking firm and the subsidiary corporation as significant,
and it requires disclosure of any such relationship to the minority shareholders.' 50
147. Glanville had been a director of UOP since 1971. Appellant's Appendix, at A50.
The Chancellor did consider the independence of Lehman Brothers in connection with the plain-
tiff's claim that the failure to disclose the lack of independence of Lehman Brothers in the proxy
statement was a material omission. The court concluded that there was "no convincing evidence that
Lehman Brothers had any commitment to Signal that would have had any bearing on its opinion.
. . .There is no evidence of any communications between Signal and Lehman Brothers concerning
the merger. As to LB-40, the mysterious document mentioned earlier, the evidence shows that no
one at either Signal or UOP was aware of its existence until after the suit was filed. Obviously,
there could have been no obligation upon UOP at the time to disclose it as a part of the proxy
materials, or to comment on its possible effect as to the independence of Lehman Brothers in giving
its opinion." 426 A.2d at 1353.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 9(b)(4) (1983).
149. See infra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
150. With respect to any report, opinion or appraisal .. .
(4) Describe any material relationship between (i) the outside party, its affiliates
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To eliminate this possibility of bias, the subsidiary corporation might retain
a wholly independent investment banking firm that has no prior relationship with
either of the parties to the transaction. For example, in Harriman v. E.L Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., s a case involving a merger of a partially-owned sub-
sidiary into its parent corporation, each company hired an investment advisor
that had no prior relationship with either of the corporate parties to the
transaction." 2 In contrast, in Tanzer the Chancellor rejected a claim that entire
fairness required the minority shareholders to be represented by an independent
investment banking firm." 3 Nor did the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger
establish such a requirement. The court did, however, criticize Lehman Brothers'
preparation of the fairness opinion. That criticism might have been partially
generated by the choice of the Lehman Brothers firm to do the job.
There are costs as well as benefits associated with retaining an unrelated finan-
cial advisor for the minority shareholders. An investment banking firm that
represents a company over a long period of time builds up a reservoir of knowledge
about the company that cannot easily be duplicated by a new firm. The absence
of such an historical familiarity may be reflected in the fee charged by a new,
independent firm to prepare a fairness opinion. The new firm will be required
to expend time and effort to examine historical financial data about the company
with which the company's regular financial advisor is already familiar and, con-
sequently, may be forced to charge substantially more than the company's general
advisor. Furthermore, the fees charged by an independent investment firm may
include a premium if the firm is hired on a one-time only basis. And in order
to ensure that the firm's opinion will not be influenced by its desire for future
business from the surviving corporation, its employment may require a prior agree-
ment that no party to the transaction will retain it for some period in the future.
The costs of complete independence, however, must be balanced against its
benefits. The principal benefit is to ensure that the interests of the minority
shareholders are adequately represented and protected from any domination by
the majority shareholder. Independent advisors can determine what would be a
fair price from the viewpoint of the minority shareholders by considering such
factors as what other alternative investments would be available to the shareholders
and the tax consequences of the transaction to the minority. That price can be
used as the starting point in negotiations by the independent negotiators to pro-
vide maximum protection for the minority."' Such representation will minimize
the control of the majority shareholder and increase the bargaining power of the
minority shareholders.
Even if an independent investment banking firm is retained to advise the con-
and/or unaffiliated representative, and (ii) the issuer or its affiliates, which existed during
the past two years or is mutually understood to be contemplated and any compensation
received or to be received as a result of such relationship.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 9(b)(4) (1983).
151. 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975).
152. They also jointly hired one firm that had been a financial advisor to each of the corpora-
tions. Id. at 142-43.
153. "It cannot be said, however, as a matter of law, that this lack of independent representa-
tion of the Kliklok minority ... necessarily caused the minority to not be treated fairly." 402 A.2d
at 391.
154. Perhaps the company's regular investment advisor could also be retained, so that the benefit
of its experience would not be lost.
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trolled corporation, the weight given to the firm's opinion may be affected by
the methodology used in formulating the opinion. In Weinberger, for example,
the $21 per share figure, which Lehman Brothers concluded was fair, was not
independently determined by Lehman Brothers. Rather, the figure was supplied
by Signal and UOP. The Chancellor, in discussing the charge that the UOP direc-
tors had failed to give reasonable consideration to Signal's proposal, stated that
the plaintiff's allegation was supported by the fact that the UOP board "did not
seek an independent appraisal of the current value of UOP's shares before
acting."' The implication of the Chancellor's statement is hat different weights
should be assigned to an independent appraisal and a fairness opinion which merely
puts a stamp of approval on the company's price. In other words, Lehman
Brothers' judgment would have been considered much more valuable if Lehman
Brothers itself had determined the amount which it considered to represent the
fair value of the UOP shares. This implication is supported by Rule 13e-3, which
provides that the discussion of a fairness opinion must include disclosure of
whether the parent or subsidiary corporation, on the one hand, or the third party
expert, on the other hand, determined the amount of consideration to be paid.' 6
The court in Collins v. SEC5 added a further refinement to this distinction.
There, each of the independent investment bankers was asked to recommend a
range of exchange ratios that it deemed to be fair, but they were also each in-
formed of their clients' views as to what the companies thought would constitute
a fair exchange ratio. The court considered this type of communication to under-
mine the integrity of the appraisal process.' 58 The experts might have been in-
fluenced by the suggestions of their clients, and such influence might have
manifested itself in the figure selected by them.
155. Weinberger I1, 426 A.2d at 1354. Other Delaware cases have focused on a current valua-
tion of certain significant assets of the corporation, such as real estate, as important for the board'sfull consideration of the fairness of price. Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971); Gimbel
v. Signal, 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974). In the Chancery Court, Weinberger did allege that the UOPboard had breached its duty to the minority shareholders by failing to have UOP's real estate and
patent assets reappraised. The Chancellor rejected this argument on the grounds that any such reap-praisal would not have made any difference to the UOP board. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1355.
In view of the Supreme Court's revision of Delaware law regarding acceptable methods of valuation,however, perhaps reappraisals of these substantial assets would have been significant to the UOP board.156. "If such report, opinion or appraisal relates to the fairness of the consideration, state whether
the issuer or affiliate determined the amount of consideration to be paid or whether the outside party
recommended the amount of consideration to be paid." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 9(b)(5) (1983).157. 532 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1976). This case involved the same transaction at issue in Harriman
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975), discussed supra at text accom-
panying note 114.
158. The court adopted the following portion of the report of the SEC Division of Investment
Management Regulations:
In our view, true independence of financial advisers where fairness is at issue would
preclude a situation where the advisers are made aware of their clients' thinking as toproper terms and consciously or not, are likely to tailor their opinions, to some degree,
to the results desired. Although it is clear from the Record that all the advisers did
considerable and highly competent work, how much more credible their final products
would have been had they been permitted to hand them over to their clients without
the pressures resulting from the knowledge that the negotiators were striving for a 2.5%
discount. Obviously, if that had been the case, the recommended ranges could have been
sufficiently disparate to require a re-thinking of the merger terms.
532 F.2d at 599 n.28.
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Again, the Weinberger court did not address this issue of the method used
by an investment advisor to determine a fair price. The purpose of imposing a
duty of fair dealing, however, is to keep the deliberative and decision-making
process as free as possible of elements of domination or influence by the majority
shareholder. To the extent that the method used to establish fair value is one
which is free from any involvement by the majority shareholder, it will further
the purposes of fairness in dealing and lend support to the value established by
the expert.
Disclosure
The standard of disclosure in Delaware for dealings between a majority
shareholder and its corporation was most recently enunciated in Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp.'59 Lynch held that majority shareholders must satisfy a standard
of "complete candor" with respect to the minority shareholders, which requires
majority shareholders to "disclose all information in their possession germane to
the transaction in issue. And . . . 'germane' . . . means . . . information
such as a reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether
to sell or retain stock. . . .Completeness, not adequacy, is both the norm and
mandate.""'6 The purpose of this strict standard of "complete candor" is to pre-
159. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). Lynch involved a tender offer by Vickers, the majority shareholder
of TransOcean Oil, Inc., for all of the outstanding shares of TransOcean.
160. Id. at 281 (citations omitted); also quoted in Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
The question naturally arises as to whether the Delaware standard of disclosure is different from
the federal securities law disclosure standard. The Delaware definition of "germane" is identical to
the definition of materiality set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) with regards to Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983). "An omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." Thus, Delaware requires disclosure of all material information. (See Rothschild, supra
note 2, at 230 n.85.
The emphasis in Delaware on "completeness, not adequacy" suggests that its standard is dif-
ferent from the federal standard. Federal law prohibits the omission of "any material fact necessary
to make the statements [already made] therein not false or misleading .. " (Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1983)) or "necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading. . . ." (Rule lOb-5(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983)).
Thus, federal law focuses on the totality of what is disclosed; Delaware law, on the other hand,
seems to focus on the existing information in a vacuum, regardless of its relation to other statements
that have been made.
At least in the Weinberger case, with respect to the issue of the disclosure of information to
the non-Signal UOP directors as opposed to the minority stockholders, the court was dissatisfied with
Signal's conduct because Signal had certain information-the feasibility study-that was "germane"
to the cash out, but which was not disclosed to the non-Signal UOP directors. The inquiry, thus,
was not on disclosure of information necessary to make other statements made not false or misleading;
there was no attention given to the relationship between the feasibility study and any other informa-
tion disclosed. Rather, the obligation imposed by the court was to disclose all information "germane
to the transaction." This standard seems to be stricter and more inclusive disclosure than that imposed
by federal law. See 15 BNA Sac. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) 2104, 2109 (1983) (reporting the comments
of Leonard Chazen at the 15th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: "All of a sudden we seem
to be confronted with a Delaware law of disclosure.")
However, shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Weinberger, the Delaware Court
of Chancery had a chance to apply the disclosure discussion in Weinberger to another cash out merger
case, and Vice-Chancellor Longobardi had some interesting comments about the Delaware disclosure
standard. In Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Civil Action Nos. 5827, 5830 (March 21, 1983), the
court addressed the claim of nondisclosure to shareholders, rather than to other directors. The vice-
chancellor seemed to emphasize materiality over completeness: "Although it is clear that the letter
and spirit of the law call for complete disclosure, disclosure is only required of material facts." (citing
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vent majority stockholders "from using special knowledge which they may have
to their own advantage and the detriment of the [minority] stockholders."' 61
The adequacy of disclosure was one of the principal issues involved in the
Weinberger case.' 62 The Delaware Supreme Court applied the standard enunciated
in Lynch to find that the majority shareholder should have disclosed to the sub-
sidiary's directors and minority shareholders the effects of the transaction on the
parent company. The court, in fact, went beyond this by holding that complete
disclosure required the parent to inform the subsidiary of the differences in the
Lynch). The court went on to emphasize that the proxy statement should be viewed in its entirety
to decide whether it "sufficiently discloses the matter to be voted on," and that the Delaware disclosure
standard is consistent with the federal standard. Id. The vice-chancellor's focus upon the sufficiency
of disclosure in the entire proxy statement seems to be a looser interpretation of the "complete
candor" standard than that given by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger. Perhaps this dif-
ference arises from the different circumstances of the two cases-in Bershad the disclosure at issue
was to stockholders in a proxy statement, in Weinberger the disclosure at issue was to other directors.
161. 383 A.2d at 281.
Even a timely and successful challenge to a merger based solely upon the inadequacy
of the disclosure of its terms and import may indirectly implicate the fairness question.
While a successful challenge may only delay the merger until adequate disclosure is made,
it is also possible that a requirement of full disclosure will induce a modification of
the transaction which eliminates all reasonable grounds for challenging fairness or will
result in a settlement at a somewhat better price for stockholders than was originally
proposed in the merger.
Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 303 n.15 (citation omitted).
162. "A primary issue mandating reversal is the preparation by two UOP directors, Arledge
and Chitiea, of their feasibility study for the exclusive use and benefit of Signal." Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 708.
[The disclosure] obligation ... may offer two kinds of protection to public stockholders
against an overreaching parent. First, disclosure of the terms and consequences of the
merger exposes insiders to the glare of publicity. The knowledge that any disadvantageous
or unequal treatment which they impose on public stockholders will be exposed to the
full view of investors may impel the insiders to treat the public stockholders more generous-
ly than otherwise. Second, even when the voting power of public shareholders is
arithmetically useless, a detailed understanding of the terms and import of the merger
may incline a greater number of them to seek appraisal, or even, on grounds of un-
fairness, to attempt to enjoin the merger or obtain a larger share of its proceeds.
Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 301 (footnotes omitted).
The Weinberger court defined fair dealing as including "how [the transaction] . . . was
• . .disclosed to the directors." 457 A.2d at 711. The court's use of the word "how" raises the
possibility that it was concerned with the manner in which information was conveyed to the board,
as well as what information was communicated. In Weinberger, for example, disclosure of the proposed
transaction to the UOP directors was accomplished through a combination of oral and written com-
munication. Signal did not prepare a comprehensive document to disclose the transaction to the UOP
directors.
The issue of how information is disclosed has been considered important under the federal securities
laws for purposes of Rule lOb-5. Two different aspects of the manner of disclosure might be relevant.
First, the form in which the information is disclosed must be such as will convey the information
to the intended recipient. Thus disclosure of information in a periodic report to the SEC may not
be as effective as a press release to get the information to the marketplace. Second, several courts
have held that it is not enough to include information in a disclosure document; the information
must be presented in a manner that adequately emphasizes the most important facts. "Buried facts,"
if material, do not satisfy the standard of full disclosure. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian
Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971), aff'd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972). Neither
of these issues has, however, been considered with respect to disclosure to the board of directors;
consideration has been restricted to how information has been disclosed to the shareholders.
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effect of the transaction on the parent depending upon various possible terms
proposed for the deal. In the past, such disclosure generally has not been re-
quired, and it is unclear whether the Weinberger court truly intended to expand
the Delaware disclosure standard. In order to determine what the court in
Weinberger held and what is required to be disclosed in future transactions, the
details underlying the disclosure issue in Weinberger must be examined.
The disclosure problem revolved around Signal's preparation of a feasibility
study on the proposed cash out merger. The study was prepared by several per-
sons who served both Signal and UOP, but it was not distributed to the non-
Signal members of UOP's board or to its minority shareholders. In the view of
the court, the failure to disclose the feasibility study caused the votes of both
the directors and stockholders of UOP to be uninformed.
The feasibility study was a sixteen page document that was prepared by Messrs.
Arledge and Chitiea, who were directors of both UOP and Signal. It included
a brief summary of the acquisition,' 63 a list of eight purposes of the merger,' 64
a chronological schedule of events leading up to the merger,'65 a summary of
the anticipated terms of a loan to be incurred to finance the cash out, and various
tables of financial information. 6 6 Most of the financial tables illustrated the ef-
fects of the acquisition on Signal assuming a purchase price for the UOP stock
at varying amounts ranging from $18 to $24 per share. 6 7 The basis of the study
was, for the most part, statistical analysis commonly performed by financial
analysts, and the bulk of the material contained in it could have been derived
from publicly available information.
163. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION
CASH MERGER
$103-137 MILLION ($18-24 per share) CASH
-BORROWED SHORT-TERM
UOP BECOMES WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF SIGNAL (Appellant's Appendix at
A1473).
164. These purposes were reiterated by the court at 457 A.2d at 708.
165.
CASH MERGER-UOP
DATE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS-fast
3/6/78 SIGNAL BOARD MEETS
UOP BOARD MEETS
3/10/78 MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED
3/15/78 PRELIMINARY PROXY INFORMATION FILED
WITH SEC
4/10/78 UOP BOARD MEETS
PROXY MATERIAL APPROVED AND MAILED TO
UOP SHAREHOLDERS
5/9/78 UOP SHAREHOLDERS MEETING-regularly
scheduled
APPROVAL AND CLOSING
Appellant's Appendix at A1476 (The words in lower case are handwritten comments).
166. Signal and/or its subsidiaries planned to negotiate a short term unsecured loan, which would
be renegotiated or paid off after the merger. Id. at A1484.
167. Other financial tables included in the feasibility study showed (1) a comparison of UOP's
1974 and 1977 stock market prices, the percentage premium of $21 per share over the market prices,
earnings, net worth and dividends (p. A1475); (2) the amount required to cash out the outstanding
UOP stock options (pp. A1480-81); and (3) the source of purchase funds depending upon the pur-
chase price, using a range of $18 to $24 per UOP share (p. A1483).
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The Chancellor found that the feasibility study "indicated that it would be
a good investment for Signal to acquire the remaining 49.5 per cent of UOP at
any price up to $24 per share. ' 68 Although the Chancellor gave no explanation
for this conclusion, it appears that he chose the price of $24 per UOP share as
the amount which would be a good investment for Signal because that was the
highest dollar amount in the $18 to $24 price range used in the feasibility study's
financial tables. Of course, the financial tables used every dollar amount between
and including $18 and $24 per UOP share in assessing the effects of the cash
out on Signal, and presumably the range .could have been expanded to include
both lower and higher per share prices. The Chancellor's selection of the $24
per share price seems somewhat arbitrary in view of his failure to explain why
he chose that price.
The Supreme Court adopted the lower court's finding regarding the $24 price
and added its own explanation for the Chancellor's conclusion. The court ex-
plained that any price of up to $24 per UOP share was a good investment for
Signal because the feasibility study showed that "a return on the investment at
$21 would be 15.7% versus 15.5% at $24 per share. This was a difference of
only two-tenths of one percent, while it meant over $17,000,000 to the minority."
' 169
If paying an additional $3 per UOP share would cause Signal to suffer only a
negligible 0.2% decrease in the return on investment, then the acquisition of the
remaining 49.5% of UOP at $24 per share would be nearly as beneficial to Signal
as at $21 per share. The court believed that this nearly equivalent benefit to Signal,
regardless of whether the UOP shares were purchased for $21 or $24, was "ger-
mane" to the transaction and that it should have been disclosed to the UOP board
as well as to its minority shareholders.' 70
When the court's reason for requiring disclosure of the feasibility study is
considered in light of the feasibility study itself, two questions are raised: first,
what did the 15.5% and 15.7% figures actually represent, and second, what did
the court believe they represented? The figures were obtained from two tables
in the feasibility study, one of which showed the financial results of the acquisi-
tion if Signal paid $21 per UOP share while the other used the $24 per share
price.' 7' The 15.5% and 15.7% figures appear on the $24 per share and $21 per
share tables, respectively, in the line entitled "Return on Equity" and under the
column labeled "1978 with 100% UOP: Full Year."' 7 2 The tables do not indicate
whether they are intended to convey financial information about UOP or Signal.
The court characterized the 15.5% and 15.7% figures as representing a "return
168. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1337.
169. 457 A.2d at 709 (emphasis added).
170. Under such circumstances, paying UOP's minority shareholders $24 would have had
relatively little long-term effect on Signal, and the Chancellor's findings concerning the
benefit to Signal, even at a price of $24, were obviously correct. . . .Certainly, this
was a matter of material significance to UOP and its shareholders.
Id. (citation omitted).
171. Identical financial tables using per share purchase prices of $18, $19, $20, $22 and $23
were also included in the feasibility study.
172. Each table contained lines for each of the following: sales, net income, earnings per share,
return on equity, net income/sales, current ratio, capitalization ratio, total liabilities/equity and book
value/share. The columns on each table were entitled: 1978 Profit Plan, 1978 with 100% UOP: Full
Year; 1978 with 100076 UOP: Eight Months; 1977 Full Year: 100% UOP; 1977 Full Year; 50% UOP.
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on the investment." 1" While this characterization is not entirely free from am-
biguity, both the language and context indicate that the court considered these
percentage figures to represent the return on the total funds. Signal would invest
to acquire the remaining 49.5% of UOP. 7 4 If the figures did represent the return
on Signal's investment in 49.5% of UOP, then it was not unreasonable for the
court to characterize the burden on Signal, resulting from a $3 increase in price,
as insubstantial.'7
It is clear, however, that the 15.5% and the 15.7% figures do not represent
the return on the total funds Signal would have invested in 49.5% of UOP. Rather,
these figures represent the effect that the additional investment at the various alter-
native purchase prices in 49.5% of UOP would have had on the total return on
Signal's equity.'"6 In this context, the 0.2% difference was indeed significant to
Signal. The 0.2% difference in the return on total equity of Signal is the effect,
on Signal, of an increase in the price paid for the additional UOP shares. It
represents a "loss" through dilution to all of Signal's existing stockholders as
173. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709.
174. If the court chose its words carefully, then the use of the term, "return on investment,"
to describe the two figures shows that the court considered them to represent either: (1) the return
on total funds Signal invested in UOP; or (2) the return on total invested funds of Signal as a whole.
The manner in which the court used the percentage figures indicates that it believed the percentages
illustrated something about Signal's interest in UOP, rather than something about only Signal itself
("a return on the investment" (emphasis added)). To obtain the figure representing the return on
total funds Signal had invested in UOP, 49.5% of UOP earnings must be divided by the cost of
49.5% of UOP stock.
Since the tables use the term "return on equity" to describe the 15.5% and 15.7% figures, the
court might have thought they represented the return on Signal equity invested in UOP. However,
because that return is obtained by dividing 49.5% of UOP earnings by the amount of Signal equity
invested in 49.5% of UOP, Signal's intent to borrow 100% of the funds needed to purchase the
remaining 49.5% of UOP would indicate that the return on Signal equity invested in UOP would be zero.
Even so, it would be surprising if the directors and shareholders could not have derived the figures
themselves. The denominator of the fraction (the cost of the 49.5% of UOP stock) could be deter-
mined simply by multiplying the number of shares to be acquired (11.5 million shares outstanding
minus the 5.8 million shares owned by Signal) by $21 and $24. Appellant's Appendix at A23. The
numerator of the fraction can be established by multiplying 0.495 by UOP's earnings. While the proxy
statement does not indicate Signal's prediction for UOP's 1978 annual earings, the comparative im-
portance of the $21 and $24 purchase prices can be determined by using the 1977 earnings figure
which, of course, was disclosed in the Proxy Statement. (The figure used by Signal in the feasibility
study as 49.5% of UOP's 1978 full year income was $14.8 million. See Appellant's Appendix at
A1493.) In fact, the percentages yielded are as follows:
$21 per share purchase price
$ 15,561,810 = 13% [using $14.8 mil., 12.36%]
$119,700,000
$24 per share purchase price
$ 15,561,810 = 11.37% [using $14.8 mil., 10.8%]
$136,800,000
176. The return on total equity of Signal is derived by dividing Signal's earnings (after interest
charges) by Signal's total equity. The percentage figures might also represent the return on total in-
vested funds of Signal as a whole. This return would be determined by dividing Signal's earnings
(before interest charges) by the sum of Signal's total equity and total debt. It seems more reasonable,
however, to assume that the table's designation of "return on equity" was carefully and accurately
chosen.
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a result of Signal paying an additional $3 for each UOP share. That is, by paying
$24 per share rather than $21 per share, Signal would have decreased the return
on the total equity invested in it by 0.2%. This information would clearly have
been material to Signal's shareholders.
The issue before the court, however, was whether this information was re-
quired to be disclosed to the UOP directors and shareholders, not whether it was
significant to Signal's stockholders. Assuming the court understood that 15.50
and 15.7% represented the return on total equity of Signal, the issue of whether
this information, and therefore the feasibility study, should have been disclosed
to the UOP directors and minority shareholders depends in part upon whether
information about the effect of the merger on Signal was material to a deter-
mination of the fair value of the UOP shares. The return on Signal's total equity
for 1977, including its 50.50o ownership of UOP, was 12.5%.177 By acquiring
the rest of UOP, this figure would have increased to a minimum of 13.0% for
the year 1977.17 This increase in the return on total equity of Signal, which resulted
from Signal's acquisition of the remaining 49.5% of UOP, was one of the
beneficial effects of the merger allocated entirely to Signal '
7 9 The question that
remains is whether such information was germane to UOP.
The analysis of this issue is complicated somewhat by the restrictions of the
Delaware appraisal statute relating to future value. Prior to Weinberger, Delaware
courts prohibited the consideration of any element of value resulting from the
merger in arriving at the fair value of stock in an appraisal proceeding. Under
this standard, it could be argued that since the information could not be con-
sidered in appraising the fair value of the shares, it would not be germane to
the shareholders. In Weinberger, however, the court expanded its interpretation
of the factors that could be considered under the appraisal statute in determining
the fair value of stock to include certain "elements of future value."'
80 Under
this expanded interpretation, disclosure of the effects of a cash out merger on
the parent might be required because any such benefit received by the parent could
be considered in determining the fair value of the minority's shares. By holding
that the feasibility study should have been disclosed, the Weinberger court
established just such a disclosure standard. It required that the benefit to the parent
arising from the accomplishment of the transaction be disclosed to the subsidiary.'
81
The question which remains unanswered is whether the Weinberger court in-
tended to require disclosure of the 15.5% and 15.7% figures because of its
expanded interpretation of the appraisal statute, or whether the court required
disclosure of such information based upon its erroneous belief that the 15.5%
and 15.7% figures represented the return on Signal's investment in UOP. Assum-
ing, for the sake of discussion, that the court did in fact intend to require that
Signal disclose to the UOP directors and shareholders the effects of the cash
out merger on Signal, the court thereby created a new standard of disclosure in
Delaware. If the court also intended to require disclosure of the difference in
177. Feasibility Study, Appellant's Appendix, at A1478, A1488-92.
178. Assuming a purchase price of $24 per UOP share. Id. at A1492.
179. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
180. 457 A.2d at 713. See supra notes 42, 108-09 and accompanying text.
181. By recognizing this benefit to the parent, the court has gone one step towards adopting
the recommendations of Brudney and Chirelstein in Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 319-22, that the
gains from the merger be shared by the shareholders of the parent and subsidiary.
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the effect of the merger on Signal depending upon each possible purchase price
to be paid, it radically expanded the disclosure standard.
The holding that Signal should have disclosed to the UOP directors and
shareholders the difference in the effect of the merger on it depending upon variouspossible stock purchase prices proposed to be paid raises a variety of questions.If this disclosure requirement is to be meaningful, the information must be disclosed
at a time when it is still useful, before the stock purchase price has been agreed
upon. But disclosure prior to the time the terms of the transaction are well settledis impractical as far as the minority shareholders are concerned. By the time thepublic shareholders are informed in detail of any significant corporate transaction,
all that is left for them to do is approve or disapprove the proposal. The termshave already been established by the directors and are embodied in formaldocuments. The public shareholders are not given the power to negotiate exceptby their votes, nor would such a large and diverse group of individuals be capable
of yielding that power efficiently.'82 Even if the difference in the effect of the
merger on Signal depending upon the purchase price paid had been disclosed to
the UOP minority shareholders, that would not have enabled them to demand
that Signal pay the $24 price. At most, such disclosure would have provided ad-ditional information for the minority shareholders to consider in deciding whether
to approve or reject the proposal.
Application of this expanded disclosure standard at the director level raisesfar more significant questions. In the context of a going private transaction, thedirectors, or whoever negotiated the deal on behalf of the subsidiary, would cer-
tainly find such information useful in assessing the value of the merger to theparent. But if, in Weinberger, Signal should have disclosed the feasibility study
to the UOP representatives because it illustrated the effects of alternate proposals
on Signal, what else should it have disclosed? Perhaps the question should bephrased in terms of whether any documents, papers or notes prepared by Signal
and relating to the cash out merger, as effected or proposed, were not required
to be disclosed to the UOP representatives. Does the Delaware Supreme Court
mean to impose a disclosure standard in situations involving parent-subsidiary trans-
actions which requires a controlling stockholder to share all information it has
with the representatives of its controlled corporation?
Such a standard is clearly much broader than that of the federal securitieslaws or prior Delaware law, and it goes beyond simulating an arm's length bargain-ing situation where the parties presumably do not have identical information.
It would, however, serve one very important purpose of fairness in dealing. By
requiring that exactly the same information about the transaction be received by
the representatives of the parent and subsidiary, any unfair advantage that might
otherwise be enjoyed by the majority shareholder as a result of its knowledge
and use of confidential material regarding the parent, the subsidiary or both willbe eliminated. Furthermore, a requirement of parity of information may lead to
the subsidiary's increased confidence in the reliability of the information withinits possession. Such a standard would therefore go far towards eliminating any
advantage gained as a result of the ability to control,'83 and perhaps even more
182. See Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 300.
183. But see Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 324-25, 315 n.42.
To assume complete independence of the parties implies disparities in information
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important it would result in the appearance of equality in bargaining power between
the parent and the subsidiary, which in turn might cause the subsidiary's minority
shareholders to have more confidence in the integrity of the negotiating and
deliberative processes.
It is not at all clear, however, that this standard of absolute and complete
disclosure between the parent and subsidiary corporations was what the Weinberger
court intended to establish. In fact, the court did not clearly state whether the
breach of fiduciary duty caused by the failure to disclose the feasibility study
was a breach of a duty owed by Signal, as majority shareholder, or by the com-
mon Signal-UOP directors. A narrow reading of the Weinberger opinion would
construe the duty to disclose the feasibility study as part of the duty of loyalty
owed to UOP by the common Signal-UOP directors. Several of the Signal-
designated members of UOP's board had the benefit of examining the feasibility
study. In fact, two of UOP's directors, Arledge and Chitiea, prepared the study.
These UOP directors did not, however, share the information in the study with
the non-Signal members of the board, nor were they isolated from the board's
deliberations on the merger. The Court's conclusion that it was unfair to fail
to disclose the feasibility study, therefore, might have been based simply on its
finding that the common directors, by keeping information about the benefits
of the transaction to Signal from UOP,' 84 violated the obligation of unflinching
loyalty owed by them to each company.
As a comparison to Weinberger, it is interesting to note the Rule 13e-3 re-
quires disclosure of the effects of a going private transaction on the parent cor-
poration, the subsidiary and the minority shareholders. The disclosure must in-
clude a discussion of the benefits and detriments of the transaction on all three
parties, and these benefits and detriments are to be quantified.1 85 While this item
which would pose a problem in valuation proceedings-what information or plans of
one company should be deemed to be known to the other? If all the buyer's knowledge
and plans are imputed to the seller, the buyer will be deprived of legitimate discovery
values. If less than full knowledge is imputed, the question arises as to how much, or
what items of knowledge should be imputed.
Id. at 315 n.2.
One interesting question raised by such a broad disclosure standard is whether the parent would
be obligated to disclose its upset price to the subsidiary. If so, the preparation by the parent of any
written document containing such information would be discouraged.
184. Since the study was prepared by two UOP directors, using UOP information for the
exclusive benefit of Signal, and nothing whatever was done to disclose it to the outside
UOP directors or the minority shareholders, a question of breach of fiduciary duty arises.
This problem occurs because there were common Signal-UOP directors participating,
at least to some extent, in the UOP board's decision-making process without full disclosure
of the conflicts they faced.
457 A.2d at 709 (footnote omitted). See supra note 128.
185. Schedule 13E-3, item 7(d) provides:
Describe the effects of the Rule 13e-3 transaction on the issuer, its affiliates and
unaffiliated security holders, including the federal tax consequences.
Instruction: (1) Concusory statements will not be considered sufficient disclosure
in response to Item 7.
(2) The description required by Item 7(d) should include a reasonably detailed discus-
sion of the benefits and detriments of the Rule 13e-3 transaction to the issuer, its af-
filiates and unaffiliated security holders. The benefits and detriments of the Rule 13e-3
transaction should be quantified to the extent practicable.
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might have elicited disclosure of the percentage figure for the return on total equity
of Signal using the purchase price agreed upon by the boards of directors of the
parent and subsidiary corporations, it would not have required disclosure of the
fact that a $3 difference in the per share purchase price would have yielded a 0.2%
difference in the return on Signal's total equity, nor of any other information
regarding the proposed prices.
Schedule 13E-3 also requires disclosure of any "report, opinion . . . or
appraisal... which is materially related to the. . . [going private transaction]. "186
If the feasibility study had been prepared by a third party, it would have been
required to be disclosed as a "report . . . relating to the consideration or the
fairness of the consideration to be offered" to the minority shareholders." 8 The
feasibility study would not, however, fall under this item, which provides for
disclosure of such reports only if they have been prepared by someone other than
the parent or subsidiary.
The Weinberger opinion is ambiguous on the issue of who owed the duty
of disclosure and why, and it also leaves open the question of what information
the court intended to require to be disclosed and why. The former issue can be
most easily resolved, under the narrow interpretation of the opinion, by ensuring
that in future parent-subsidiary transactions, the subsidiary is not represented by
a group that includes persons who serve both corporations. Such a requirement
is entirely consistent with the notion of fair dealing as it relates to the element
of negotiation.
Delaware should not, in the interests of fairness in dealing, adopt a broad
interpretation of Weinberger that would require an absolute sharing of informa-
tion between the parent and subsidiary. While equality of information might be
a laudable and understandable ideal, it is also an unreasonable one. The notion
of fair dealing has as its purpose the simulation of an arm's length bargaining
situation, which involves at least some notion of adversariness. In contrast, ab-
solute sharing of information would most likely result in the relationship between
the parent and subsidiary being characterized by cooperation. While an atmopshere
of cooperation may lead to a more efficient bargaining process between truly in-
dependent parties, where the parties are not in fact independent, a negotiating
process imbued with some degree of adversariness will provide necessary protec-
tion against overreaching. Moreover, a complete sharing requirement would be
overkill. It would require the parent to disclose information gained because of
its ability to control as well as any other relevant information. It is the inclusion
of "any other relevant information" in the disclosure standard that makes such
a rule unduly burdensome and unreasonable.
A secondary disclosure issue considered by the Weinberger court was Signal's
failure to disclose to the UOP minority shareholders the "cursory" manner in
which Lehman Brothers prepared its fairness opinion. In the opinion letter, a
(3) If this statement is filed by an affiliate of the issuer, the description required
by Item 7(d) should include but not be limited to, the effect of the Rule 13e-3 transac-
tion on the affiliate's interest in the net book value and net earnings of the issuer in
terms of both dollar amounts and percentages.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 7(d) (1983).
186. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, item 9(a) (1983).
187. Id.
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copy of which was distributed to the UOP directors and to the minority
shareholders in the proxy statement, Lehman Brothers disclosed the actions it took
in preparing its opinion."" But the proxy statement did not state that all of Lehman
Brothers' activities were accomplished within a period of only three business days.
The problem with requiring disclosure of the time spent on the investigation
supporting an investment banking firm's fairness opinion, however, is that, without
any standard of comparison, it is a relatively meaningless piece of information.
The time spent on the investigation for a fairness opinion ought to vary accord-
ing to the historical relationship between the company and the expert, the com-
plexity of the company and the sophistication of the expert. At most, disclosure
of the number of days or weeks spent on the supporting investigation, 9 when
coupled with a description of the activities that were performed as a part of the
investigation, would give the shareholders some indication of the case with which
the opinion was prepared, and, consequently, the reliability of the opinion.
If the Signal-UOP merger was accomplished today, the amount of time spent
by Lehman Brothers in preparing its fairness opinion would not be required to
be dislcosed pursuant to Rule 13e-3. The Rule does not even require that the
opinion itself be disseminated to the minority shareholders,19 but it does oblige
the company to prepare and disclose a summary of the opinion. The summary
must "include, but not be limited to, the procedures followed; the findings and
recommendations; the bases for and the methods of arriving at such findings and
recommendations; instructions received from the issuer or affiliate; and any limita-
tion imposed by the issuer or affiliate on the scope of the investigation."' 19' While
the amount of time spent in preparation of the opinion might be included as
part of the discussion of the instructions received by the investment firm, such
information is not specifically required to be discussed in the summary and it
is not common practice to include it. In a case such as Weinberger, however,
time was of the essence and it was one of the principal reasons that UOP's Chair-
man retained the Lehman Brothers firm. Therefore, requiring disclosure of the
schedule imposed by Signal might be justified as providing the minority
shareholders with a more complete picture of the interests involved in, and the
nature of, the deliberative and decision-making processes.
Initiation
The majority shareholder has virtually complete control over when to initiate
a going private transaction and this control may be used to detrimentally affect
the value placed upon the minority's shares in the subsidiary.' 92 The time selected
188. The actions taken by Lehman Brothers and listed in the opinion include those referred
to in the text accompanying note 78, supra, as well as a review of the terms of Signal's 1975 invest-
ment in UOP and other cash out mergers of comparable corporations. Appellant's Appendix at A102.
For a discussion of the requirement to disclose the basis upon which the cash out price was
established, see Borden, supra note 2, at 1029-30.
189. In fact, the disclosure would have to be of the number of days spent by the number of
people to be accurate.
190. See Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 9 (1983), and Rule 13E-3(e)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e(e)(1) (1983). The opinion would, however, be required to be filed as an exhibit to the Schedule
pursuant to item 17(b) thereof, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 17(b) (1983).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 9(b)(6) (1983).
192. See Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 300 ("[T]he timing of the decision to merge may be
19841
The Journal of Corporation Law
for the transaction might be when the economy and the stock market are generally
depressed. The market price of the subsidiary's stock then would be low com-
pared to its historical stock prices, but the stock would not be undervalued by
the public. On the other hand, the problem might be one of disclosure resulting
in undervaluation. The time selected to initiate the transaction might be when
the market does not accurately reflect the value of the subsidiary because infor-
mation favorable to the subsidiary's financial position is known by the majority
shareholder but unavailable to the public.
Both of these factors have been considered relevant in assessing the fairness
of a majority shareholder's actions. The disclosure aspect of the initiation ele-
ment was considered in Polin v. Conductron Corp.,'93 where the challenged trans-
action was a going private merger in which the public shareholders of the sub-
sidiary, Conductron, exchanged their stock for stock of the parent company. The
plaintiff claimed that the exchange ratio was grossly inadequate, in part because
the parent had waited to initiate the merger until the market price of Conductron
stock was artificially low. The artificially depressed market price was caused, ac-
cording to the plaintiff, by two acts of the parent: its refusal to enforce a legitimate
claim on behalf of the subsidiary and its procurement of the delisting of the sub-
sidiary's stock from the American Stock Exchange. The court found that the parent
had not caused the delisting or mishandled the subsidiary's claim, which even-
tually was settled; it therefore concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove
his claim.
Cases like Polin can be regulated most efficiently through enforcement of
the Lynch standard of disclosure. Any information which reflects upon the market
value of the subsidiary's stock would clearly be germane to the transaction, and
therefore ought to be disclosed. If the information is not ripe for disclosure, the
majority shareholder should follow the rule of "disclose or abstain" and delay
the transaction until disclosure has been accomplished and the information is
accurately reflected in the market price of the minority's shares.'19
Most of the concern regarding the time of the transaction's initiation has
involved the depressed market situation rather than a disclosure problem. In
Tanzer,'" for example, the plaintiffs argued that the cash out merger was pro-
posed at a time when the subsidiary's stock price was beginning to appreciate,
after being depressed by the general market decline in the early 1970's. The
Chancellor was unconvinced that it was unfair to execute the transaction at such
a time, however, because the market price that was relevant for purposes of com-
based on the parent's anticipation of a substantial increase in the subsidiary's earnings." Id. at 305-06);
Arsht, supra note 34, at 1499; Sommer, Background and Policy Considerations (Panel), 32 Bus. LAW
1513, 1514-15 (1977) ("It seems to me that fairness also has ... a 'fourth dimension, and that dimension
is one of timing. It seems to me that, when management (the insiders) uses corporate assets to take
advantage of the cycles in the market for the corporation's stock for their own advantage, this should
be put on the scale when weighing to find fairness.").
193. 552 F.2d 797, 816 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying Delaware law). See also Harman v. Masoneilan
Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).
194. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Securities and Exchange Comm'n
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See
Weiss, supra note 2, at 679 n.349; Restatement, supra note 1, at 1366; Rothschild, supra note 2, at 198.
For a discussion of the timing of the cash out with respect to the initial affiliation of the parent
and subsidiary, see also supra note 12.
195. 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979).
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parison to the merger price was the market price at the time of, or just prior
to, the merger. The Delaware appraisal statute, at the time of the Tanzer deci-
sion, was interpreted as not permitting consideration of future value, so that the
market trend after the merger was irrelevant. The merger price in Tanzer included
a premium over the market price of the stock on the day preceding the announce-
ment of the merger, and the court considered that premium indicative of substan-
tive fairness. 96
In two cases dealing with "classic" going private transactions, where only
one business entity was involved, the courts took more seriously the claim of un-
fairness resulting from the majority shareholder's selection of a time when the
company's stock price was low in comparison to its historical market prices. In
Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,' the court affirmed the denial of a motion
to dismiss a complaint which claimed money damages as a result of a cash out
merger. In reaching its decision, the court noted that "the majority [had] com-
plete control over the timing of the 'squeeze play' on the public stockholders-a
timing conceivably selected to favor the majority only, based upon the status of
the market and the elements of an appraisal."' 98 This complete control by the
majority shareholder convinced the court that the transaction before it should
be judged against a standard of "the strictest observance of the law of fiduciary
duty." 99 Similarly, in Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp.,"' the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in discussing the fairness of the proposed transaction, noted that the
majority shareholders apparently chose "a most opportune time-in relation to
Power/Mate's earnings record since it went public-to buy out the minority at
an unreasonably low price." ''  Moreover, just prior to the proposed merger,
$200,000 was paid out to two principal corporate officers as bonuses.2"2 That pay-
out decreased the company's earnings per share, thereby potentially affecting the
stock's market price.203
The State of Wisconsin has formally addressed the issue of the possible un-
fairness resulting from the time when a going private transaction is initiated in
an administrative securities regulation. The Wisconsin rule adopts a presumption
that a going private transaction is fair if certain conditions regarding fair value
are met. One of those conditions is that, if the company's most recent sale of
stock to the public occurred within ten years before the going private transaction,
then the price offered for the stock of the minority shareholders in the going
private transaction must be at least equal to the company's most recent public
196. Id. at 392-95. As to the amount of the premium in going private transactions generally,
see Phalon, FoRBES, Nov. 7, 1983, at 40, 42.
197. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). Roland involved a "classic" going private situation, in which
only one business enterprise was involved. It would have been categorized as a Type III transaction.
See supra note 12. Several commentators have recommended prohibition of such transactions.
198. Id. at 1037.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
201. Id. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573. In fact, Power/Mate went public at $5 per share and proposed
to go private at $2 per share. Id. at 39-41, 342 A.2d at 568-69. See infra note 204.
202. Id. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573 (1975).
203. Id. at 48-49, 342 A.2d at 573-74. See also Schlick v. Penn-Dixie, 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1974) (plaintiff claimed that the parent corporation manipulated the market price of the subsidiary's
stock and then used the resultant depressed price as the basis of the merger exchange ratio).
See generally Mayerson & Crawford, Fairness to Minority Shareholders in "Going Private" Trans-
actions: A Growing Concern, ILL. BAR J. 484, 485 (April 1979); Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 306.
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offering price.204 An Indiana statute prohibits any second step of an acquisition,
within two years of the first purchase, unless "substantially equivalent terms"
are offered in the second transaction. 25 Similarly, Rule 13e-3 excepts from its
terms a going private transaction that follows within one year of a tender offer
in which the majority shareholder gained control2 6 so long as the consideration
paid to the minority shareholders is at least equal to the highest price offered
in the tender offer.
Delaware has not adopted a requirement of equal price regardless of a dif-
ference in economic conditions, nor did the Weinberger court indicate that such
a rule was required for fair dealing. In fact, the court merely identified the initia-
tion of the transaction as one element of fair dealing without explaining the mean-
ing or significance of the term. Schedule 13E-3 provides some guidance on whether
this aspect of initiation should be considered relevant to fairness. It requires
disclosure of the "the reasons ... for undertaking such transaction at this time. ' 20 7
If those reasons include a comparatively low current market price for the sub-
sidiary's stock, then disclosure of that information should provide the subsidiary's
representatives and minority shareholders with a basis for assessing the fairness
or unfairness of the deal. If they consider the time of the transaction's initiation
to cause the fair value of the stock to be unreasonably low, they can exercise
their voting power to reject the proposal until a later date. The element of initia-
tion, therefore, is really just one more aspect of the requirement of adequate
disclosure. Complete disclosure by the majority shareholder could cure both con-
cerns regarding the time when the transaction is initiated if the minority or its
representatives have the ability to respond to such disclosure.
Approval of the Transaction
Delaware law requires a simple majority vote of the stockholders to approve
a merger such as that of UOP into Signal.20 8 A going private transaction, therefore,
could be approved by the necessary votes if only the majority shareholder voted,
without regard to any voice of the minority shareholders. It is common practice,
however, for the majority stockholder to require approval by a majority of the
minority shares as a condition to the effectiveness of the merger.
Delaware courts have considered the existence of such a condition evidence
of the fairness of the transaction.0 9 By agreeing to such a condition, the majority
shareholder releases some of its controlling power in favor of the minority
204. "The terms of the transactions shall be presumed to be fair if . . .[t]he latest public
offering of the securities occurred more than 10 years prior to the transaction, or the compensation
is greater than the public offering price." WIs. ADMxN. CODE § SEC 6.05 (a)(2) (1980).
205. IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (Supp. 1983).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(1) (1083). See supra note 12; Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 337.
But see Borden, supra note 2, at 1006 & n.100 (recommending that the cash out price following
a tender offer be below the tender offer price). In response to Borden, see Restatement, supra note
1, at 1361 n.15.
207. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 7(c).
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)(Supp. 1982). See Borden, supra note 2, at 1017.
209. The absence of a condition of approval by a majority of the minority shares has been
cited as a reason for not placing the burden of proof of unfairness on the minority shareholders,
Tanzer v. Int'l General Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 383, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979); Harman v. Masoneilan
Intern., Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 499 (Del. 1982). The presence of such a condition may weigh in favor
of a finding of fairness. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d 1333, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1981). See BORDEN, supra
note 125, at § 8.05.
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shareholders. In Tanzer, the Chancellor stated that the absence of such a condi-
tion was good reason for not placing the burden of proving unfairness on the
minority shareholders. 210 The burden of proof rested with the majority shareholder
because of its ability to use its power of control to its advantage and to the cor-
responding detriment of the minority shareholders. Without the condition, the
minority has no say whatsoever regarding the transaction. There is no semblance
of arm's length bargaining because the majority is the sole meaningful actor in
the entire transaction. In contrast, if the merger is subject to the approval of
the minority shareholders, then in theory the parent corporation is not using its
power of control to force the transaction upon the minority.21' There is then
someone-the minority shareholders-on the other side of the transaction from
the majority shareholder.
The court in Weinberger recognized this theoretical distinction and gave it
practical consequences. It held that if a going private transaction is approved by
a majority of the minority shares, and the vote is based upon complete disclosure,
then the burden of going forward on the issue of entire fairness shifts to the
complaining minority shareholder." 2 Therefore, such approval removes the
210. 402 A.2d 383, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979).
211. Cf. Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 495 (Del. 1982). The complaint
alleged proxy misrepresentation "coerced" the stockholders' approval, and the court found this allegation
to constitute a charge that the majority shareholder used its power of control to effectuate the tran-
saction. Id.
But see Weiss, supra note 2, at 676-77 (disagreeing with the view that a vote of minority shareholders
should influence the court); Longstreth, supra note 3, at 20 (questioning the ability of the minority
to accurately assess the fairness of the proposal); Fair Shares, supra note 2, at 300:
Indeed, even if the merger plan were made effective only when approved by a majority
of the public stockholders, as if the latter were a separate class, the barriers to concerted
stockholder action in the context of management's exclusive control of the proxy machinery
would almost always assure a favorable vote. The atomized nature of the company's
stockholdings, together with the easy salability of shares, means that stockholders can-
not rely on group action to reject what they see as a mistaken decision to merge, par-
ticularly when the decision was made by a parent holding a large block of stock. Moreover,
ratification gives dissatisfied stockholders only the limited option of rejecting the merger;
they do not generally either initiate the merger discussion or participate in formulating
its terms. They are confined to approving or disapproving a transaction, the terms of
which are defined by management and can rarely be modified by stockholders during,
or after, the bargaining process. Finally, since the timing and context for seeking ap-
proval of the merger are also dictated by management which controls, and has unlimited
access to, the proxy apparatus, the process of seeking stockholder approval is skewed
in favor of a vote for approval.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Compare Borden, supra note 2. In criticizing Fair Shares, Borden states that: "One is reminded
here of Mr. Churchill's famous dictum: if the choice is to be a determination by an imperfect democratic
process or by regulatory fiat, I for one would prefer the former." Id. at 1016 n.133.
212. After agreeing with the Chancery Court's determination that the plaintiff bears a burden
of pleading "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to demonstrate
the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority" and is also required to show some reason why
"entire fairness" ought to be the standard against which the challenged actions are judged, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of who bears the ultimate burden of proof as to the fairness of the trans-
action. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (footnote omitted). According to the Chancellor, that burden
was on the majority shareholder. The Supreme Court concurred with this as a general rule but carved
out one important and potentially all-inclusive exception: where the transaction has been approved
by a majority of the minority shares, then the minority shareholder must prove that the transaction
was unfair. The court added, as a condition to this exception, the requirement that the majority
shareholder demonstrate that the vote of the minority shareholders was based upon full disclosure.
Therefore, after Weinberger, if there is full disclosure and the merger is approved by a majority
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presumption of unfairness which generally attaches to such transactions. Such a
shift in the burden of persuasion resulting from an informed vote of the
shareholders has been applied in prior Delaware cases, but has never before been
applied to a case challenging a fundamental corporate transaction such as a going
private merger.21
3
of the minority shares, then the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the merger was unfair
to the minority shareholders.
Prior to Weinberger, once the plaintiff produced evidence of self-dealing, the entire fairness test
was applied and the only option open to the defendant was to prove that the transaction was fair.
After Weinberger, the defendant has two, or perhaps three, responses available. First, the defendant
can prove the fairness of the transaction and respond as would have been appropriate before Weinberger.Second, the defendant can produce some evidence of fairness by showing that the transaction was
approved, after full disclosure, by a "cleansing" vote of the shareholders. This evidence does not
conclusively establish the fairness of the transaction, but it results in rebutting the presumption of
unfairness. In response, the plaintiff may still show unfairness, even where the transaction has been
approved by the minority shareholders after full disclosure. The third option potentially open to thedefendant is to show that it has complied with the requirements of fair dealing, and to argue that
this also should be regarded as evidence of fairness sufficient to rebut the presumption where ap-
proval by the minority shareholders has been obtained. Because evidence of fair dealing establishes
full disclosure, the presumption should be considered met. But where approval of the transaction
was obtained only at the board level, then even though that can satisfy fair dealing, Delaware has
not indicated that it will consider board-level approval sufficient to rebut the presumption of un-
fairness. See generally Epstein, supra note 32 (presenting a system of presumptions regarding the pleading
and development of a case).
213. Although the court set forth this exception as if it was a well established rule of law,it was in fact the first time in a case challenging a fundamental corporate transaction, such as a
merger, that the Supreme Court held that the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shares
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove unfairness. See Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680,682 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970) (involving a stock-for-stock merger of affiliated
corporations; the court refused to shift the burden of proof even though the transaction was approved
by a majority of the minority shares); Stryker & Brown v. The Bon Ami Co., No. 1945 (Del. Ch.
March 16, 1964), reprinted in 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 157 (1977) (involving a stock-for-stock parent-
subsidiary merger; the court refused to put the burden of proof on the minority shareholders even
though a majority of the minority shares were voted in favor of the transaction); David J. Greene
& Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432 (Del. Ch. 1968) (involving facts similar to those
in Stryker & Brown, and following it); Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del.Ch. 1979). But see Fisher v. United Technologies Corp., No. 5847 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1981) reprinted
in 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 380 (1981) (involving the second step of a tender offer, a stock-for-stock merger
of the target into the bidder, where the court held that shareholder ratification results in the burden
of proof being on the plaintiff minority shareholder, citing Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del.
1979)).
The court in Weinberger cited Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979), as support for
the exception. Michelson involved a challenge to the directors' modification of a stock option plan
of Household Finance Corporation and, as such, involved a claim that the directors were guilty of
self-dealing. The directors, however, submitted all of their actions to the shareholders for ratification
and, after the plaintiff's suit was brought, the shareholders' vote of approval was obtained. The court
held that so long as the corporate act under consideration did not amount to waste or a gift of
corporate assets, then a vote of the shareholders based upon full disclosure approving the actions
resulted in the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving unfairness. Accord Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58-59 (Del. 1952). But see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976)(involving a corporate opportunity claim; the court refused to follow Gottlieb because, while a majority
of the shares voted approved the transaction, most of the shares that were voted were held by the
defendants. "Only about one-third of the 'disinterested' shareholders voted, and we cannot assume
that such non-voting shareholders either approved or disapproved."); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (involving a claim of corporate opportunity between a parent and subsidiary
corporation, where the court disregarded the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shareholders
due to the parent's control over the subsidiary's management and proxy machinery).
While Michelson clearly stands for the proposition that, in a typical breach of fiduciary duty
case, an informed shareholder vote will result in the burden of proof being placed on the complaining
stockholder, the factual context of Michelson distinguishes it from Weinberger. Michelson involved
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While Weinberger established that minority shareholder approval results in
the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving unfairness, it left open the questions
of what is sufficient to constitute minority shareholder approval and whether such
approval is an independent element of fair dealing aside from its effect on the
burden of proof.21 4 As to what constitutes minority shareholder approval, three
possibilities exist: the transaction might be conditioned upon approval by a majority
of the outstanding minority shares; the transaction might be conditioned upon
the approval of a majority of the minority shares voted, with or without specify-
ing a minimum number of minority shares required to be voted; or the transac-
tion might simply be subjected to a vote of all the shareholders without making
minority approval a condition for effectiveness, where, in fact, the approval of
a majority of the minority shares voted is received. The facts of the Weinberger
case place it in the second category, but the court there neglected to explain whether
the vote would have been effective to shift the burden of persuasion if it had
not been obtained pursuant to a condition of the effectiveness of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the Wisconsin rule governing going private trans-
actions requires both the approval by a majority of the outstanding minority shares
and that the vote be obtained pursuant to a condition of the effectiveness of the
transaction in order for the vote to support a presumption of the transaction's
substantive fairness.2 5 Similarly, Schedule 13E-3 requires disclosure of the existence
of a condition of approval by the minority shareholders as part of the discussion
of the fairness of the transaction.2 16' The Schedule is ambiguous as to whether
the requirement is for a majority of the outstanding minority shares or of the
minority shares voted, but the SEC has indicated that the Schedule refers to the
latter, less burdensome requirement. 21 7
Choosing among these three possibilities raises several questions. On the one
hand, the statute requires a simple majority vote to approve a transaction such
as that involved in Weinberger."1 8 To impose an obligation upon the majority
shareholder to relinquish its right to single-handedly approve the transaction runs
counter to the statutory rule of a majority vote. On the other hand, if the only
consequence of such a condition of minority shareholder approval is to shift the
burden of going forward, then the majority shareholder can still accomplish the
transaction without consulting the minority so long as it can prove that the deal
is fair if it is subsequently challenged. Moreover, if no condition of approval
is imposed on the effectiveness of the transaction, there is no incentive for the
minority shareholders to vote at all, since the deal will be accomplished with or
without their vote." 9 Therefore, the third alternative of no condition should not
be sufficient to relieve the majority shareholder of the burden of proving entire
fairness.
a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising out of an ordinary corporate transaction; Weinberger, in
contrast, involves a fundamental corporate transaction-a merger-for which many of the "rules,"
including the necessity for stockholder approval, are different.
214. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., Civil Action No. 5278 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1983); Prickett
& Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve a Level Playing Field for Cash-
Out Mergers, 8 Del. J. Corp. L. 59, 65 (1983).
215. Wisc. ADnm,. CODE § SEC 6.05(1)(a)(3) (1982).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 item 8(c). In the proposed version of Rule 13e-3, part of the
substantive fairness requirement was whether the transaction had been approved by a majority of
the minority shares. Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(2)(A), Securities Act Release No. 5884, supra note 16, at 857.
217. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17719, question 22, supra note 16, at 799.
218. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1983).
219. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Company, Civil Action No. 5278 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1983), slip
op. at 29.
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As between the first two alternatives, requiring approval by a majority of
the outstanding minority shares, as opposed to a majority of those shares voted,
might result in the imposition of unwarranted burdens of solicitation on the
majority shareholder. The majority shareholder may be hard pressed to convince
a sufficient number of minority shareholders to vote at all. When any proposal
is submitted to a vote of a public corporation's shareholders, there is a substan-
tial tendency towards apathy on the part of the public stockholders. The inability
to obtain the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding minority shares
might result simply from such apathy and the consequent failure of such owners
to vote at all, rather than from any negative view of the transaction held by the
minority. If that is true, then the view of the minority could be adequately
represented by the affirmative vote of a majority of some substantial number
of minority shares, though less than a majority of all shares outstanding."'
More difficult than the burden of proof issue is the question of whether
minority approval should be required as a necessary condition to fair dealing.
The Weinberger court was silent on this question, but its silence might be inter-
preted as an indication that fair dealing does not require an affirmative vote of
the minority. The statute which authorizes cash out mergers provides that the
transaction must be approved by a simple majority of the outstanding shares en-
titled to vote. If, to fulfill its duty of fair dealing, a majority shareholder must
submit the proposal to a vote of the minority shareholders and forego effectuating
the transaction absent an affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shares,
then fair dealing requires the majority shareholder to grant a veto power to the
minority. This is in direct conflict with the statutory provision for majority rule
and the consequences are infinitely more serious than shifting the burden of proof.
Had the Weinberger court intended to establish such a contradictory requirement,
it presumably would have made its position crystal clear. Instead, the court in-
dicated only that the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shares might
support a finding of fair dealing as well as substantive fairness. The court did
not take the next step to find that fair dealing always requires the approval of
the minority shareholders even when the other elements of fair dealing are present.
Where the minority shareholders are not represented by persons independent
of the majority shareholder at the board level, as was the case in Weinberger,
fair dealing should require that the transaction be approved by a fully-informed
majority of the minority shares."' Without such a requirement, the minority could
be denied any voice in the decision making process; there would be no one at
the board or shareholder level to consent to the transaction with the majority
shareholder. Consequently, it would be impossible to find that the majority had
not forced the deal upon the minority by exercising its controlling influence. At
the very least, then, fair dealing requires that where the minority shareholders
are not provided with adequate representatives at the board level, the minority
must be granted an effective veto power over the proposed transaction.
Even if the minority shareholders are represented by independent persons at
the board level, the question still remains whether fair dealing ought to require
220. In Weinberger, only 56% of the outstanding minority shares were voted. When added to
the shares controlled by Signal, over 75% of UOP's outstanding shares were voted in favor of the
merger. Moreover, the merger did receive the affirmative votes of a majority of the outstanding minority
shares. 457 A.2d at 708.
221. See infra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
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approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority shares. The statutory
sanction of majority rule is premised upon an alignment of the interests of the
holders of a majority of the shares with those of the holders of a minority of
the shares. The idea is "if it's good enough for the majority, it's good enough
for all." In a transaction between the majority shareholder and the corporation,
however, the interests of the majority may be significantly different from those
of the minority shareholders. Particularly in a cash out merger, where the majority
receives value in a different form than the compensation paid to the minority,
the majority's consent to the transaction does not bear upon its approval of the
deal as it affects the minority. In such a case, that which is good enough for
the majority is not even offered to the minority. 2 2
From a policy standpoint, however, it is better if the law encourages minori-
ty voting without requiring it. The Delaware statute is in direct conflict with any
requirement for approval in excess of a majority vote. Furthermore, giving the
minority a right to vote on the transaction may not, in fact, be a meaningful
addition to their representation at the board level by independent parties. It is
improbable that the minority would ever reject a transaction negotiated and ap-
proved on its behalf by independent representatives. Not only is it likely that such
a transaction would in fact satisfy the interests of the minority shareholders but,
in addition, the combination of shareholder apathy and the common failure of
shareholders to carefully consider the alternatives offered in voting rights makes
it unusual for shareholders to reject any proposal recommended by their represent-
atives. Therefore, no real additional benefit may result from a requirement of
minority approval. 223 Finally, even if fair dealing does not require approval by
the minority, it is likely that most parent-subsidiary transactions will be condi-
tioned upon such approval simply because of its effect on the burden of proof.
Therefore, fair dealing ought to require the affirmative vote of the minority only
when they are not represented by independent negotiators at the board level. In
other cases, it should not demand that the majority grant a veto power to the
minority in order to accomplish a statutorily recognized transaction.
Summary
While Weinberger went a long way towards defining fairness in dealing,
it did not address the question of whether the identified elements of fair dealing
are all equally important or whether some of the elements of fair dealing are
more significant than others. 22 4 The importance of this question is clear in light
of future attempts to comply with the duty of fair dealing. So long as the ques-
tion is unanswered, efforts to comply with the duty may be as unsuccessful as
any effort to hit a moving target.
222. Brudney, supra note 5, at 1091-102.
223. Weiss, supra note 2, at 676-77; Longstreth, supra note 3, at 21.
224. A similar question has been considered with respect to § 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982). Generally, six or seven factors are enumerated as being relevant to the
availability of a § 4(l) exemption (the number of purchasers and offerees, relationship of offerees
to each other and to the issuer, number of units offered, and the size and manner of the offering).
It is customary for courts to list all of the factors as relevant to a determination of the availability
of the exemption. It has been suggested, however, that at least three of the factors-relationship
of offerees to each other, number of units offered and size of the offering-are relatively unimpor-
tant. Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REv. SEC. REO. 869 (1981), reprinted
in JENNiNoS & MARsH, CAsES AND MATERIAis oN SEcuRiTs REGULATION 250, 251-52 (5th ed. 1982).
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The difficulty in determining whether certain elements of fair dealing are more
important than others stems from the fact that all of the elements are related.
For example, the best way to protect against the risks of the majority's exercise
of control associated with the elements of initiation and structure is to require
full disclosure and independent representatives for the minority. After full
disclosure, the representatives will be able to assess the necessity for the form
of the transaction and its impact on the minority shareholders, and then negotiate
for a different structure, if necessary. Similarly, the representatives will be able
to judge the effects of the timing of the proposal in light of all relevant informa-
tion regarding the companies and the market. The presence of independent
representatives also help to alleviate the concern that the majority shareholder
may exert undue time pressures on the subsidiary's decision making process. The
independent representatives can protect against such pressures simply because of
their independence from the majority. They owe allegiance and a duty of care
only to the subsidiary and its minority shareholders. For the same reasons, such
representatives are in the best position to ensure that any experts retained on behalf
of the subsidiary are free from the influence of the majority shareholder.
As a result of the interrelationship of all the elements fair dealing, it is im-
possible to formulate a precise mathematical formula of the weight assigned to
the various elements. It is possible, however, to identify some of the elements
of fair dealing as more important than others. This can be accomplished by con-
sidering the elements in light of the purpose of fair dealing. As discussed, fair
dealing is intended to neutralize the control of the majority shareholder by recogniz-
ing various parts of the process of accomplishing the transaction when that con-
trol might be exercised to the detriment of the minority shareholders. Generally,
it seeks to protect the minority defensively, by imposing certain obligations, most
notably disclosure, on the majority shareholder, as well as offensively, by pro-
viding the minority with the ability to protect itself through the presence of in-
dependent representatives or the right to veto the transaction. 225
These two elements of fair dealing-disclosure and independent, adequate
representation for the minority-are the most important factors for eliminating the
taint of the majority shareholder's control. By complying with these two elements,
the majority shareholder will be restrained from using its control to the detriment
of the minority because it will have to disclose the reasons for and effects of
its action. This disclosure will provide the minority and its representatives with
all the information necessary to assess the effect of the transaction on both par-
ties, and thereby enable the minority to insist upon equal and fair substantive
treatment. Moreover, the independent representatives of the minority will be able
to use the information disclosed in an affirmative manner. Full disclosure and
independent representation will create an adversary relationship between the
minority and the majority and arm the minority to use its position just as effec-
tively as if there was no connection between the parties.
Generally, full disclosure by the majority and independent representation for
the minority will lead to compliance with the other elements of fair dealing.
Because of the relationship among the elements of fair dealing, these two factors
usually will result in protection for the minority against the parent's exercise of
225. See supra note 50. For a discussion of the purpose of fair dealing, see supra notes 43-50
and accompanying text.
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control at the various stages of the bargaining process. Moreover, evidence of fair
dealing regarding these consequential elements should indicate compliance with
the disclosure and representation requirements.
The aim of the test, however enunciated, is to consider the circumstances
as a whole in order to discover whether the transaction was infected by the majority
shareholder's influence or whether the dealing between the parent and the sub-
sidiary were conducted as if they were entirely independent of one another. The
elements of the duty of fair dealing ought not be used to force a mechanical
review, but they may beneficially be employed to add certainty to the court's
inquiry and provide guidance to parties trying to comply with the duty of fair
dealing.
PART III
One of the fundamental issues raised by the Delaware Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Weinberger is the continued significance of the requirement of fairness
in dealing. That is, is fair dealing relevant only to a determination of fair value
(and, is it merely relevant or is it required for a finding of substantive fairness),
or must fair dealing be shown even if the price is found to be fair?
The Weinberger court did not go very far towards answering these questions.
In the last portion of its opinion, where it discussed what constituted fair value,
the court indicated that price might be the basic issue in assessing entire fairness.
It stated that an appraisal proceeding would be the sole remedy available to future
cashed out shareholders in most circumstances. 26 In providing for such a limited
remedy, the court expressed its intention to return to the law as it existed prior
to Singer v. Magnavox Co.,227 when appraisal was the exclusive financial remedy
available to a cashed out shareholder.2 This statement, alone, indicates that the
court did not consider fair dealing a separate compensable right owed to the
minority shareholders. The court went on to explain, however, that if the ap-
praisal remedy was inadequate, then the Chancellor still had the power to grant
"any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate" and it iden-
tified "cases where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of cor-
porate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved" as cases where
appraisal may be an inadequate remedy. 2 9 In many cases, if the majority
shareholder has breached its duty of fair dealing, therewill be fraud, self-dealing
and/or misrepresentation. In the hypothetical case where the absence of fair deal-
ing does not amount to fraud or misrepresentation, however, Weinberger does
not answer whether the minority has a right to anything more than fair price.
Furthermore, Weinberger's expression of confidence in the appraisal process
could be viewed as negating the significance of fair dealing as a method of
determining fair value. The court's emphasis and reliance on appraisal indicates
that fair dealing is not the only way to arrive at fair value. If appraisal is available
226. "[A] plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized
appraisal proceeding herein established .... " Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
227. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
228. "Thus, we return to the well established principles of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 78 (1962) and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., Del. Ch.,
281 A.2d 30 (1971), mandating a stockholder's recourse to the basic remedy of an appraisal."
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. See also supra note 34.
229. Id. at 714. Nor did the court indicate that this list was intended to be exclusive.
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as an ex post check on substantive fairness, perhaps fair dealing is an entirely
superfluous notion in the regulation of cash out mergers.
In order to assess the significance of fair dealing as a method for determin-
ing substantive fairness, the nature of substantive fairness must be considered.
In the context of a parent-subsidiary going private transaction, substantive fairness
means fair value. It is the value of an ongoing business to some, but not all,
of its owners. Any valuation of an ongoing enterprise involves some degree of
uncertainty. Even more uncertainty is characteristic of fair value in the context,
because value also may include certain benefits of the transaction to the parent.
Such benefits might take the form of operating efficiencies resulting from the
actual business combination or tax savings arising from the parent's 1000 owner-
ship of the subsidiary. As a result of the difficulty of assigning a dollar value
to such benefits and to other characteristics of an ongoing business, the amount
constituting fair value is not easily determined with any degree of precision. "30
Several alternative methods exist for establishing fair value prior to the
accomplishment of the transaction. One method is to subject the proposed trans-
action to an ex ante review by an objective third party.23 ' The third party, whether
a court or special administrative agency, would be required to assess the fairness
of the proposal and perhaps establish alternative terms if the proposal fell short
of fair value. Such a procedure obviously would entail costs on society to support
the reviewing mechanism. In addition, it might interject significant uncertainties
as to the timing of the transaction, which could negatively affect the proponent
of the deal. Finally, the parties to the transaction might not have much confidence
in the judgment of the court or agency as a result of two factors: the difficulty
of determining fair value with precision and the lack of participation in the valua-
tion process by the parties themselves.
Another alternative is to establish a minimum price, such as the most recent
public offering price, for fair value.2 32 This alternative, of course, has the advan-
tage of certainty. A minimum price, however, would not necessarily constitute
fair value. And, since this method might not take into consideration any change
in circumstances for the corporation, the result could be rather arbitrary.
Fair dealing is a third alternative method of selecting fair value. Instead of
relying on an outsider or some objective indicator to determine fair value, fair
dealing relies upon the parties to the transaction to make that determination. "33
It differs from the other two alternatives by its use of an adversary negotiating
process. It keeps the parties as the representatives of their own interests and pro-
vides them with the power and responsibility for defining fair value themselves,
as whatever term, within reason, to which they agree. Fair dealing rests on the
assumption that the result of an adversary process is likely to be at least as ac-
curate an assessment of fair value as a third party's judgment. And through par-
ticipation, direct or indirect, in the process by which fair value is established,
230. See Phaon, supra note 196, at 42 (suggesting that "'fair value' is an extremely elastic
number. It's generally higher when big investors feel they are being short-changed. And it's lower
when a group of odd lotters is up against a management that thinks it holds all the cards"); Brudney,
supra note 5, at 1085 n.30 & 1095 n.64. See also Weiss, supra note 47, at 49 (["T]he courts may
be better equipped to pass upon the correctness of the process by which a cash-out merger is arranged
than they are to decide if a price is fair." (footnote omitted)).
231. See Greene, supra note 2, at 510-11; Brudney, supra note 5, at 1098.
232. See, e.g., Wisc. ADMIN. CODE § SEC 6.05(I)(a)(2) (1980); IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (Supp.
1983).
233. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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the minority may perceive their interests as more satisfactorily represented than
if the entire determination was handed over to an objective party. Fair dealing
also avoids any direct cost on society, such as those that would be incurred under
the first alternative method, and instead imposes any burden on the parties to
the transaction. The costs of compliance with fair dealing ought to be accounted
for as any other cost of accomplishing the transaction.
Delaware has elected to rely on fair dealing as the method of determing fair
value at the pre-transaction state. Weinberger makes it clear, however, that after
the accomplishment of the transaction, appraisal is available for assessing fair
value. The court's emphasis on appraisal has led some commentators to conclude
that fair dealing is superfluous and appraisal is the only test for fair value.
231
The availability of appraisal should not be considered equivalent to a pre-
transaction process for arriving at fair value. Appraisal comes too late for both
the majority and the minority shareholders. Fair dealing offers the majority
shareholder some guidance in determining fair value. If the majority shareholder
satisfies the requirements of fair dealing, that will be strong evidence that the
price agreed upon is fair. If appraisal is the only relevant test of fair value, it
leaves the majority shareholder without a means of planning its conduct to comply
with the law before the deal is done. The majority can only guess at fair value,
and add a premium to the identified base price.13
Appraisal places the entire burden of testing the fairness of the financial terms
of the merger on the minority shareholders. The individual minority shareholders
must affirmatively perfect their rights to an appraisal and bear, at least initially,
the costs associated with proceeding. 236 Appraisal also imposes a cost of uncer-
tainty on the minority and, indirectly, on all investors. Since appraisal comes after
the accomplishment of the transaction, the minority will never be sure of whether
or not they have been mulcted until after the fact, and even after the fact, an
individual minority shareholder will discover the appraised value only if he takes
the initiative. For some shareholders, then, the uncertainty may continue. It may
also expand into uncertainty of fair treatment in the capital markets generally.
It is difficult for an investor to plan against being in the position of a minority
shareholder, because takeovers and going private transactions are increasingly com-
mon. As a result, it would be hard for the average investor to avoid the risk
of being a minority shareholder in a parent-subsidiary merger, and the conse-
quent risk of unfair substantive treatment. 2
37
Appraisal is different from fair dealing in substance, too. Appraisal approaches
fair value by delegating the division to an objective third party as judge, as did
the first alternative method for an ex ante determination.238 Fair dealing, however,
operates on the assumption that the parties to the transaction are in the best posi-
tion to decide what is fair. It is a less paternalistic method of assessing value
than is appraisal. Fair dealing encourages the parties to protect themselves so that
an outsider need not interfere, and places the burden of making enforceable
bargains on the parties interested in the deal rather than on the courts. It is,
234. Berger and Allingham, supra note 6, at 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2000-01 (Oct.
28, 1983) (report on 22d Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, comments of A. Gilchrist Sparks III).
But see Weiss, supra note 47, at 54-56.
235. As to the amount of the premium, see Phalon, supra note 196, at 42.
236. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 2620), which provides for an eventual award of attorney's
fees in appraisal proceedings.
237. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 1086.
238. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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therefore, a more efficient method of regulating substantive fairness than is
appraisal.
Finally, making appraisal the sole method of determining fair value con-
travenes the recent trend of the Delaware judiciary to provide more protection
for shareholders against potential abuse by management.239 Appraisal places the
entire burden of protecting the minority on the minority, indeed, on individual
minority shareholders. Such limited protection stands in stark contrast to
Delaware's recent willingness to protect and intervene on behalf of shareholders
generally.
Fair dealing, therefore, should have a significant place in the regulation of
parent-subsidiary transactions. First, fair dealing is an effective method of ascer-
taining fair price. Second, the alternative to fair dealing, appraisal, is inadequate
as the sole determinative of substantive fairness. Appraisal is available as a back-
up, for shareholders who are unhappy with the result of the negotiation and
deliberative process. Fair dealing, however, should be the initial and primary pro-
cedure for defining fair value.
Even though fair dealing defines substantive fairness, that does not mean
that fair dealing is a separate right to which minority shareholders are entitled.
While in most instances the absence of fair dealing will adversely affect the substan-
tive terms of the deal, such a relationship between procedure and substance may
not always exist. Appraisal might validate the price paid to the minority in a
transaction where the requirements of fair dealing were not satisfied. Weinberger
does not answer whether, in such a case, the minority shareholders have been
given all that they deserve-i.e., fair price-or have suffered an injury by the
lack of fair dealing.
One approach to this problem is suggested by analogy to the issue of causa-
tion as it arises under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Assuming that the parent-subsidiary transaction was required to have been ap-
proved by the subsidiary's minority shareholders and/or their representatives at
the board level,2"' it might be asked whether the decision-makers were affected
by the absence of fair dealing. In other words, was the approval of the transac-
tion the result of the absence of fair dealing, or would the transaction have been
approved even if the requirements of fair dealing had been satisfied? If the substan-
tive terms (i.e., price) of the transaction were fair, then it could be argued that
the transaction would have been approved regardless of the existence of fair deal-
ing. The interests of the minority shareholders would be served by any deal which
is substantively fair, so those interests would dictate approval. Therefore, the
absence of fair dealing could not have caused the approval of the transaction.
Since the transaction would have been approved anyway, the absence of fair dealing
did not cause any harm to the minority shareholders.
A substantially similar line of reasoning was adopted by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co.2" ' In Mills, the plaintiffs,
minority shareholders, alleged that they had been induced to approve a proposed
merger as a result of material misrepresentations in the proxy statement by which
their votes were solicited, in violation of Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act.242 The
239. For a discussion of this trend, see Fischel, supra note 2.
240. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
241. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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Court of Appeals affirmed a finding that the proxy statement contained a material
misrepresentation. 243 However, the court also held that if respondents were able
to show that the transaction would have been approved regardless of the proxy
misrepresentation then petitioners would not be entitled to any relief.
24 4
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and found
the causation requirement to have been satisfied. The Court disagreed with the
lower court's premise that "the shareholders of every corporation are willing to
accept any and every fair merger offer put before them. 2 45 It recognized that
certain unidentified factors other than the financial value of the offer might in-
fluence a shareholder's view of such a fundamental transaction.24 6 Consequently,
the Court disagreed with the proposition that the transaction unquestionably would
have received the requisite approval if the proxy statement had made full and
accurate disclosure. Instead, it found that the plaintiffs had made out a violation
of Rule 14a-9 based upon the misleading proxy statement.14  The substantive
fairness or the merger was not a defense to the flaw in the process of obtaining
approval of the transaction because the Court could not be sure that the transac-
tion would have been approved had the proxy statement been accurate.2 48
The Court's analysis in Mills provides a useful analogy to the issue of the
importance of fair dealing where substantive fairness exists. The premise of the
Supreme Court in Mills was that substantive fairness does not ensure approval
of a transaction. That premise is equally true where the proposed transaction is
a cash out merger. The premise is based, at least in part, upon the Court's un-
willingness to presume that shareholders or decision-makers are equally motivated
by the same factors. While substantive fairness may be sufficient for some, others
may be motivated by different considerations, such as the form of their invest-
ment or the purpose for the transaction. In Mills, the Supreme Court characterized
the assumption that any fair transaction would be approved by the shareholders
as "pure conjecture. 249
If substantive fairness does not guarantee approval, then the manner in which
a transaction is presented to the decision-makers may affect their vote. In Mills,
nondisclosure of the controlling relationship between the majority shareholder and
the directors of the subsidiary was enough to negate the effectiveness of the
shareholders' approval. Fair dealing includes not only the issue of adequate
disclosure, as involved in Mills, but also encompasses generally the way in which
a transaction is presented to the decision-makers. The absence of fair dealing could
induce the shareholders' and/or directors' affirmative vote. Moreover, fair deal-
ing could influence the terms that would be negotiated by the decision-makers,
242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983), issued pursuant to § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
243. Mills, 403 F.2d at 435.
244. Id. at 436.
245. 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970).
246. "[In view of the many other factors that might lead shareholders to prefer their current
position to that of owners of a larger combined enterprise, it is pure conjecture to assume that the
fairness of the proposal will always be determinative of their vote." Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
Mills involved a stock-for-stock parent-subsidiary merger.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 385.
249. See supra note 246.
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thus reaching beyond the issue of approval. Where fair dealing has not been pro-
vided, it would be difficult to show not only whether approval would have been
obtained but also what terms would have been negotiated had the requirements
of fair dealing been satisfied. Causation should be presumed under such cir-
cumstances. The absence of fair dealing should be viewed as having caused the
form and approval of the transaction.250
Accepting, then, that a causal relation exists between fair dealing and ap-
proval of the transaction, the assumption that approval is required by the minori-
ty or their representatives must be examined.2"' If no such approval is necessary
apart from the requirements of fair dealing, then the proposition that fair dealing
is important because it is an inducement for approval of the transaction must
be rejected. Such a proposition rests upon a circular argument that fair dealing
is important because of its affect on the approval process, and the approval pro-
cess is important because it is an element of fair dealing. If the transaction need
not be approved by anyone independent of the majority shareholder, then fair
dealing is superfluous to the accomplishment of the transaction.
The Delaware statute authorizing mergers such as that involved in Weinberger
requires the transaction to be approved by the boards of directors of each of
the merging corporations. 2- 2 In any parent-subsidiary merger accomplished pur-
suant to section 251 of the Delaware Corporation Law25 3 then, the merger must
be approved 'by the board of the subsidiary in order to be effective. In many
cases, however, the board of the subsidiary will not be independent of the parent
corporation; it is common for at least some members of the subsidiary's board
to serve, at the same time, on the board of, or otherwise owe loyalty to, the
parent.2 5 ' Nowhere does the Delaware statute explicitly require that the board of
the subsidiary be independent of the parent in order to approve a parent-subsidiary
merger. Without such a requirement for approval by independent representatives,
however, the statutory command of approval by the board of each merging cor-
poration is meaningless in this context. The parent will consent for itself and for
the subsidiary, and the interests of the subsidiary's minority shareholders will be
250. It might be argued that the directors or other board-level representatives should be re-
quired to testify as to their reliance on the absence of fair dealing. Unlike the situation in Mills,
where a shareholder vote was involved, the number of persons required to testify would not render
such a requirement impracticable in a case like Weinberger where the relevant decision was at the
board level. However, it would be just as difficult for the directors to testify as to what they would
have done differently if fair dealing had been provided as it is for anyone to show reliance on a
failure to disclose. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970). The requirement
of materiality in Mills can be paralleled by a requirement of a significant departure from fair dealing,
involving the element of disclosure or representation. Such a requirement should guarantee that only
material departures from the requirements of fair dealing will result in the presumption of causation.
251. See supra text accompanying note 240.
252. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(b) (1983) ("The board of directors of each corporation which
desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or
consolidation.").
A short-form merger, accomplished pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1983), need not
be approved by the board of the subsidiary corporation, and, therefore, presents an entirely different
case than that discussed. See Green v. Sante Fe Indus., No. 74 Civ. 3915 (Nov. 22, 1983. S.D.N.Y.)
(where the court construed the plaintiff's claim as challenging only the price paid in a short form
merger pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253, it limited the plaintiff to the remedy of appraisal,
in reliance on Weinberger), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). It is beyond the scope of this article
to analyze the necessity for fair dealing in the context of a short-form merger.
253. Id. § 251.
254. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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disregarded. Could Delaware intend to render the statutory mandate of approval
meaningless? Again, an analogy to the federal securities laws is helpful in resolv-
ing this issue.
In actions brought under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act,25
courts have recognized that the directors of a corporation are not always adequate
representatives of the corporation for disclosure purposes.2 56 In certain cir-
cumstances, disclosure of information to the board of directors will not be con-
sidered equivalent to disclosure to the corporation. 257 The corporation cannot ade-
quately be represented by its board for disclosure purposes whenever the direc-
tors, or some of them, have or represent interests conflicting with those of the
corporation.
This idea is based upon the law of agency. A principal (analogous to the
corporation) will not be charged with the knowledge of its agent (analogous to
the board of directors) whenever the agent acts or represents interests adverse
to those of the principal.2 5 Generally, knowledge is imputed from an agent to
the principal because the agent has a duty to disclose relevant information to
the principal. If it is obvious that the duty will not be fulfilled because of the
agent's dual loyalties, the principal will not be charged with the agent's knowledge.
If knowledge of the board would not be imputed to the corporation under agency
principles, then, for purposes of the federal securities laws, disclosure to the board
should not constitute disclosure to the corporation. It cannot reasonably be
presumed that the board will use such information to protect or benefit the cor-
poration. Therefore, disclosure to a different, adequate representative of the cor-
poration is necessary. In such circumstances, the shareholders generally are viewed
as the true representatives of the corporation.25 9 If the board is disqualified,
then disclosure must be made to the shareholders in order for such information
to be binding on the corporation.
This notion, that disclosure is effective only if made to a suitable represen-
tative of the corporation, suggests an answer to the question of whether consent
by a board of directors controlled by the other party to the transaction ought
to be considered effective for purposes of state law. If the directors would be
255. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
256. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
257. While it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the situations in which the board
will be an insufficient representative of the corporation for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, at
least the easy case may be laid out. In Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1069 (1978), all of the directors of the subsidiary were apparently under the control of
the parent. The parent's control of the subsidiary's directors was sufficient to render the board in-
capable of representing the corporation for purposes of receiving information on its behalf. In Jones
v. Nat'l Distillers, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,140 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
two directors of the subsidiary deceived the other directors and the minority shareholders; the court
held that was sufficient to allege deception of the stockholders. Weinberger is similar to Jones in
that at least two Signal-UOP directors were aware of all relevant information, but the non-Signal
UOP directors were uninformed. Moreover, in Weinberger a majority of the UOP board was under
the control of Signal. See also Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, 1983 (Del. Supr. Ct., March 1, 1984)
(Demand on directors excused where a majority of the board is interested in the transaction approved
by the board and being challenged. But the fact that a majority of the board was nominated and
elected by a majority shareholder does not disqualify such directors from passing upon a transaction
to which such majority shareholder is a party.).
258. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 279 (1957).
259. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-20 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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inadequate representatives of the corporation for disclosure purposes in a case
such as Weinberger, then the minority shareholders would be the appropriate
representatives of the corporation for such purposes. 2" Disclosure to such
shareholders would be required in order to bind the company. Similarly, if the
board is incapable of adequately representing the corporation because it is con-
trolled by the other party to the transaction, the consent of the board should not
be binding on the corporation. In that case, the corporation should be viewed as
equivalent to the minority shareholders, and the requisite consent should be that
of such shareholders or their representatives. Therefore, state law should be inter-
preted as requiring consent by a truly representative body, whether or not that
constitutes the board of directors. Effective, meaningful consent by the subsidiary
should be required. The parent's consent on behalf of the subsidiary, exercised
through the subsidiary board of directors, must be considered insufficient to bind
the subsidiary in a transaction with the parent.
The analogy to the federal securities laws thus supports the proposition that
fair dealing is important in addition to fair price. A parent-subsidiary merger such
as that involved in Weinberger must be approved by representatives of the sub-
sidiary who are independent of the parent, and the decision of those independent
representatives may be affected by the presence or absence of fair dealing. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the parent to satisfy the requirements of fair dealing
regardless of the ultimate determination as to the fairness of the price that was
actually paid to the minority. Otherwise, the absence of fair dealing will negate
the effectiveness of the statutorily required approval of the deal by the subsidiary.
This conclusion is supported by policy considerations, as well. The same fac-
tors rendering appraisal inadequate as the sole method of determining fair value-
the cost of uncertainty resulting from an ex post test, the lack of guidance pro-
vided to the majority shareholder, and the burden imposed on the minority
shareholders and the courts as a result of such a paternalistic approach26 '-also
support a general requirement of fair dealing in addition to fair value. If there
is no duty of fair dealing, few majority shareholders will comply with its re-
quirements. Instead, majority shareholders will be apt to estimate fair price, add
some premium to that figure, and push the deal through by virtue of their con-
trol. Such action may alienate minority shareholders and might conceivably result
in the majority shareholder paying substantially more than is required. A require-
ment of fair dealing would not only further the chances that fair value would,
in fact, be paid, but would also eliminate some of the guesswork attached to
the determination of that price. The goal of substantive fairness, therefore, justifies
the imposition of a requirement of fair dealing as a code of conduct designed
to produce the desired result.
Accepting that fair dealing is required in addition to fair price, the inquiry
turns to what the form of relief should be where fair dealing was not provided
but fair price was paid. If fair value has been paid, has the minority shareholder
suffered actual damages from the denial of fair dealing, or, is such a shareholder
entitled at best to only nominal damages?
Again, the resolution of similar problems in other areas of the law provides
useful analogies. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,2" the Supreme Court ad-
260. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
262. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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dressed the issue of damages after concluding that the misrepresentation in the
proxy statement had resulted in the approval of the transaction.2 63 The most ob-
vious form of relief appropriate in Mills would have been rescission, since the
merger was approved as a result of a violation of Rule 14a-9. There, however,
as in most similar cases, rescission is simply not feasible. The time between the
accomplishment of the transaction and the court's provision of a remedy would
make it nearly impossible to fairly unscramble the combined businesses. Moreover,
rescission will not always serve the best interests of the subsidiary corporation,
much less those of the combined enterprise.
2 64
Aside from equitable relief, monetary damages might be appropriate to redress
the absence of fair dealing. While payment of fair value shows that the shareholders
are not entitled to anything more for their stock, perhaps they are entitled to
monetary damages simply because of the absence of fair dealing. The Court in
Mills addressed an analogous issue when it considered whether monetary relief
would be appropriate where the misrepresentation did not relate to the substan--
tive terms of the transaction. The Court of Appeals had concluded that the merger
was fair to the plaintiffs, but the Supreme Court found that the proxy statement
violated Rule 14a-9. The Court declined to hold that the misrepresentation, alone,
gave rise to damages without proof of actual injury to the plaintiffs. It held that
damages should not be presumed under such circumstances, but should be awarded
"only to the extent that they can be shown. ' 265 On appeal after remand from
the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue
of damages in light of the pre-merger market price of the subsidiary's stock and
the plaintiff's share of the synergistic savings resulting from the merger.2 66 The
court found that the Auto-Lite shareholders did, in fact, receive their propor-
tionate share of the synergism produced by the merger. The consideration of the
synergistic effect of the merger is consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate
that damages must be shown, to be recoverable.
It could be argued that damages should be awarded based upon the presumed
effect on a shareholder of a denial of procedural fairness. Procedural unfairness
might result in a shareholder feeling, or at least suspecting, that he has been
mulcted. It could be argued that this feeling or uncertainty might give rise to
mental and emotional distress on the part of the shareholder. Such distress, could
be presumed whenever fair dealing has not been provided. Proof of actual damages,
then, might not be required under such circumstances.
A similar argument was addressed by the Supreme Court in connection with an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983267 for a violation of procedural due pro-
263. Id. at 386-97.
264. See id. at 386-88.
265. Id. at 389.
266. 552 F.2d 1239, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1977). The synergistic effect of a merger was first iden-
tified as an element for consideration in establishing a fair price for the shareholders by Brudney
and Chirelstein in Fair Shares, supra note 2.
267. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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cess. In Carey v. Piphus,2 "6 the plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process had
been violated, resulting in their temporary dismissal from school. The plaintiffs
failed to offer any proof as to the nature and extent of their damages. Instead,
they asked the Court to presume damages based upon the mental and emotional
distress resulting from the denial of their Constitutional rights.26 9 They did not,
however, prove actual mental and emotional distress. The Court rejected the no-
tion that the denial of due process automatically results in mental and emotional
distress. 7 ' Not every violation of procedural due process gives rise to a compen-
sable injury. The Court held that actual injury must be proven to support an
award of compensatory damages; damages will not be presumed on the basis of
an implied injury. 71
These cases suggest an answer to the question of what form of relief ought
to be available where fair price was paid but the requirements of fair dealing
were not satisfied. The natural form of relief under such circumstances, as in-
dicated in Mills, is rescission. Practically, however, rescission is rarely available
as a viable alternative to damages. The combination resulting from the challenged
transaction usually has been long established, so that it would not serve the in-
terests of the corporate parties nor those of the shareholders to attempt to undo
the deal.
If rescission is the natural remedy, but practically unavailable, then injunc-
tive relief might be the next best thing. If the shareholders can detect a violation
of the duty of fair dealing before the accomplishment of the transaction, injunc-
tive relief ought to be granted to prevent the tainted consent from being given.
At that point, the relationship between the parties can be adjusted to comply
with the primary requirements of disclosure and representation, so that a mean-
ingful decision can be made. While the court in Weinberger indicated its inten-
tion to return to the days before Singer, when injunctive relief was generally
unavailable, it left open the right to equitable relief where the circumstances so
demanded.272 Where a significant departure from the requirements of fair dealing
is detected, and such departure would negate the effectiveness of the subsidiary's
approval of the transaction, injunctive relief ought to be available.
If the transaction has been accomplished and rescission is impractical, Mills
and Carey suggest that compensatory damages should not be awarded solely as
a result of the denial of fair dealing. But if that means there is no remedy awarded
where fair dealing was not been provided, then the right to fair dealing has no
teeth. Not only would there be no incentive on the part of minority shareholders
to enforce their rights, but there also would be no reason for the majority
shareholder to comply with the requirements of fair dealing. The costs of com-
plying with the requirements of fair dealing would outweigh the costs of non-
compliance. As a result, if no remedy is provided, there will be, in effect, an
268. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
269. Id. at 261.
270. Id. at 263.
271. Id. at 264. This conclusion can be supported on the additional ground that the law
should not base recovery upon fictitious injuries. In many cases, the denial of procedural due process
will not actually cause emotional distress. In fact, the victim may be unaware of the violation of
his Constitutional rights. See generally NAHMOD, CIviL RIGHTS & CIvIi LIBERTIEs LITIGATION § 4.02
(1979).
272. 457 A.2d at 714.
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incentive for the majority shareholder not to deal fairly with the minority. That
is exactly what the law should avoid. Even if it is not ultimately required, at
the very least, fair dealing should be encouraged and rewarded, not penalized.
273
Furthermore, if fair dealing produces a fair price more often than the absence
of fair dealing, the failure to provide a remedy for the denial of fair dealing
may, over time, generally reduce the number of transactions in which the price
paid is fair. If the persons responsible for planning parent-subsidiary transactions
know that if they pay fair value, determined without regard to fair dealing, they
will not be liable for damages, then such persons will be less likely to comply
with the requirements of fair dealing. The cost of being wrong as to price would
be the same whether or not fair dealing was provided, but providing fair dealing
would not be free. Therefore, fewer transactions would be conducted in com-
pliance with the requirements of fair dealing, resulting in fewer transactions in
which fair value will be paid. The absence of any remedy for fair dealing, then,
will result generally in fewer transactions being accomplished where fair price is
paid.
To avoid these consequences, some remedy ought to be provided for the denial
of fair dealing, regardless of fair price. Several alternatives exist. Nominal damages
might be awarded, but they usually constitute such a modest amount that the
parties would react just as if no remedy was available. Perhaps a new measure
of nominal damages could be developed, to provide for an award that is "not
so low as to trivialize the right that was violated. ' 27 Alternatively, an attempt
could be made to value the deprivation of fair dealing. A shareholder's uncer-
tainty, where fair dealing was not provided, as to whether or not he was mulcted
might be valued as the amount that such a shareholder would charge for the
uncertainty-the risk of substantive unfairness.27 Another possibility would be
to devise a new exception to the general rule against awarding attorney's fees.276
If nominal damages and attorney's fees could be awarded to a shareholder who
successfully proved a violtion of the duty of fair dealing, at least the right to
fair dealing could be enforced without suffering a burden. Further, enforcement
would set an example for future transactions, and thereby encourage others to
comply with the requirements of fair dealing. Regardless of the remedy chosen,
neither punishment nor overcompensation are required. The remedy should simply
result in furthering compliance with fair dealing.
273. See 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2104, 2109 (1983) (reporting the comments of Leonard Chazen
at the 15th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation). But see Berger and Allingham, supra note
6, at 23-24.
274. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive
Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 980 (1983).
275. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
60 (1936).
276. The general American rule is that attorney's fees should not be awarded absent specific
statutory provision. One exception to this rule, available in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 392-97 (1970), is where the lawsuit will benefit all shareholders of a class. In such a case, a
court might award attorney's fees against the corporation in which such shareholders own stock. This
exception is commonly referred to as the "common fund" exception. But in a cash out situation,
the plaintiff-shareholders are not owners of the surviving corporation, so the common fund rationale
does not justify assessing fees against the surviving entity. As to the private attorney general exception
to the American rule, which has not been used in Delaware, see generally Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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CONCLUSION
In the future, the boundaries of the notion of fair dealing must be developed.
Weinberger established only the skeleton of the elements and the most exacting
interpretation of them, but future cases will require courts to decide the outer
limits of what is meant by fair dealing. In doing so, the Delaware courts must
take care to strike a balance between the interests of the majority and the minority
shareholders. The minority should be protected from the controlling influence of
the parent, and that protection can be provided by enforcing the duty of fair
dealing. The majority shareholder, however, must be provided with some way
of effectuating statutorily authorized corporate transactions. The law ought to
be clear and certain enough to permit corporations to plan such transactions to
comply with its requirements, and those requirements should not be so exacting
as to force the majority shareholder to sacrifice its own interests in order to be
sure that the deal complies with the law. The concept of fair dealing can be used
to strike such a balance if it is developed and applied in a thoughtful and con-
sistent manner.
